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English summary 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this Ph.D. thesis is to look at forest management from a range of ethical 
perspectives. This involves formulating, and analysing in detail, certain ethical 
assumptions. These assumptions underlie and inform some familiar approaches to 
management practice. As such they have a bearing on several forestry-related issues 
of current interest. 
 
Achieving and maintaining an economically, ecologically and socially sustainable 
approach to forest management while at the same time conserving biodiversity is a 
major challenge facing forestry today. This is true not only in Denmark and the rest of 
Europe but also worldwide. In Denmark, and in large parts of Europe, forest is 
managed according to a multiple-use paradigm. Multiple-use incorporates elements 
such as resource and nature conservation, and nature restoration. Paradigmatically, it 
produces forests in which timber, wildlife and recreation interests are managed for 
simultaneously, often in the same area/stand. It is, then, a way of addressing the 
concerns and needs of a number of different stakeholders − consumers, special interest 
groups and future generations. 
 
The thesis presents stakeholder-based analyses of forest management issues. But it 
also examines the value framework underlying rival approaches to management. In the 
context of forestry, it asks how value should be characterised, what possesses value, 
and how values are best promoted. Some of these issues become clearer in the light of 
ethical positions. Drawing on these positions, the author asks whether the aim should 
be to maximise value or to weigh up the consequences of a given activity or policy; 
whether we have a special obligation to maintain particular forest values and whether 
there are certain things we should abstain from doing in a forest management context. 
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More specifically, the thesis discusses ethical perspectives on six interconnected issues 
raised by multiple-use forest management. These issues are: 
 
(1) Value assumptions of the concept of sustainability; (2) the current ‘back to nature’ 
trend in silviculture and forest management; (3) the use of introduced species and 
genetically modified trees in forestry as examples of the manipulation of nature; (4) 
value assumptions attaching to the concept of biodiversity in relation to ecological 
restoration and multiple-use forest management; (5) a range of views on forest value 
emanating from an economic and, especially, ecological point of view, the latter being 
assessed using nature quality indices; and finally (6) the acceptability of forest 
management and silvicultural practices, as assessed in ethical accounting and the 
ethical matrix. 
 
The thesis aims to contribute to introducing a higher degree of ethical transparency in 
forest management. This is an important condition to attain higher levels of 
‘stakeholder acceptability’ vis-à-vis forest management decisions and, in general, to 
maintain or develop a better accord between management practices and stakeholder 
values. To reach this accord it will be necessary to promote greater awareness of the 
value conflicts concealed in concepts such as those of sustainability and biodiversity. 
It will also be necessary to clarify and critically evaluate the value assumptions that 
underlie forest management practices. In this way, fruitful dialogue with the rest of 
society, including politicians and the general public, can proceed. 
 
Keywords: acceptability, biodiversity, ecological restoration, environment, ethics, 
forest management, forestry, genetic modification, introduced species, nature, 
silviculture, stakeholder, sustainability, values 
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Dansk sammendrag 
 
 
 
 
 
Formålet med denne ph.d.-afhandling er at se på skovdrift fra forskellige etiske 
synsvinkler. Det sker i form af at sætte ord på samt analysere etiske antagelser bag 
specifikke eksempler på dyrknings- og driftspraksis og andre skovbrugsrelaterede 
emner. 
 
Opnåelse og fastholdelse af økonomisk, økologisk og social bæredygtig skovdrift samt 
bevarelse af den naturlige mangfoldighed i skovene er to af de vigtigste overordnede 
udfordringer for skovbruget og skovforvaltningen, ikke blot i Danmark, men også i 
Europa og resten af verden. I Danmark og i store dele af Europa forvaltes skovene 
flersidigt. Flersidig skovdrift og –forvaltning omfatter benyttelse og ressource- samt 
naturbevarelse såvel som naturgenopretning. Her forsøges det at tilgodese en række 
interesser (fx træproduktion, jagt, rekreation) på samme tid og ofte på samme areal. 
Flersidig skovdrift og forvaltning kan derfor ses som en måde, hvorpå man forsøger at 
betænke en række skovinteressenters eller -aktørers (såsom forbrugere, specielle 
interessegrupper og fremtidige generationer) bekymringer og behov. 
 
Udover at give interessent-baserede analyser af skovdriftsemner undersøger 
afhandlingen også den bagvedliggende værdiramme. I afhandlingen analyseres 
forskellige holdninger til, hvad der i en skovbrugssammenhæng kan anses for at være 
fundamentale værdier og på hvilke måder, disse værdier kan fremmes. Nogle af disse 
emner klargøres i lyset af etiske grundholdninger. For eksempel undersøges det, om 
det er et spørgsmål om at maksimere værdi, vægte konsekvenser, eller om vi har 
særlige forpligtelser til at bevare visse skovværdier, eller der direkte er ting, vi skal 
afholde os fra at gøre i en skovdriftssammenhæng. Mere specifikt diskuterer 
afhandlingen etiske perspektiver på seks indbyrdes forbundne emner, som flersidig 
skovdrift og –forvaltning rejser. Disse emner omfatter: 
 ix
 (1)  Værdiantagelser i forbindelse med bæredygtighedsbegrebet, (2) den nuværende 
’tilbage til naturen’ tendens inden for skovdyrkning og –drift, (3) brugen af indførte 
arter og genetisk modificerede træer i skovbruget som eksempler på manipulation af 
naturen, (4) værdiantagelser i forbindelse med biodiversitetsbegrebet i relation til 
naturgenopretning og flersidig skovforvaltning, (5) forskellige syn på, hvad en 
værdifuld skov er ud fra økonomiske og økologiske tilgange, bl.a. via begrebet 
naturkvalitet, og endelig (6) opgørelse af accept af driftsformer og dyrkningstiltag 
gennem brugen af etisk regnskab og etisk matrix i skovbruget. 
 
Afhandlingen peger på behovet for en højere grad af gennemskuelighed i skovdriften 
og –forvaltningen fra et etisk synspunkt. Dette er en vigtig forudsætning for at opnå 
en højere grad af accept af drifts- og forvaltningsbeslutninger samt for generelt at 
fastholde eller udvikle bedre overensstemmelse mellem praksis- og interessentværdier. 
I afhandlingen konkluderes det, at for at opnå denne, forbedrede overensstemmelse 
kræves for det første en større opmærksomhed omkring de værdikonflikter, der kan 
være skjult i brugen af begreber såsom bæredygtighed og biodiversitet. For det andet 
kræves der en forbedret afklaring og gennemgående kritisk diskussion af 
værdiantagelser i forbindelse med drifts- og forvaltningspraksis. På denne vis kan en 
frugtbar dialog mellem skovbruget og beslutningstagere samt befolkningen 
videreudvikles. 
 
Nøgleord: accept, biodiversitet, bæredygtighed, etik, miljø, genetisk modificering, 
indførte arter, interessenter, natur, naturgenopretning, skovbrug, skovdrift og  
–forvaltning, skovdyrkning, værdier 
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Synopsis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Overview 
The thesis comprises this synopsis and the six papers listed below.  
 
1. Dubgaard, A., Sandøe, P., Gamborg, C. and Larsen, A. 1999. Bæredygtighed – 
økonomi, etik og energi. (In Danish, English abstract) Nationaløkonomisk 
Tidsskrift 137: 256-283. 
 
2. Gamborg, C. and Larsen, J.B. ‘Back to nature’ – a sustainable future for forestry? 
Submitted to Forest Ecology and Management. 
 
3. Gamborg, C. and Sandøe, P. Designer trees, exotic species and the ethics of 
manipulating nature. Submitted to Environmental Values. 
 
4. Gamborg, C. and Sandøe, P. Beavers and biodiversity: the ethics of ecological 
restoration. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Biodiversity. Okksanen, M. (ed.). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
5. Gamborg, C. and Rune, F. Economic and ecological approaches to assessing 
forest value in managed forests – ethical perspectives. Submitted to Society and 
Natural Resources. 
 
6. Gamborg, C. The acceptability of forest management practices: an analysis of 
ethical accounting and the ethical matrix. Submitted to Forest Policy and 
Economics. 
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Appendix 1 contains a list of publications written during the Ph.D. project period 
1998–2001. A list of all references used in the synopsis and in the six papers appears 
in Appendix 2. 
 
This synopsis serves two objectives. First, it sets out the background to the themes 
developed in the thesis and explains why the work was undertaken. In the background 
and rationale section the discipline of applied ethics, its relationship to forest 
management, and the growing body of research within these fields, are described. 
Secondly, the connections between the six papers that make up the thesis are made 
explicit. Each paper, including its main conclusions, is summarised. 
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2. Background and rationale 
Trees and forests are but one aspect of nature.1 The forest forms, and always has 
formed, an integral part of the lives of those in the community that lives in and around 
it. It is a source of energy, building materials, fodder, fibre and even food.2 It is also 
used for shelter, for grazing and for litter racking, and it offers shelter from such 
calamities as sandstorms and avalanches (Rowe, 1947; Westoby, 1987). Again, the 
forest provides many amenities, is extremely versatile and is often used for many 
purposes, not least recreation. Because the forest fulfils many functions, it is ascribed 
a number of active and so-called passive use values: economic, ecological, social, 
symbolic, spiritual and scientific values. 
 
At the same time, the forest can be a useful aid to understanding the interaction 
between humans and nature from an ecological and economic point of view.  
 
Forests are, in the economy of man and nature, of direct and indirect utility, the 
former through their produce, and the latter through the influence which they 
                                          
1  Nature can be defined as: “all the animals, plants, rocks, etc. in the world and all the features, 
forces and processes that happen or exist independently of people, such as the weather, the sea, 
mountains, reproduction and growth” (Cambridge International Dictionary of English). Most 
definitions imply that nature is at the same time the material world and its phenomena or the 
forces and processes that produce and control all the phenomena of the material world. In a 
more colloquial sense, nature may be defined as the world of living things and the outdoors. 
Often, it is also defined in contrast with civilisation as a primitive state of existence, untouched 
and unaffected by artificiality. (This freedom from artificial influence is reflected in the use of 
the word ‘natural’ to describe the characteristics and qualities of a person.) Environment may be 
defined as the “complete range of external conditions, physical and biological, in which an 
organism lives” (Allaby, 1998: 143). 
2  A broad definition of forest is: “An ecosystem characterised by a more or less dense and 
extensive tree cover, often consisting of stands varying in characteristics such as species 
composition, structure, age class, and associated processes, and commonly including meadows, 
streams, fish and wildlife” (Helms, 1998: 70). The term ‘ecosystem’ was coined by the English 
ecologist A. G. Tansley (1935: 299), who defined it as including “not only the organism-
complex, but also the whole complex of physical factors forming what we call the environment 
of the biome”. An ecosystem can be described as a discrete unit of living and non-living parts 
interacting to form a stable system. The concept can be applied on a smaller or larger scale. 
Several definitions have been given since Tansley’s. See Odum (1975) and Walter (1984) for an 
account of the relation of the concept of an ecosystem to other vegetational concepts. For an 
analysis relating the concept of an ecosystem to the history of ecological ideas, see Worster 
(1994). 
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exercise upon climate, the regulation of moisture, the stability of the soil, and 
their sanitary, ethic and aesthetic effect upon man (Schlich, 1922: 5). 
 
A wide of range of issues relating to forests, forest management and forestry have 
arisen and received considerable attention around the world over the past twenty-five 
years.3 In Europe, the main issues have been the maintenance of profitability, concern 
about the so-called novel forest decline (dieback), forest fires in the Mediterranean 
area, and more recently afforestation and concern about losses of biodiversity and 
habitat. In North America, it is the continued economic use of forests, the clearing of 
old-growth forest, habitat loss and the spotted owl issue, together with general 
concern over protection of biodiversity, that provoke the greatest concern. By 
contrast, on the South American, Asian and African continents, the exploitation of 
rainforest and other forest types, deforestation, the depletion of forest-related 
biodiversity and the attainment of community forestry are the key issues (see e.g. 
Wolvekamp, 1999). The emergence of these issues suggests that today’s forestry 
needs to be more than profitable or economically feasible; more than environmentally 
reasonable, or ecologically tolerable; and indeed more than socially satisfactory: it 
needs to be ethically acceptable. According to Wagner et al. (1998: 40) the social or 
ethical acceptability of specific forestry practices rests on a number of factors. It 
                                          
3  A modern definition of forest management is: “the practical application of biological, physical, 
quantitative, managerial, economic, social and policy principles to the regeneration, 
management, utilisation, and conservation of forests to meet specified goals and objectives while 
maintaining the productivity of the forest. Forest management includes management for 
aesthetics, fish, recreation, urban values, water, wilderness, wildlife, wood products and other 
forest resource values” (Helms, 1998: 71). The last part of the definition actually alludes to 
management of a forest under a multiple-use management regime (see below, note 10). 
Forestry is the systematic use of a forest, and as such much more than exploitative tree logging. 
Nearly 200 years ago, the first Danish Professor of Economics, Christian Olufsen (1764–1827), 
described forestry succinctly as follows: “a tree is cut, another one is planted. In essence, the 
sum of forestry.” (Olufsen, 1811, my translation). This ‘definition’ reflects an historic context in 
which there was a lack of fuelwood and timber and where afforestation was one of the main 
objectives (as was the case at the time in many European countries with low forest cover and 
economic hardship). Many definitions have followed. A recent one is: “the profession embracing 
the science, art and practice of creating, managing, using, and conserving forests and associated 
resources for human benefit and in a sustainable manner to meet desired goals, needs, and 
values” (Helms, 1998: 72). 
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“results from a complex interaction of a person’s environmental values, agreement 
with goals, risk perceptions and trust in science and management”. 
 
Forests have been looked at in two distinct ways. According to one of these, the forest 
is essentially a resource that can be used by human beings. A concept often employed 
in this connection is that of ‘sustainability’. This stresses the possibility of harvesting a 
renewable, but limited resource on a continuous basis.4  However, forestry in 
Denmark (and other countries in Europe with low forest cover) does not contribute 
significantly to the gross domestic product. At most roughly a quarter of total annual 
wood consumption in Denmark is domestically produced, and less than 4,000 people 
work in the Danish forests.5 According to the second, and quite common way of 
looking at forests, the forest is more than simply a resource. It is both a significant 
part of the landscape and a habitat for plant and animal life. The concept of 
‘biodiversity’ is associated with this approach.6  
 
Together, the concepts of sustainability and biodiversity may be used to address 
questions about how we perceive forests and nature in general, and how we should use 
and manage forested land. When these issues are connected with general ethical 
claims − claims about what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ and conversely what is ‘bad’ or 
‘wrong’; about what could be done, and what is acceptable in a forestry context − 
ethical perspectives on forest management are formed. Related questions focus on the 
reasons for aiming at sustainable forest management, the type of sustainability alluded 
                                          
4  Sustainability can be broadly defined as a state or process that can be maintained indefinitely. As 
a concept, sustainability originates from a more than 250-year old principle of sustained yield 
(see von Carlowitz, 1713). 
5  Approximately 45,000 are employed in the wood industry, other wood related industries and the 
paper recycling industry. A typical forest property derives its revenue from wood production 
(40–75%), the production of Christmas trees and decorative greenery (25–50%) and user 
payments, especially hunting rights (0–25%): see Einfeldt and Fodgaard (1997). 
6  Biodiversity is defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) as “the variability 
among all living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity 
within species, between species and of ecosystems”. However, it has been subject to many 
definitions and interpretations: see e.g. Takacs (1996). 
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to and what, exactly, can be considered sustainable forestry.7 How to agree on 
definitions, and on the measures required to reach a particular version of 
sustainability, is an ethical issue. For it depends on what concerns are seen as ethically 
relevant in the first place, and how these concerns are balanced. Ethical questions 
about biodiversity include the following. Why do we want to conserve biodiversity? 
What kinds of biodiversity do we mean? When is biodiversity sufficiently protected? 
In clarifying the various reasons that have been offered in support of the claim that we 
should conserve the forests’ biodiversity, we will shed light on the concept of 
biodiversity itself. We will then have a better understanding of biodiversity as a 
management objective, and clearer picture of the different ways in which people 
perceive nature. The more specific ethical issues, addressed in this thesis, relate to 
current foci and trends within European forest management. 
 
2.1 Recent developments in forest management 
Two major goals of forest management at present seem to be the efficient production 
of wood and fibre products and the conservation of forest-related biodiversity. 
Worldwide, wood consumption has risen, and although wood production has also 
increased, concerns have been expressed about keeping up with demand. In Denmark, 
for example, less than a quarter of the total wood consumed is domestically 
produced.8 However, at the same time, prices have gone down, making it difficult to 
attain economic sustainability in forestry. Secondly, naturally occurring forest-related 
biodiversity has been eroded over the last century. A so-called biodiversity crisis has 
been proclaimed by ecologists like Norman Myers and E.O. Wilson, who have 
                                          
7  Sustainable forest management and sustainable forestry were defined, following United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, as the practice of meeting the forest 
resource needs and values of the present without compromising the similar capability of future 
generations. This definition was expanded after the Montreal Process of 1993, where criteria of 
sustainable forest management were identified. Likewise, in a European context, the Helsinki 
conference in 1993 defined sustainable forest management as: “the stewardship and use of 
forests and forest lands in a way, and at a rate, that maintains their biodiversity, productivity and 
regeneration capacity, vitality, and potential to fulfil, now and in the future, relevant ecological, 
economic, and social functions at local, national and global levels, and that does not cause 
damage to other ecosystems” (Ministerial Conference, 1993). 
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predicted that between one-third and two-thirds of all species will be lost around the 
world in the next century if present land use and resource extraction trends continue.  
 
In many European countries with little forest cover afforestation has increased. 
Overall stand-productivity has also risen considerably throughout the twentieth 
century. Over the last century, new demographic structures have developed: both the 
rural population in general and farmers in particular occupy a smaller proportion of 
the population as a whole. In many European countries, the standard of living and the 
general level of welfare have increased over the past hundred years. Nature is no 
longer viewed merely as a renewable resource, if indeed it ever was. It is viewed as 
among other things a source of recreational activities. However, at the same time 
difficulties reconciling the different views that have been taken about how to utilise the 
forest have become evident. There is now a need for something more than discussions 
about use or no use. In many European countries, the real discussion concerns 
intensity of usage and the degree of manipulation that proposed uses involve, for there 
is practically no wilderness left in Europe. 
 
When forest management objectives change, they do so in part in response to 
demographic developments and changes in the level and distribution of welfare. As 
time has gone by, the range of people and organisations that can be regarded as 
stakeholders in the forest has changed, and the number of parties affected by forestry 
has increased. In a European context, this means that less emphasis has been placed 
on timber production and more on other products, services and functions of the 
forest:9 “Forestry is changing; it is becoming a wider philosophical, scientific, 
                                                                                                                         
8  This is part of a larger discussion about wood substitution. Some of the identifiable trends are 
towards less virgin wood for paper, more recycled wood, wood fibre efficiency, and sustainable 
substitutions where possible. 
9  For example, nature restoration 100 years ago was in many cases about reclaiming land (e.g. 
where it had been taken over by drifting sand dunes). Regarding themselves as nature 
restorationists, forest workers tried to transform sandhills into lush woodlands for the benefit of 
man, as well as the animals and plants that depend on a forest climate. Today, three generations 
later, forest workers are given courses in ‘desert management’ where the aim is to restore the 
sand dunes − that is, to get rid of the trees planted or seeded under great duress at the end of the 
nineteenth century! The trees, formerly considered useful and selected for their ability to spread 
under harsh conditions are now seen as invasive, introduced species. This is not necessarily 
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technical and social concept than it was twenty years ago” (Boyd, 1987: 132). 
However, so far European forest management is not experiencing as great an upheaval 
as has occurred in North America, where there are emerging paradigms of adaptive 
management, ecosystem management and so on (Kohm and Franklin, 1997). In 
Europe, the current focus is more practical: the issue is how to adapt present 
silvicultural practices so that the requirements of sustainable forestry and biodiversity 
conservation can be met. Present efforts tend to involve trials of new approaches − 
approaches such as so-called ‘nature-based silviculture’.  
 
These changes raise the question of how the forestry sector should be encouraged to 
evolve over the coming years. In the 1980s, and indeed before that, in many 
‘afforestation countries’ of Europe − the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands, for 
example − with tracts of reasonably young, evenly aged, mostly coniferous 
plantations, changes in forestry mainly reflected the desire to satisfy both nature 
conservation and development objectives. Essentially, three archetypes of forest 
management may be distinguished. These are shown in Table 1.  
 
                                                                                                                         
something to bemoan. It illustrates rather well the fact that within a single forest rotation, the 
prevailing values of society can change. 
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Table 1. Three ‘archetypes’ of forest management and their objectives and concerns 
 
‘Archetype’ 
 
 
Management objectives  
 
 
Basis of objectives 
 
 
Dominant concerns 
 
Production forest 
 
To yield an 
economically feasible or 
optimal  
quantity of timber and 
non-timber forest  
products 
 
(Economic)  
rationality and 
utility 
 
Healthy, resistant 
stands of trees 
High volume  
production 
High wood quality 
 
Park forest 
 
To provide recreational  
opportunities 
 
Aesthetic, 
romantic and 
amenity values 
 
Adequate  
opportunities 
connected with 
aesthetic ideals and 
demand 
 
(Semi-)natural 
forest 
 
To maintain structures 
and processes 
characteristic of the 
forest in a particular 
region 
 
 
Ecological  
considerations 
 
Deadwood 
Key habitats 
Biodiversity 
 
Where most present-day forest management is concerned, the question is not one of 
attending either to nature conservation or production, but rather one of choosing the 
appropriate level of intensity − in, say, silvicultural practices and forest operations − 
to meet a combination of the management objectives listed in Table 1 
simultaneously.10 This integrated approach was espoused in the strategy of the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN, 1980). This strategy tried to promote a resource use 
                                          
10  In North America, more attention to nature conservation interests had been paid through the 
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960. This act identifed timber, watershed, wildlife and 
fish and outdoor recreation as possible multiple uses. The Federal Land Policy Management Act 
of 1976 which followed this act stipulated that a combined and diverse resource use should be 
made, trying to take into account the future needs (Helms, 1998). It could be a combination of 
resource uses that would not necessarily yield the greatest unit return or economic output. 
However, the act did not require the multiple uses to be integrated at one site; they could be 
segregated from each other. This was possible because vast tracts of land are available in North 
America. In Europe, on the other hand, land for forestry was scarcer. The integration of 
objectives had to take place in most cases at the stand or forest level and less often at the 
landscape level. 
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philosophy, captured in the phrase “conservation for sustained development”, that 
balances wood production and nature conservation instead of polarising them. 
Development, often conceived of in economic terms, was seen as constrained by 
nature conservation concerns. Focusing on the survival of native species in their 
natural habitats, nature conservation was a new culture of the twentieth century 
(Sheail, 1998). This was not easy, because the “new conservation movement had to 
find its own way among the existing, powerful vested interests, making a plea for a 
recognition which was sparingly and often reluctantly given” (Boyd, 1987: 115). 
Today, after the World Commission on Environment and Development, the so-called 
‘Brundtland’ commission has taken up the concepts of sustainability and sustainable 
development, refined them and effectively communicated these concepts to a broader 
audience. And following the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development − the ‘Earth Summit’ of 1992 − nature conservation has not been 
perceived to the same extent as a constraint for forestry.11 This contrasts strikingly 
with the traditional distinction between foresters as resource conservationists, on the 
one hand, and environmentalists as nature conservationists, on the other, illustrated in 
Table 2. 
 
 
                                          
11  Sustainable development has been defined by the ‘Brundtland’ Commission as: “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 8). Future generations are taken to be generations of 
people not yet born. Generally, this definition of sustainable development is considered a little 
vague, and the exact meaning of the expression ‘sustainable development’ is subject to much 
dispute (Palmer, 1997). The concept’s ethical thrust is toward social justice and toward future 
generations. These concepts have been discussed extensively (e.g. McNeill, 2000; Lee, 2000; 
Sikora and Barry, 1978). 
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Table 2. Characteristics traditionally ascribed to foresters and environmentalists 
 
Foresters  
(as resource conservationists) 
 
 
Environmentalists  
(as nature conservationists) 
 
 
Imperialists 
Materialists 
Reductionistic 
Control, order 
 
Standard attitude: A forest is a natural 
resource and should accordingly be 
under some form of resource 
management  
 
Arcadians 
Idealists 
Holistic 
Freedom 
 
Standard attitude: a forest is a particular 
kind of nature and should be left unmanaged 
(but in some cases, management for nature 
conservation is acceptable)  
 
Source: based on Peterken (1996). 
 
 
However, in most cases this distinction is now archaic. It has been succeeded by a 
convergence of objectives. This convergence is usually described under the heading 
‘sustainability’. Interestingly, the general idea of sustainability in the forestry context 
(in German: Nachhaltigkeit) can be traced back to a Saxon forest regulation of 1560 
(Kurth, 1994). The term ‘sustained yield’ was used in connection with the 
procurement of firewood by a Saxon mining manager called H.C. von Carlowitz at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. He described silvicultural methods designed 
to increase forest productivity. The criteria for sustained yield were biologically 
determined. They concentrated on specific tree species; on the composition, volume 
and quality of production; and on felling at a rate lower than the annual growth 
increase.  
 
During the last 250 years, the interpretation of sustainability has evolved. In the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the main focus was on sustaining the economic value 
of the forest, or the economic output of the forest in the long run, instead of on the 
maintenance of a certain level of wood production (Zürcher, 1965). In the middle of 
the twentieth century, economists attempted to operationalise the concept of 
sustainability more precisely and formulated minimum standards of conservation 
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(Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952). The principal idea was to prevent economically irreversible 
deterioration of soil, water, flora and fauna, i.e. to avoid deterioration that would be 
too expensive to reverse.  
 
The concept of sustained yield has expanded to include non-wood products as well, 
reflecting the multiple-use management paradigm. Thus, sustainability has evolved 
from a concept concentrating on the level of wood production, or yield, to the present, 
more comprehensive concept integrating ecological, economic and social aspects of 
forestry. However, the role of the concept of sustainability in a forest is disputed. 
Four interpretations can be distinguished. These are briefly presented below.  
 
(1) Sustainability is inherent in, and fundamental to, the general concept of forestry 
(Müller, 1969). In contrast with the ad hoc and unregulated exploitation known as 
timber mining that preceded it, modern forestry as it has operated over the last 250 
years has been by definition planned and regulated. This more recent use of the forest 
by man accordingly embodies the concept of sustained yield or sustainability. Hence 
talk about sustainability in connection with modern forestry is in principle redundant.12
 
(2) Sustainability is just one example of a forest management principle. Sustainability 
in forestry is one of many reasonable planning and management objectives. 
Essentially, sustainability can be conceived of as a restriction on the utilisation of a 
forest which it seems sensible to apply in view of the inherently long-term nature of 
forestry. 
 
(3) Sustainability is a folly. In forestry, it is unrealistic, and it is rooted in a mistaken 
ideal. Attempts to invoke the idea of harmonious nature and infinite surplus have 
proved misconceived through the course of the last 250 years (see Schanz, 1996: 
                                          
12  The redundancy arises if sustainability is inherent in the concept of forestry and forestry is 
defined as: ‘forestry is the sustainable utilisation of a forest’. For from this it would follow that 
sustainable forestry is the ‘sustainable sustainable’ utilisation of a forest. 
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67).13 The many interests relating to forestry, and the multiple objectives, cannot be 
properly handled under a single heading of sustainability. 
 
(4) Sustainability is a moral foundation underlying forestry. It can be seen as 
something backed by a categorical imperative, or maxim, that applies to any forestry 
activity.14 Viewed as such, sustainability is a philosophy of intergenerational 
production, or just utilisation, that relates to the regenerative capacity of natural 
ecosystems. It prescribes certain deep principles that should govern forest planning 
and management. These take into consideration the needs of future generations for 
forest utilities. The sustainable use of a forest is, then, a moral imperative. 
 
Some observations about these interpretations of sustainability can now be made. The 
first interpretation is that sustainability epitomises forestry − that forestry is a form of 
human prospering through the maintenance of a renewable resource in perpetuity. 
However, many activities falling into the category of forestry have in fact been 
exploitative, and this suggests that there is a need to emphasise a long-term 
perspective on resource conservation by attaching the label ‘sustainable’. In the second 
interpretation, it is pointed out that, in the forestry context, sustainability is simply 
one example of the many restrictions placed on forest management by social, 
economic and ecological factors, and hence does not call for special attention. 
However, because the concept is used to provide a comprehensive framework within 
which forestry can operate, it may be argued that it requires particular special 
attention. According to the third interpretation, it seems that some flatly reject the idea 
of an integrated concept of sustainability because in forestry it represents a misleading 
ideal. However, what can be rejected is any use of the concept of sustainability that 
does not recognise the balancing values imported by the concept. Finally, in the fourth 
interpretation, some see sustainability as a moral imperative implying certain 
                                          
13  The idea of a harmonious nature is but one conception. Others conceptions include those in 
which nature is seen as capricious, tolerant, benign or ephemeral (Thompson et al., 1990 cited 
in Schanz, 1996:67). 
14  This interpretation very loosely echoes the term ‘categorical imperative’ coined by the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as a guiding principle of actions. The dictates of the 
categorical imperative can go against one’s immediate wishes and predispositions. 
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management principles. Here, it is worth pointing out that rules which prescribe 
actions are not necessarily ‘moral imperatives’, but may be framed in another ethical 
framework. 
 
Clearly, these attitudes to sustainability indicate that the concept of sustainability in 
forestry needs to be examined more closely. At present, there seems to be two main 
ways in which forestry, especially in Central and Northern Europe, can develop. The 
first is down a technical-biotechnological path. The other is down a biological, or 
ecological, nature-based path.  
 
Most of the papers in the thesis deal with ethical issues arising from the future 
development of temperate forest management. One such issue is: why is there a 
reluctance to use genetically modified trees in forestry when at the same time 
traditionally bred material is used and species from other continents have been widely 
introduced? The kind of objections and concerns raised here depend on empirical, 
scientific and economic results and reasoning, as well as on other ethical assumptions 
(see the paper ‘Designer trees, exotic species and the ethics of manipulating nature’.) 
The attractions of the so-called ‘back to nature’ trend in forestry may seem self-
evident when we consider the recent growth in concern about nature conservation, but 
why are the stands of tree resulting from plantation silviculture and forest management 
in many European countries not seen as ‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ nature?15 How, in any 
case, should ‘nature’ be defined? What level of intervention is consistent with it? (See 
the paper ‘“Back to nature” – a sustainable future for forestry?’) 
 
The restoration of a particular landscape element, such as a river or a forest, and the 
restoration of a species array by reintroducing certain faunal and floral species, raise 
the issue of the ethical acceptability of such practices. Differences of opinion over 
acceptability are influenced by factual disagreements, to be sure. But they also seem to 
arise from divergent value assumptions, differing conceptions of biodiversity and 
                                          
15  Silviculture can be defined as “the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, 
composition, health, and quality of forests and woodlands to meet the diverse needs and values 
of landowners and society on a sustainable basis” (Helms, 1998: 167). 
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nature, and diversity among ethical outlooks (see the paper ‘Beavers and biodiversity: 
the ethics of ecological restoration’). The concept of value is notoriously hard to 
deploy with exactitude, and it remains a potentially ambiguous tool in discussions 
about forest use and management. This leads to the question why some forests are 
highly valued whereas others are not. In connection with this, it might be asked why a 
more ‘original’ or ‘wild’ environment, with a higher degree of ‘authenticity’, is often 
highly valued. In most parts of Europe, and especially Denmark, ‘wild’ nature cannot 
be found. At most, urban and rural landscapes can be distinguished. The reasons that 
have been offered for attaching value to what is wild and original raise a number of 
ethical issues (see the paper ‘Economic and ecological approaches to assessing forest 
value in managed forests – ethical perspectives’). 
 
Forest management, and especially multiple-use forest management, aims to 
accommodate the concerns and needs of several interest groups at the same time. This 
raises the question: what kinds of stakeholder should be included here? Consumers 
and special interest groups, certainly, but should any other parties be taken into 
account? It also forces us to consider how the different considerations stakeholders 
bring in, some of which are potentially conflicting, should be balanced (see the paper 
‘The acceptability of forest management practices: an analysis of ethical accounting 
and the ethical matrix’).  
 
In general, these questions point to the need to engage in ethical deliberation. Hence it 
becomes necessary both to clarify the notion of the ethical and to ask what kinds of 
ethics are relevant in a forest management context. 
 
2.2 The relevance of moral and ethical concerns to forest management 
The words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’, and the related terms ‘ethical’ and ‘ethics’, are 
often used interchangeably, but they are in an ethical/philosophical context often 
assigned specific meanings.16 ‘Morality’ relates to a personal or social set of standards 
for good or bad behaviour or character. These standards might be based on, for 
example, fairness and honesty. They are something each individual believes in and, 
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perhaps, acts in accordance with. Similarly, ‘ethics’ is likely to refer to the “general 
beliefs, attitudes or standards that guide customary behaviour” (des Jardins, 1997: 
16). However, in philosophical discussion the term ‘ethics’ can also be used to denote 
the systematic study of what is morally right and what is not. Here ethics does not 
involve straightforward acceptance of the idea that customary behaviour is right: 
instead it requires us to examine critically our customary behaviour and especially the 
norms or standards via which we guide our behaviour. For example, how can moral 
norms be justified? How do we explain and defend our presently held values? 
Controversies relating to the natural environment can often be traced back to 
differences in the disputants’ basic beliefs, general attitudes or values. Ethical 
concerns are influenced by beliefs about the basic conditions of nature, the importance 
of nature to human life and the role of human beings in manipulating the environment. 
One’s acceptance of a set of goals and approaches in forest management is connected 
with the environmental values one adopts (Wagner et al., 1998). Moreover, these 
values and ethical beliefs underlie the complex trade-offs between conservation and 
the consumption of renewable resources. 
 
In general several steps are involved in the ethical examination of an activity or policy 
− in an exercise, that is, of applied ethics. The first step is to identify the ethical issue, 
or issues, at stake. This involves the identification of (explicitly or implicitly made) 
ethical judgements such as: ‘natural biodiversity ought to be preserved’. The 
identification of these normative judgements is important, since many disagreements 
persist because the underlying ethical judgements are insufficiently recognised.17 A 
further step in the analysis is to assess these judgements, and in particular to examine 
the reasons offered in their support. This involves the clarification of differences in 
the definition or interpretation of key concepts. It also requires us to identify 
underlying value assumptions and general ethical principles and theories. 
 
The examination of ethical aspects of general questions about the environment and 
more specific questions about forest management is important, therefore, for three 
                                                                                                                         
16  Please note that in some works, the definitions of ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are interchanged. 
17  A normative judgement is often, but not always, indicated by the words ‘ought’ or ‘should’. 
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reasons. First, ethical analysis can assist by identifying ethical issues and by offering 
reasons for patterns of behaviour. Secondly, ethical analysis can help to clarify basic 
concepts and to make explicit common beliefs. In this way it can direct our attention 
to possible conflicts among underlying value assumptions. Thirdly, ethical analysis 
can help us to assess specific cases and controversies, and if necessary it can suggest 
ways in which attitudes, beliefs and behaviour need to change. 
 
2.3 Recent developments in applied ethics 
Ethical analysis of the kind just described is, as was mentioned in passing, an example 
of applied ethics. It is worth pausing here to explain the relationships between the 
various types of ethical reflection. Ethics as a general category can be divided into 
descriptive ethics and moral philosophy, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Ethics
Normative ethicsMeta-ethics
Moral philosophy Descriptive ethics
. . .
. . .
Legal
ethics
Business
ethics
Medical
ethics
Environmental
ethics
Non-human
bioethics
. . .
Ethical theory Applied ethics
. . .
 
Figure 1. The division of ethics into descriptive ethics and moral philosophy, and sub-
divisions. Note that not all sub-divisions are shown here, as is indicated by the ellipsis 
(. . .). 
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Moral philosophy is normally divided into normative ethics and meta-ethics. The latter 
is concerned with the nature of morality and moral epistemology. Normative ethics 
examines questions of, for example, duty and value, and can be further divided into 
ethical theory and applied ethics.18 Applied ethics is “concerned with furthering our 
understanding, and thus the resolution, of practical issues of right and wrong” (Dare, 
1998: 183). However, the resolution of these issues requires attention to some of the 
perennial questions of ethics and philosophy in general − for example, what is the 
good life, and what is a good society? (Almond, 2000). To answer these questions, 
ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, liberal rights theory and virtue ethics can be 
consulted. 
 
Thirty years ago, applied ethics was not considered a proper field in its own right. 
Philosophers were preoccupied with the refinement of ethical theories and with meta-
ethical problems such as defining moral terms properly (Dare, 1998). However, in the 
intervening period, specific practical issues have been addressed. These include 
euthanasia, birth control, animal rights, and questions about the social implications of 
technological change and scientific advances. They also include issues arising from 
race and gender, personal relationships and man’s relationship with nature and the 
environment. Moreover, the development of professional codes of responsibility, and 
reflection on their proper role, is also a matter of applied ethics. As a result, several 
sub-fields have been established, including medical ethics, bioethics and 
environmental ethics (see Figure 1). Environmental ethics is, of course, concerned 
with our relation to the natural environment.  
 
In general, environmental ethics may be viewed as a systematic account of the moral 
relationship between human beings and the natural environment (des Jardin, 1997). 
An assumption underlying it is that human behaviour is governed by moral norms. 
Environmental ethical theories make different suggestions as to what these norms are. 
Much work has been done on building a theory of environmental ethics that would 
                                          
18  An ethical theory can be understood as an “attempt to provide systematic answers to the 
philosophical questions raised by descriptive and normative approaches to ethics” (des Jardins, 
1997: 17). 
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show to whom, or what, humans have responsibilities, and to try to explain the kinds 
of responsibilities involved and the justification of these. An environmental ethical 
theory might be expected to tell us which kinds of beings have moral standing − that 
is, to whom it is appropriate to direct moral consideration (see Goodpaster, 1978; 
Elliot, 1995). Very roughly, three types of theory can be distinguished. The question 
is whether we have responsibilities regarding the natural environment, or 
responsibilities to the natural world. That is, what can be considered morally 
significant in its own right?  
 
(1) An anthropocentric, or human-centred, environmental ethic holds that 
environmental responsibility derives entirely from human interests. According to this 
view, only human beings are moral agents, or have moral value or moral standing. 
Any responsibility regarding the natural environment is indirect. Ultimately, it is a 
responsibility to other humans. Our duty to, say, protect a forest depends on the 
extent to which this type of natural environment is considered conducive to human 
survival or well-being. This view can be extended so that future human generations 
are also objects of moral responsibility. Much of the concern about future generations 
visible in some views on sustainable development can be explained in anthropocentric 
terms. 
 
(2) A second view expands the circle of morally significant agents to include higher 
animals, such as the squirrel, the beaver and the cat. This expansion is based on an 
appeal to criteria of sentience. According to this view, our responsibilities to the 
natural environment depend on the impact of our actions on sentient creatures, and in 
particular on animal welfare. This view has been influential mainly in the 
improvement of the conditions in which livestock are kept. It has had less influence on 
general resource-management and forestry. 
 
(3) Theories in the third group, which are considered by some to be the only true 
exemplars of the environmental ethic, are biocentric or ecocentric. According to the 
biocentric, or life-centred, view we have direct responsibilities to the natural 
environment. All varieties of animal and plant deserve direct moral consideration. 
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Differences of opinion exist about how to express this responsibility. One view is that, 
independently of their psychological capacities, animals and plants have moral 
standing and intrinsic value. On this view our duties to animals and plants are direct 
(Attfield, 1981).19 The ecocentric approach, by contrast, shifts the focus from living 
individuals to more abstract entities such as species, populations or entire ecosystems. 
It involves the claim that we have moral responsibilities either to collections of 
individuals or relationships of individuals. This view has been dominant in ethical 
work on natural resource management, agriculture, forestry and nature conservation. 
 
Theories of the kind just classified focus on the moral foundations of environmental 
responsibility and the extent of this responsibility. In the past thirty years these 
theories have been subject to intense debate. Their content, and the soundness of the 
concepts they involve, has been rigorously examined. This has resulted in the theories 
being defended, and subsequently refined, in a variety of ways. However, it is one 
thing is to determine what has moral standing and quite another to decide what weight 
differing concerns should be assigned, and thus how these concerns should be 
balanced. (Note that the latter task is bound to be important in the context of multiple-
use forestry.) Here, both environmental ethics and bioethics can make a useful 
contribution. 
 
2.4 The relationship between bioethics and environmental ethics 
Bioethics has often been identified with medical ethics (sometimes as referred to as 
‘biomedical ethics’). Discussions have focused on the use of human subjects in 
biomedical research, partly prompted by the events during World War II. Later on, 
the use of animals for experimentation was questioned from within bioethics. The 
                                          
19  For example, in relation to the felling of a tree, the claim is that because they possess intrinsic 
value, trees are worthy of respect, and that therefore it is prima facie wrong to cut them down or 
in any other way destroy their living potential. Another way to argue this is to say that we 
should not consider the moral significance of felling the tree merely by looking at affects on 
other humans and animals. “The thought is that the tree itself has claim to moral consideration 
and that the death of the tree is a feature of the act relevant to its [the act] moral evaluation” 
(Attfield, 1981: 10). To cut a tree, kill it, or limit its growth is to impede its “flourishing”, i.e. 
to frustrate its “biologically determined goals” (Attfield, 1981: 10). Here, further clarification of 
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term ‘bioethics’ is thought to have been used for the first time by Potter (1971). His 
original definition is: “biology with humanistic knowledge from diverse sources . . . 
[to] forge a science of survival that will be able to set a system of priorities” (Potter, 
1971: 4). The key notion in this definition is survival. He speaks of “acceptable 
survival” in connection with medical and environmental problems. Acceptable 
survival is today best understood as involving a sustainable society within a healthy 
ecosystem. In a broader sense, bioethics has recently been defined as “the study of the 
moral, social and political problems that arise out of biology and the life sciences 
generally and involve, either directly or indirectly, human wellbeing” (Frey, 2000: 
89). In the 1980s, non-human bioethics developed rapidly as questions about the use 
of gene technology and other types of modern biotechnology, and especially animal 
husbandry and agriculture, grew in urgency.  
 
The development of non-human bioethics may be characterised as one in which 
specific applied issues are addressed at the same time as broader questions concerning 
the natural environment and man’s relation to it. In this development, the concept of 
sustainable use of the natural environment is prominent. 
 
Bioethics and environmental ethics have developed largely independently of one 
another.20 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was hoped that environmental ethics 
would contribute to the resolution of pressing issues such as deforestation, the 
depletion of the ozone layer and the loss of biological diversity. Most people deemed 
these environmental issues, which arose as a result of human activity, to be practical 
problems both for the environment and humans dependent upon the environment.21 
However, in the following decades, theoretical questions about the nature of the value 
                                                                                                                         
what flourishing and biologically determined goals amount to is required. We also need to know 
how to adjudicate conflicting interests. 
20  However, the subject areas of bioethics and environmental ethics can in fact overlap. Some 
commentators even talk of ‘environmental bioethics’ and ‘agricultural bioethics’. 
21  Pre-Socratic philosophers (i.e. those ruminating before c. 430 BC) discussed the question of 
moral respect for non-human animals. The importance of the natural environment to our well-
being has been contemplated since the time of Rosseau (1712–1778) and Kant (1724–1824). The 
contrast between the built and the natural environment, as well as the significance of ‘place’, 
was a central feature of the philosophy of Heidegger (1899–1976). 
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of nature were discussed and practical solutions were to that extent postponed 
(Rowlands, 2000). In particular questions about the value of wilderness – which can 
be broadly defined as an uncultivated area of land with no (or few) roads or towns 
built upon it – and about our ethical obligation to preserve such wilderness have been 
examined. Preoccupation with questions about the nature of value in the natural world 
seems to have been prompted by among other things species loss and land clearance 
(see Rolston, 1988b).  
 
However, the characterisation of wilderness has proved difficult and controversial. 
Wilderness is defined in the 1964 United States Wilderness Act, Section 2c as “an 
area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man 
himself is a visitor who does not remain” (quoted in Palmer, 1997: 106-107).22 Before 
the formal designation of wilderness areas several writers, including John Muir 
(1838–1914), addressed the idea of wilderness and examined the ways in which such 
land might be valuable to humans.23 As mentioned above, there has been considerable 
debate within environmental ethics about the idea of wilderness. A number of 
environmental ethicists, including J. Baird Callicott, have argued that the idea of 
wilderness should be abandoned.24 Callicott (1991) argues that the idea of wilderness 
is ethnocentric and ignores the presence and former impact of native Americans. He 
also argues that the idea of wilderness is static and rests on a fundamental and 
undesirable separation of humans and nature – leaving areas of wilderness as shrines 
of nature. However, environmental ethicists such as Holmes Rolston maintain that the 
idea of wilderness still has a point.25 Rolston (1994) argues that some of the designated 
                                          
22  In the United States Wilderness Act 1964 wilderness is characterised as an area which “(1) 
generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of 
man’s work substantially unnoticeable, (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a 
primitive and unconfined type of recreation, (3) has at least 5,000 acres . . ., and (4) may also 
contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational or scenic value” 
(quoted in Palmer, 1997: 107). 
23  The first formal wilderness area in United States was designated in 1924. The American 
forester, Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), suggested the establishment of such areas. 
24  See e.g. Nelson (2001) for a resumé of Callicott’s views and ideas within environmental ethics 
in general. 
25  See e.g. Weir (2001) for a brief overview of the Rolston’s main ideas on environmental ethical 
issues. 
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areas of wilderness have in fact been little used by native Americans, and that the idea 
of wilderness does not necessarily exclude humans anyway. The idea behind 
invocation of the concept of wilderness is to set certain limits to what humans can do. 
Ethicists such as Callicott, however, disagree. According to Callicott (1991), the focus 
should be on sustainable development. Humans should be viewed as part of nature, as 
beings capable of living in harmony with ecosystems. We profit little by clinging to an 
outdated idea of wilderness. 
 
To summarise, it might be said, that while recognising the importance of such notions, 
and the insight they offer into conceptions of nature, environmental ethics has now 
shifted beyond the focus on wilderness, species loss and values in nature. It is the 
applied ethical issues that are raised by human use of the natural environment that 
concern most environmental ethicists today. On the other hand, (non-human) bioethics 
has moved from specific, mostly biotechnological, questions to ethical issues relating 
to our use of the natural environment and our relation with nature. The disciplines of 
both bioethics and environmental ethics seem, then, to have moved towards a point at 
which the concepts of sustainability and biodiversity are in very much in focus. 
Ethical questions relating to forestry can therefore be addressed from the viewpoint of 
these two disciplines (see the paper ‘Designer trees, exotic species and the ethics of 
manipulating nature’). 
 
2.5 Ethics in forestry 
Ethics in forestry may be characterised as a combination of issues from applied ethics, 
and more precisely from bioethics and environmental ethics. In this respect, it is 
similar to agricultural ethics.26 Agricultural ethics can be defined as the study of moral 
issues relating to farming, under which human interference with the course of nature 
is included (Comstock, 2000). Forestry often entails, like farming, systematic 
cultivation of the land: here it is the equivalent of agriculture, namely silviculture. 
                                          
26  Thompson (1995) noted in the mid-1990s that the main journals in the field of environmental 
ethics (e.g. Environmental Ethics and Environmental Values) contained few papers pertaining to 
agriculture. There seems to have been a change now, with more papers being published on 
applied problems within agriculture, animal husbandry and forest management. New journals 
(e.g. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics) also address these issues. 
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Some questions raised in agricultural ethics (e.g. the influence of certain practices on 
social and natural conditions, and issues of fairness in the distribution of cultivated 
produce and land) are also relevant to forestry (Irland, 1994). However, forestry also 
involves conservation and restoration. In the following discussion we will briefly 
review three main ethical schools and types of ethical issue relating to, predominantly 
North American, forestry (List, 2000). However, the types of ethical issue raised are 
also relevant to European forestry with some exceptions discussed after the brief 
review.  
 
One school of ethical thought in forestry adopts the anthropocentric economic 
resource model or what might be labelled ‘resourcism’. In this model the forest is 
treated as a resource for human consumption. This model is known in North America 
as the ‘wise use’ or Pinchotian conservationism model: 
 
The first great fact about conservation is that it stands for development. There 
has been a fundamental misconception that conservation means nothing but the 
husbanding of resources for future generations. There could be no more serious 
mistake. Conservation means provision for the future, but it means also and first 
of all the recognition of the right of the present generation to the fullest 
necessary use of all resources . . . (Pinchot, 1907: 40). 
 
‘Preservationism’ is a second school of ethical thought in forestry; and in different 
ways it both complements and opposes ‘resourcism’. Preservationists generally do not 
oppose every use of the forest, but they focus on the forest’s protection for non-
economic reasons (List, 2000). Their main concern is to preserve forests in a ‘wild’ 
state. In the US this outlook is typified by a group of writers including John Muir. 
These so-called ‘wilderness visionaries’ (Vickery, 1994) voiced their concerns at a 
time when forest exploitation in North America was prevalent:  
 
Any fool can destroy trees. They cannot run away; and if they could, they 
would still be destroyed,⎯chased and hunted down as long as fun or a dollar 
could be got out of their bark hides, branching horns, or magnificent bole 
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backbones. Few that fell trees plant them; nor would planting avail much 
towards getting back anything like the noble primeval forests (Muir, 1901: 365). 
 
According to this view, nature conservation − as opposed to resource conversation − 
is the ethically legitimate objective. This can either be approached from a human-
centred (or anthropocentric) point of view or a life-centred (or biocentric) point of 
view.  
 
A third position on the ethics of forestry, again looking at matters from a North 
American perspective, is the so-called ‘land ethic’ proposed by the forester and 
founder of modern wildlife management Aldo Leopold (1949). The land ethic offers a 
comprehensive perspective, including a decision process for handling such diverse 
issues as wilderness preservation, forestry, pollution and resource depletion. 
Moreover, unlike a biocentric, individualistic theory, the land ethic avoids certain 
theoretical problems posed by the felling of a single tree or the culling of deer. 
Leopold’s writings have attained an almost canonical status and have been much 
discussed (e.g. Callicott, 1989, 1998; Society of American Foresters, 1998; Zeide, 
1998). His work forms the basis of the ecocentric ethical outlook. It also underpins 
ethical deep ecology. Leopold’s theories have become increasingly relevant to modern 
forestry as the focus of discussion has moved towards a more ecologically benevolent 
silviculture. In the US this has been signalled both by the use of such headings as 
“biotic forestry” (List, 1998) and, more generally, by forest management practices 
that are sensitive to impacts upon the natural environment and go under the heading 
“ecosystem management” (see e.g. Kohm and Franklin, 1997). Leopold held that we 
should regard trees and other forest components as integral parts of “biotic 
communities”. He insisted that we should neither exclude use nor concentrate solely 
on preservation. The familiar passage below addresses the problem of ethically 
acceptable forest management: 
 
The ‘key-log’ which must be removed to release the evolutionary process for an 
ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic 
problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically 
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right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold, 1949: 262). 
 
The idea is to combine ecological observations with the principle of preserving 
“integrity, stability and beauty” to arrive at normative conclusions about what to do in 
a specific land-use or management situation. However, Leopold’s key concepts of 
integrity, stability and beauty have resisted easy definition. Still more importantly, 
Leopoldians face the difficult question – mentioned above in Section 2.4 – of how to 
balance the concerns of integrity, stability and beauty where they conflict. Without 
some kind of rubric or calculus here, it will sometimes be impossible to tell whether 
“a thing is right”. Indeed in most cases, managing land involves compromise among 
diverse interests. Leopold’s insinuation that there is simply a question of right or 
wrong leaves no room for things being more or less right. 
 
C. D. Stone (1974) has attempted to operationalise some of the above-mentioned 
ethical issues in a legal context. He asks whether legal rights can be conferred on trees 
and other natural objects. The paradigm case Stone focuses on concerns a legal 
dispute over Mountain King Valley, a wilderness area adjacent to California’s Sequoia 
National Park. In this dispute, Walt Disney Enterprises wanted to develop a ski resort 
in the valley. The nature conservation organisation, the Sierra Club, filed a suit in the 
federal court to prevent this commercial development. The suit was rejected in 
California courts on the grounds that the Sierra Club lacked standing. Members of the 
society were not harmed, in a legal sense, by the proposed development. According to 
Stone, the Sierra Club should have been allowed to file the suit as a legal guardian of 
the threatened rights of the mountain and the trees: 
 
[T]hese objects have traditionally been regarded . . . as objects for man to 
conquer and master and use . . . Even where special measures have been taken 
to conserve them, as by seasons on game and limits on timber cutting, the 
dominant concern has been to conserve them for us – for the greatest good of the 
greatest number of human beings (Stone, 1974: 10). 
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 In the last part of this passage, Stone alludes to the well-known resource conservation 
dictum of Pinchot. According to Stone (1974: 16, emphasis in original), 
“Conservationists . . . want to conserve and guarantee our consumption and our 
enjoyment of these other living things. In their own right, natural objects have counted 
for little . . .” Stone’s suggestion raises several issues that need to be resolved: Who 
is the proper guardian of the rights of these natural objects? Who decides what is in 
the object’s ‘best interests’? Would a local commercial timber company be the proper 
guardian? A local fishing club? Or the Sierra Club? According to Stone, some sort of 
public consensus would need to be achieved on this issue. 
 
Since Stone’s early discussion, it has proved difficult to extend rights-based moral 
standing to trees, rivers and mountains. Theorists have as a result turned away from 
legal and moral rights and concentrated instead on the nature of values in a forest (e.g. 
Rolston, 1988a; Rolston and Couffal, 1991).  
 
Other issues in applied ethics, including that of setting an ethically acceptable degree 
of manipulation of nature, have been vigorously discussed. These discussions are 
often prompted by developments within modern biotechnology, and especially genetic 
engineering. Current centre on the question how to alleviate the pressure on the 
natural environment now that, in both forestry and farming in Europe, many of the 
former production goals that caused these pressures have largely been met. The 
predominantly North American discussion about wilderness is less relevant in a 
European context. In Europe, and especially in countries such as Denmark, it is 
practically impossible to find natural landscapes that are unmanaged and free of any 
kind of (deliberate or non-deliberate) human intervention. Here the main ethical 
questions are about defining the kind of nature conservation to practise in a natural 
environment heavily influenced by man, finding acceptable degrees of control of the 
natural environment and deciding on the intensity of the kind of natural resource 
management involved in forestry. These are the issues this thesis addresses. 
 
 
 27
 3. Main objectives 
The aim of the present thesis is to look at forest management from a range of ethical 
perspectives. This involves formulating, and analysing in detail, certain ethical 
assumptions. These assumptions underlie and inform familiar approaches to 
management practice. As such they have a bearing on several forestry-related issues 
of current interest.  
 
The multiple-use management paradigm, which is dominant in Denmark and large 
parts of Europe, fosters management for such things as wildlife and recreation 
interests as well, and at the same time, as timber production. Often these goals are 
indeed to be pursued in the same area or stand. In this way, multiple-use is a way of 
addressing the concerns and needs of different stakeholders − for example, consumers, 
special interest groups and future generations. Although it may be recognised within 
forestry that different stakeholders make distinct ethical assumptions and attribute 
quite different values to forests and forestry, these values and assumptions need to be 
clearly formulated. Increased clarity about what is at stake from an ethical perspective 
will make it easier to understand what the different stakeholders consider to be 
desirable and ethically acceptable in the way of forests and forest management 
practices respectively. The thesis aims to facilitate discussion about underlying value 
assumptions and the role they play. 
 
The most fundamental task of an ethical analysis is to identify the concerns that bear 
on a specific forest management issue and discuss what different stakeholders see as 
important and valuable. An important follow-up question is how to balance these 
concerns where they conflict. Although the thesis will present stakeholder-based 
analyses of forest management issues, it is also an objective of the present work to 
examine the underlying value framework. The thesis will analyse different attitudes to 
questions about what is of value. It will ask how to characterise value in the context of 
forestry and explore ways to promote these different values. Some of these issues 
become a good deal clearer in the light of ethical theories. For example, armed with 
such theories we can ask whether the aim should be to maximise value or to weigh up 
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consequences. We can ask whether we have a special obligation to maintain particular 
forest values, and whether there are certain things we should abstain from doing in a 
forest management context. All these questions will be examined in the thesis.  
 
The thesis will discuss ethical perspectives on six interconnected issues raised by 
multiple-use forest management. This means we shall consider examples of actual 
ethical problems in forestry. As Forbes and Lindquist (2000: 9) point out, such an 
approach “. . . is the next logical step in progress for forestry ethics”. The thesis 
seeks to provide a thematic discussion of the different value assumptions in play here. 
It discusses ways of evaluating different forest management systems in connection 
with underlying perceptions of nature and value foundations. It will both apply and 
analyse approaches such as ethical accounting and the ethical matrix in order to 
facilitate the discussion of ethical issues in forestry. The thesis will critically examine 
some of the main concepts used in forest management, such as sustainability and 
biodiversity, and will try to bring out the way in which value conflicts can be hidden 
behind these concepts. A more detailed outline of the six papers is given below in 
Section 5. 
 
It should be noted that many other important ethical issues pertaining to forest 
management are not included. For instance, issues of autonomy, democracy and rights 
are not examined in the present work. Moreover, the thesis does not examine 
questions raised by a professional forestry ethic or code of conduct. These codes are 
common in North America: for example, the Society of American Foresters has 
developed a code of conduct (see Society of American Foresters, 1996; Ebel, 2000). 
They are less familiar in Europe however.  
 
It is important to stress that the thesis does not intend to moralise, i.e. to express first-
order judgements about the rightness or wrongness of forest management practices. 
Nor does it promote just one ethical theory. The main goal of the thesis is to facilitate 
critical reflection on forest management issues from an ethical perspective. It reflects 
on actual and possible reasons why certain practices are as ethically problematic or 
unacceptable. The thesis tries to demonstrate that it is important to try to understand 
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the different attitudes and considerations bearing on forest management. It proceeds 
on the surely sound assumption that this may eventually result in better dialogue 
among forest stakeholders.  
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4. Methodology 
“As I remember, ethics was not an issue at the top of my agenda as a student or young 
professional. I vaguely remember discussing ethics in a philosophy class in college. At 
the time, I made no connection between ethics and the profession of forestry . . . The 
discussion of ethics is necessary, timely, and productive” (Ebel, 2000: 1). Ethical 
questions about the use of nature have been the subject of systematic, comprehensive 
research in Denmark only in recent years. Some of this research is described in the 
following section. 
 
4.1 Recent Danish research 
Operating under the auspices of Odense University (now the University of Southern 
Denmark), the Humanities Research Center conducted a number of studies over a 
five-year period between 1992-1997 on cultural, ecological, sociological and 
philosophical aspects of our perception and uses of nature. The title of this project was 
‘Man and Nature’. In the mid-1990s, other interdisciplinary research programmes 
were also undertaken − for example, ‘Man, Landscape and Biodiversity’ with the 
objective of studying “. . . the interactions and dynamics involving human impacts 
and design of landscapes.”27 Focus was on “the effect of human exploitation of natural 
resources (related to production as well as to recreation) on biodiversity”, and 
moreover how the use of natural resources can affect attitudes to the landscape.28 
Research projects in this programme included ‘Value, Landscape and Biodiversity’, 
which involved philosophers, ecologists, economists and landscape architects from 
five Danish universities, and ‘Boundaries in the landscape’, which aimed at clarifying 
“. . . the connections between the use of nature and nature and social processes in 
relation to landscape structure and biodiversity.”29 However, the main focus in all of 
these projects was on the countryside in general and the open landscape, and to a 
lesser extent forests.  
 
                                          
27  http://www.fsl.dk/boundaries/fBoundaries.htm. 
28  http://www.fsl.dk/boundaries/fBoundaries.htm. 
29  http://www.fsl.dk/boundaries/. 
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Other research institutions in this field include the Centre for Ethics and Law in 
Nature and Society and the Center for Social Research on the Environment (CeSaM). 
The aim of the Centre for Ethics and Law is to “. . . initiate research and international 
cooperation in the fields of ethics and law.”30 The intention is to examine the 
relationship between bioethics, social ethics and environmental ethics, on the one 
hand, and biolaw, social law and environmental law, on the other. Projects undertaken 
over the period 1993–1997 included one in which an attempt to clarify fundamental 
bioethical problems was made, particularly in relation to law, and another in which 
basic ethical problems in biomedicine and health research were documented and 
analysed across fourteen European countries. The overall purpose of the CeSaM is to 
“. . . provide insights into the complex interrelationships among the various social 
actors, or stakeholders, involved in environmental policy- and decision-making”.31 A 
more general aim of the centre is to support environmental research within the social 
sciences and humanities. CeSaM has participants in several Danish universities. Its 
secretariat is based at the University of Aarhus. 
 
In 1997, and with the support of the University of Copenhagen, the Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University (KVL) established a five-year research chair in bioethics 
at KVL. The objective of this initiative was to identify and analyse ethical questions 
relating to research areas within KVL, such as modern animal husbandry, 
biotechnology, agricultural food production and forestry. It was agreed that different 
ethical views on these matters should be examined, and that pertinent concepts, such 
as sustainability and the perception of nature, should be clarified. In 1999, a 
multidisciplinary research centre focusing on the use of gene technologies in 
(particularly) food production was established. The Centre for Bioethics and Risk 
Assessment, with a secretariat at KVL, represents biological and social sciences as 
well as philosophy. The main task is to “. . . respond to concerns, voiced or 
otherwise demonstrated by the Danish public, regarding further advances in gene 
                                          
30  http://www.inet.uni2.dk/home/centre_for_ethics_and_law/about.htm. 
31  http://www.au.dk/~cesamat/. 
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technology in food production and the release of genetically modified plants into the 
environment.”32
 
These activities and projects point to a growing research environment in Denmark in 
the sphere of applied ethics and the natural environment, including farming and 
forestry. This thesis is intended to make a contribution to this increasingly vigorous 
area of research. 
 
4.2 Ethical analysis and interdisciplinarity 
What is entailed by the title ‘ethical perspectives on forest management’? The overall 
topic, ethics and forest, can at the same time be perceived as a very narrow one and a 
quite broad one. To explain, this thesis has a broad scope inasmuch as it addresses 
ethical questions relating to forests. However, the scope is narrow in the sense that it 
addresses only issues related to forest management and forestry. The thesis may be 
seen as having a broader scope since there are many ethically relevant issues existing 
within this the topic of forest management and forestry: these range from global 
deforestation, forest restoration at the stand or landscape level and biodiversity 
conservation, at one extreme, to more specific regional issues such as pesticide use 
and conservation of old-growth. However, the scope of the thesis is narrower because 
only a small part of these issues – which are particularly relevant in a European 
context – are dealt with. 
 
Ethical analysis of forestry and forest use in general can be performed at a number of 
levels and in connection with many aspects of forestry. In this thesis, I will consider 
the following two kinds of ethical analysis. 
 
(1) The first involves the analysis of fundamental discussions about perceptions of the 
‘right’ way to use a forest − for, say, production purposes, nature conservation or 
restoration. Here, the aim is to examine the value assumptions underlying 
prioritisation, identifying relevant ethical concerns, A further purpose is to consider 
how ethical concerns should be balanced where they conflict. The papers in the thesis 
                                          
32  http://www.bioethics.kvl.dk/epresent.htm. 
 33
involving particular case studies, such as ‘Beavers and biodiversity: the ethics of 
ecological restoration’ and ‘Designer trees, exotic species and the ethics of 
manipulating nature’, offer this kind of analysis. 
 
(2) The second kind of ethical analysis involves the consideration of central, but 
value-laden and often ambiguous notions relating to forestry and forest use in general. 
It is widely believed that ethical issues arise after scientific research has been 
conducted. In fact, they need to be addressed prior to, or in conjunction with, such 
research. Ethical assumptions about what is good and bad, or right and wrong, are 
generally implicit and unacknowledged in the conduct of scientific research. Two 
papers in the present thesis therefore examine concepts, used in the discussion of 
forestry and in forest use in general, that import ethical attitudes. These are 
‘Bæredygtighed – økonomi, etik og energi’ and ‘Economic and ecological approaches 
to assessing forest value in managed forests – ethical perspectives’. 
 
It will be clear by now that this thesis is a piece of interdisciplinary research. To see 
what this means, consider the analysis and discussion of empirical results, and 
compare it with the analysis and discussion of arguments and underlying assumptions. 
And consider a proposal to restore part of a forest ecosystem in order to (a) enhance 
the habitats of certain endangered or threatened species, and (b) further the overall 
objective of maintaining or increasing the level of natural biodiversity. Several types 
of argument could be made in connection with this proposal. Science-based arguments 
might either substantiate the claim or show it to be unsound. For example, a scientific 
case for saying that biodiversity is not increased by the proposed measures might be 
propounded. However, underlying value assumptions, connected with different ethical 
theories, are also bound to play an important part, and the task is to analyse the 
arguments used, scientific or otherwise, and bring forward these assumptions.  
 
Applied ethical analysis can assist forestry, both as a profession and an academic 
discipline, by showing how values and ethical outlooks can exert a discernible 
influence on forest management practices and silvicultural proposals. Environmental 
ethics, as an academic discipline, needs to be applied to actual practices. It needs to 
 34
move beyond the theoretical level and discuss such matters as the nature of value in 
the natural world and the ethical status of wilderness. In forestry, there are at least 
three ways of doing this. First, philosophers can apply ethical theories to specific 
cases connected with forestry and more generally natural resource management. In 
this way, philosophical quality may be introduced, but there is a danger that the 
descriptions of actual practices and objectives will be irrelevant or inaccurate. 
Secondly, forest scientists without philosophical training might themselves embark on 
ethical deliberation. This is likely to reverse the advantages and disadvantages just 
described. Until now the first of these approaches has prevailed. However, thirdly, 
co-operation between philosophers and foresters may provide a more promising 
approach. Such co-operation requires additional training on both sides − especially, 
perhaps, if a forester is to be able to engage in fruitful ethical deliberation.  
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5. Structure and outline 
The thesis comprises six papers. The papers present, analyse and critically discuss 
ethical perspectives on: (1) the concept of sustainability, (2) the so-called ‘back to 
nature’ trend in forest management and silviculture, (3) forest-related manipulation (4) 
the concept of biodiversity and ecological restoration, (5) forest values in relation to 
managed forest, and (6) acceptability and accountability in forest management. In one 
way or another, all the papers concern sustainability and biodiversity in a forest 
management context. The papers include elements of conceptual analyses and the 
applied analysis of actual case studies.  
 
In the first paper, ’Bæredygtighed – økonomi, etik og energi’ (in Danish, English 
abstract, ‘Sustainability – economics, ethics and energy’) a conceptual analysis of 
sustainability is developed. Sustainability is a key concept within natural resource 
management and indeed, in effect, within any activity having consequences of an 
intragenerational or intergenerational kind. The basis of the demand for sustainability 
is ethical, as is shown by the following, often asked, questions. What do we owe 
future generations? Do we have duties toward or with regard to nature? How do we 
distribute obligations and duties in relation to future generations and nature? The aim 
of the paper is to analyse the ethical assumptions implicit in economic sustainability 
theory. In this paper, the Danish energy policy is used as a paradigm case. Examples 
used in the paper to shed light on the problem of substitution and distributive justice 
include the use of agricultural food crops for energy and the use of wood fuels as a 
substitute for fossil energy. 
 
The paper examines the concept of sustainability as it has been defined and applied 
within resource and environmental economics. A number of conflicting interpretations 
of sustainability are presented in this paper. These range from so-called ‘very weak’ to 
‘very strong’ sustainability. They differ in two primary respects. One difference is in 
the possibility of substituting natural for man-made capital; the other concerns 
discounting. It is argued that a profound disagreement over whether nature has 
economic resource value only or should be valued according to other standards 
underlies the economic discussion about substitution. Equally, disagreement over the 
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principles of intragenerational and intergenerational distributive justice lies beneath, 
and informs, contemporary discussion of discounting. The main conclusion of this 
paper is that, to some extent, the differences between the various interpretations of 
sustainability reflect differing empirical assumptions − for example, about 
technological innovation. However, a disagreement over values and ethical principles 
is clearly involved as well. These value assumptions and ethical principles must be 
analysed and discussed as a preliminary to economic analysis. 
 
In the second paper, ‘“Back to nature” – a sustainable future for forestry?’, the 
concept of sustainability as it is defined within forestry is used as a yardstick to 
analyse and assess a certain trends in forest management and silvicultural practice. 
The main aim of the paper is to gain a better understanding of the rationale of the so-
called ‘back to nature’ approach to forest management and silviculture.  
 
The case for adopting this ‘back to nature’ approach is examined, and it is shown that 
this case depends heavily on the current interest in obtaining or maintaining 
sustainability, and in maintaining or increasing the level of forest-related biodiversity. 
It is asked whether the ‘back to nature’ trend represents a shift in ethical outlook. The 
development of the trend, and the retreat of the productionist paradigm, is traced, and 
it is explained how this development represents a departure from the classical 
silvicultural systems. En route, the dividing line between forest non-intervention and 
intervention is examined. It is argued that discussions about a managed forest will 
concern the intensity of the relevant management routines, i.e. the degree of use of, 
control over and modification of the natural environment. 
 
An important thing to stress is that, in adopting nature-based silviculture, foresters are 
bound to address nature conservation concerns more seriously. They must now meet 
society’s changed demands on a forest and forestry practice. More broadly, forest 
stakeholders need not only to discuss the ways in which the natural is perceived or 
enquire into what the ‘proper’ use of a forest is, and what constitutes a ‘genuine’ 
forest, but they need to engage in a discussion about which values to promote and 
which concerns are considered ethically relevant (see paper No. 5). 
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 It might be difficult to pinpoint what a sustainable future for forestry entails, but it is 
clear that a sustainable future for forestry will require us to balance these values both 
against one another and against any concerns felt to be ethically relevant by the 
various stakeholders. 
 
 
In the third paper, ‘Designer trees, exotic species and the ethics of manipulating 
nature’, the main aim is to analyse the connection between modern biotechnology and 
forest and landscape management, and to discuss ethical responses to current 
practices.  
 
Forest management is at its core concerned with using, changing or regulating the 
natural environment in pursuit of defined objectives. With increased skills, scientific 
knowledge and technical expertise, the degree of change and regulation of nature has 
risen throughout the twentieth century in particular. Besides drainage and the use of 
pesticides and fertilisers, current measures include, in particular, harvesting as a way 
of regulating and controlling the distribution of species in time and space. A poor 
array of naturally occurring tree species is found in Europe, as compared with arrays 
found further east and west along the same latitude. As a result many tree species have 
been introduced by Europeans to enhance wood production. Moreover, in the past 75 
years, selective breeding has moved into the sphere of forest management, and now, 
of course, it is possible to modify a tree’s genome. However, the public is 
apprehensive about these latter developments; and the increased attention to the use of 
native species and nature conservation observable at present in many European 
countries also appears to be in conflict with intensive and technology-dependent 
management practices. 
 
Both the native versus non-native issue and the question of using genetically modified 
trees are in part empirical. That is, these issues can, to some extent at least, be tackled 
by natural scientists. However, underlying value judgements are also, and inevitably, 
involved. Biotechnological intervention and forest and landscape management can 
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both be seen as manipulations of nature, although obviously they operate at different 
levels: the former intervenes at the micro-level and the latter intervenes at the macro-
level. (The word ‘manipulation’ is used here as a convenient general term for any 
purposive human impact on the development of a forest.) Can species and gene 
introductions be assessed by asking how much manipulation they involve then? The 
paper argues that they can. Such an approach would indeed help to clarify the way in 
which manipulation at one level can have ramifications at another level. It is suggested 
that we should consider methods, production systems and practices at both the micro-
level and macro-level from a combined, non-anthropocentric bioethical and 
environmental ethical perspective. 
 
In the fourth paper, ‘Beavers and biodiversity: the ethics of ecological restoration’, 
the concept of biodiversity is examined through an analysis of a recent case of beaver 
reintroduction in a forested area in Denmark. The question here concerns the 
acceptability, not of species introduction (as it was in the third paper), but species 
reintroduction. It is asked: what assumptions about the value of nature and 
biodiversity underpin nature restoration, and in particular species restoration? 
 
Multiple-use forest management is about procuring timber and non-timber forest 
products, as well as about managing for water, recreation and wildlife. Beavers have 
been reintroduced to Denmark after an estimated absence of in excess of 2,000 years. 
The aims of the reintroduction were mixed. The initiative was undertaken partly to 
ensure the long-term survival of beavers as a species throughout Europe, but the 
animals were also reintroduced as agents that foster biodiversity and promote variation 
and dynamics in the natural environment. 
 
Appeals to biodiversity are made by both advocates and opponents of species 
restoration, but with very different results. In this paper, it is suggested that this is 
because two quite different conceptions of biodiversity are being pressed into service. 
One of these conceptions treats biodiversity as something that is constituted by certain 
‘end-states’. The other treats it as a certain kind of ‘historical’ process. The main 
lesson to be drawn from the beaver case concerns the values that underlie debates 
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about restoration. Greater awareness of these values is required if they are to be 
properly promoted. A careful examination of the conflicting notions of biodiversity 
invoked in discussions of the adoption of restoration policy in multiple-use forest 
management will prove helpful in deciding whether, where and what to restore. 
 
In the fifth paper, ‘Economic and ecological approaches to assessing forest value in 
managed forests – ethical perspectives’, ways of assessing a forest’s value are 
examined. The main aim of the paper is to show how to make the process of ascribing 
value to a forest more transparent. Forest values can be seen as relatively enduring 
concepts of what is good or desirable, or conversely what is bad or undesirable, about 
a forest. 
 
It is often claimed that forests of high, or higher, value ought to be prioritised in 
management. However, we need to ask which forests are the most valuable, and from 
what perspective. With the trend towards greater integration of production and nature 
conservation in forestry, traditional economic approaches have been considered 
inadequate in the formulation of forest policy and the setting of forest management 
objectives. However, in the last few decades, other types of economic approach to the 
assessment of forest value have gained a foothold. They have done so, where they 
have, because among other things they reflect concern for nature conservation issues 
in relation to, for example, future generations more adequately. However, non-
economic approaches have become even more prominent. From an ecological point of 
view, the concepts of ecosystem health and nature quality must be employed if we are 
to assess a forest’s value properly. Here, ‘better’ systemic health, or ‘higher’ nature 
quality, confer higher value on forests in which they are present. Clearly, however, 
the concepts of ‘health’ and what is ‘natural’ need to be carefully elaborated. In 
particular, the use of these concepts in the context of the intensively managed forests 
of Europe needs to be explained. 
 
Two issues are at stake. One is about what happens when better defined utility or use 
values are complemented by other kinds of value. The approaches mentioned above 
try to capture these ‘other’ values and in this way assess the ‘true’ or ‘full’ value of a 
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forest. The second issue concerns problems surrounding the actual measurement and 
estimation of these values. Clarification of these issues, and the critical discussion it 
requires, will help to make the process of ascribing value to a forest more transparent. 
 
In the sixth paper, ‘The acceptability of forest management practices: ethical 
accounting and the ethical matrix’, practical methods of assessing forest management 
practices are analysed. The main objective is to examine the feasibility of stakeholder 
approaches, such as the idea of ethical accounting and the so-called ethical matrix, in 
such assessment. It is argued that these tools must not be seen as panaceas to analyse 
the value assumptions underlying certain management practices. We need to reflect on 
the ethical outlook implicit in these approaches before using them. 
 
In primary sectors, such as farming and forestry, there seems to be a shift away from 
a shareholder-orientated approach to a broader stakeholder approach in which users 
and directly or indirectly affected parties are taken into account. A distinction has 
been made between what are called visible and invisible stakeholders. This distinction 
helps us to anticipate the acceptability and accountability of forest management 
practices. Ethical accounting is a stakeholder-orientated accounting process. It can be 
used to bring out the values underlying the management practice and to relate these to 
actual results and consequences. This approach is clearly applicable at the 
management level. The ethical matrix is a tool for assessing the ethical impact of new 
technologies, changes in production system and management practices on specified 
stakeholders. It is designed for use at the political decision-making level. The two 
approaches are therefore complementary rather than alternatives.  
 
Both approaches are facilitating methods. They are not intended to yield ‘correct’ 
answers, but instead reflect the inputs in a systematic way. As such they can be used 
effectively to create more transparency in the decision-making process on several 
different levels. Each approach can be useful in a forest management context. 
However, if either is to be of real use, due consideration of the considerable variation 
in ownership and management objectives, especially when a forest is managed under a 
multiple-use regime, is required. As was mentioned above when the previous paper 
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was described, a forest has many diverse values. While these ensure that both ethical 
accounting and the ethical matrix are relevant and helpful, they also make the two 
approaches more difficult to apply. It also has to be recognised that a greater number 
of invisible stakeholders needs to be taken into account. However, most importantly, 
it must be recognised that careful consideration of one’s basic ethical view and one’s 
underlying values is necessary if one to be in a position to choose meaningfully 
between the two approaches.  
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6. Main conclusions and the significance of the thesis 
Over the last twenty-five years especially, forest management in Europe and North 
America has been rethinking its foundation. At the same time, as List (2000) points 
out, environmental philosophy has also been engaged in a process of expanding and 
revising its foundation. The principal focus for both environmental philosophy and 
forestry is the concept of value. Value can here be understood in more than one way − 
for example, as what different stakeholders consider important; as value in a forestry 
context; as the values, understood as functions, of a forest; or, finally, as basic beliefs 
which influence attitudes to the various potential uses of a forest.  
 
The thesis sets out examples of ethical dilemmas. It focuses on issues inherent in 
forest management and silvicultural practices, and it presents a number of the most 
pressing questions in applied ethics that forestry raises. Suggestions about the ways in 
which ethical perspectives on forest management can be used to understand the 
practices that will be adopted in forestry in the coming years are made. At a 
methodological level, the thesis also attempts to contribute to the general development 
of research in applied environmental ethics, particularly in a forestry context. 
 
The thesis asks whether forests and forestry require special treatment. Thus it asks: 
are there ethical issues that are exclusive to forest management and require special 
attention? Or can ‘answers’ to the problems in forestry be deducted from existing 
theories and research in the area of environmental ethics? In pursuing these questions, 
it is natural to ask whether tools used in adjacent areas, such as agriculture and animal 
husbandry, can be of use in relation to forestry. 
 
The thesis explains how ethical analysis can be applied in connection both with 
economic and ecological analysis of forest management and specific silvicultural 
practices. The description of actual cases from forestry may stimulate discussion 
among professional philosophers with an interest in environmental ethics. Moreover, 
the engagement with actual problems within forest management and administration 
may contribute to a more comprehensive approach to on-going discussions within 
forestry. 
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 Forest management can benefit from the analysis of its underlying value assumptions 
in several ways. (1) Such analysis helps to identify ethical issues and reveal the 
reasons why people and agencies have act as they do. (2) Such analysis also helps to 
clarify basic concepts and directs enlightened attention to possible conflicts arising 
from value pluralism. (3) Finally, such analysis assists us in assessing specific cases 
involving particular management practices. Ethical analysis can assist various 
stakeholders: it can enable policy makers to shape attractive forest policies, enable 
forest managers to understand different attitudes to the practices they operate with, 
and enable environmentalists to justify their actions and beliefs. To the extent that they 
are disseminated, all three of these benefits will increase public awareness of the 
ethical issues raised by managed forests. 
 
An overall contribution of the thesis is to point for the need to introduce a higher 
degree of ethical transparency in forest management. This is an important condition to 
attain higher levels of ‘stakeholder acceptability’ vis-à-vis forest management 
decisions and, in general, to maintain or develop a better accord between management 
practices and stakeholder values. Such an accord requires, first, a greater awareness 
of the value conflicts concealed in the use of concepts such as sustainability and 
biodiversity. Secondly, it requires improved clarification, and a thoroughgoing critical 
discussion, of any value assumptions underlying forest management practices. These 
are some of the conditions under which fruitful dialogue with the rest of society, 
including politicians and the general public, can proceed.  
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‘Back to nature’  
– a sustainable future for forestry? 
 
  
Christian Gamborg and J. Bo Larsen1
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we examine whether the present ‘back to nature’ trend offers a 
sustainable future for forestry. We trace developments in back to nature silviculture 
against the backdrop of a receding productionist paradigm in forestry, and we ask 
whether these developments are sustainable in a post-Brundtland sense. We analyse in 
detail what is involved in a back to nature approach and examine whether this 
approach represents a change of ethical outlook or is merely is a prudent response to 
shifting priorities. En route, the dividing line between forest non-intervention and 
intervention is examined. The back to nature trend seems to suggest that habitual 
thinking, and the creation of dogmatic approaches, should be avoided in forest 
management and silviculture. Instead, the development of a raised awareness of the 
different values of the various forest stakeholders is required. This means 
acknowledging that a sustainable future for forestry requires a continuous process of 
balancing these values against the concerns that are considered ethically relevant by 
different stakeholders. 
 
Keywords: nature-based silviculture, forest management, values, ethics, sustainability, 
exploitation  
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1. Introduction 
What should tomorrow’s forest look like? What kind of products, services and 
experiences should it be able to provide? What functions do we want it to perform? 
These are some of the far from unproblematic questions the various stakeholders in 
the ‘global forest village’ face today. The questions can be raised in connection with 
both the management of existing forests and plantations and the afforestation efforts 
now taking place in many parts of the world. However, in Europe and elsewhere, 
problems are associated with many intensively managed plantations: problems of 
ecological stability and flexibility, of biodiversity, and of an aesthetic and recreational 
kind (Larsen, 1995; Emborg and Larsen, 1999). The ‘back to nature’ trend now 
seems to represent a very likely development path for forest management. In general 
usage, for example in relation to lifestyle, ‘back to nature’ signifies “advocating or 
relating to reversion to a simpler way of life” (Pearsall and Hanks, 1998). In many 
European countries, at least, where even-aged plantations of introduced coniferous 
species dominate, where there is a growing urban population, and where there is 
generally strong competition for land, an integrated approach along the lines of back 
to nature forestry seems attractive.  
 
There appear to be widening gaps between the public perception of a forest, the forest 
owners’ expectations, and industry’s needs (List, 2000; Steel et al., 1994). Across 
Europe, and in parts of North America, even-aged, production-orientated plantations 
are beginning to be regarded in the same way as old industrial complexes. Most 
European plantations were created primarily to provide wood for domestic timber 
processing. This happened after the natural forests had been cleared, when the scarcity 
of wood became a reality (Kirby and Watkins, 1998). Today the plantations are being 
maintained in what is, in effect, a completely different era, with different objectives, 
priorities and values (Farrell et al., 2000). The production of timber, with increased 
productivity and the regimented afforestation of unproductive uplands or heathland, 
has become a central objective. Moreover, economic and technical efficiency have 
been prioritised in pursuit of high yields. This approach represents a production 
philosophy in which the emphasis is on human utility. In North America and in 
Europe, the sustained yield, multiple-use paradigm has been invoked to contest this 
 80 
view for several decades (Maser, 1993; Berlyn et al., 1996). Here, the production of 
wood products is not necessarily more important than other aims, i.e. aims relating to 
the production of non-timber forest products, the protection of landscape amenities 
and cultural heritage, nature conservation, environmental protection and the 
encouragement of recreational use of woodlands. Economic and technical efficiency is 
still a priority, but ecological and social factors are also increasingly taken into 
account and this leads to the multiple use of a forest. 
 
Going beyond multiple-use, an emerging view is that more consideration will need to 
be given to natural and environmental values if societal concerns are to be met (Kohm 
and Franklin, 1997; Berlyn et al., 1998). A forest is no longer seen merely as a 
production unit serving human needs and technological wants. It is increasingly 
perceived as an ecosystem whose living and abiotic components should be given 
serious attention by managers (Maser, 1994). To some, indeed, the ecosystem’s health 
ought to be the predominant concern. Management designed to maintain or increase 
what might be called good health, or the right ecological balance with a proper 
composition and functionality, becomes a goal in itself (see Costanza et al., 1992).  
 
The roles here are once more reversed: human extraction is yet again, albeit 
voluntarily, placed under the vagaries of nature. This broad trend may be dubbed back 
to nature forestry, although it has already acquired a number of alternative names. In 
Europe it is often called ‘close-to-nature’ or ‘nature-based’ silviculture; in North 
America, at a more general level of forest management, the terms ‘ecosystem 
management’, ‘adaptive management’ and ‘new forestry’ are more likely to be used.  
 
In this paper we explore the border between non-intervention and nature conservation, 
on the one hand, and extractive silviculture and management in the classical sense, on 
the other. The key question is whether back to nature forestry is likely to be part of a 
so-called sustainable future for forestry. To answer this question, we start by 
clarifying the different varieties of back to nature forestry, tracing their origin and 
development. We seek especially to characterise nature-based silviculture, which is an 
approach of central European origin and part of the conceptual foundations of 
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ecosystem management. Next we examine whether, from an economic, ecological and 
social perspective, the current trend is toward sustainable forest management. Finally, 
we examine another departure from the classical silvicultural systems. We look at a 
low-key approach – so-called ‘sustainable exploitation’ – as a further development of 
the back to nature approach, and perhaps as part of a sustainable forestry practice in 
the future.  
 
 
2. Back to nature approaches 
The recent, and growing, interest in back to nature silvicultural systems represents a 
new form of discussion among forest scientists and practitioners. Formerly, discussion 
in this field focused either on yield (e.g. Leibundgut, 1983), or the conversion from 
monoculture to mixed forest (Gayler, 1985), or, especially in the 1980s, the 
relationship between nature-based silviculture and air pollution and the so-called novel 
forest decline (Hatzfeldt, 1985). Currently, however, discussions focus on the role of 
nature-based silviculture in conserving biodiversity (Christensen and Emborg, 1996) 
and improving stand stability (Emborg and Larsen, 1999). Moreover, general 
concepts are now regularly applied to specific regions, with different forest types and 
under different natural conditions, in North America (Bergeron and Harvey, 1997; 
Schulte and Buongiorno, 1998; Hansen et al., 1999), and especially Europe 
(Bradshaw et al., 1994; Mason and Quine, 1995; Skovsgaard, 1995; Fries et al, 1997; 
Lähde et al., 1999; Nabuurs and Lioubimow, 2000; Bengtsson et al., 2000; Emborg 
et al., 2000). 
 
Mason and Quine (1995: 14) treat the challenge of converting large parts of even-aged 
conifer plantations to more structurally and functionally diverse forests as a task of “at 
least equal magnitude to that involved in their establishment earlier this [i.e. the 
twentieth] century”. Larsen (1997) believes we are at a crossroads. He suggests that 
we require a complete reassessment of current silvicultural practices, and that this 
reassessment may follow one of two paths. The first option is to continue with the 
kind of technological rationalisation that has been a dominant feature of forest 
management in the last century. The second is to opt for so-called ‘biological 
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optimisation’, a key component in a back to nature silvicultural approach. In what 
follows, we will briefly review the origin and development of this concept. 
 
Managed forest ecosystems and natural forest differ greatly in their structure, 
dynamics and functions. Nature-based silviculture mitigates this difference by taking 
advantage of naturally occurring processes (Schmidt, 1998). Early developments took 
place in the mountainous regions of central and southern Europe, where the role of 
forests in protecting against avalanches is of special importance. In his seminal work 
on mixed forest, Gayer (1886) argued for the importance of stability and continuity of 
forest stands. The rationale for reintroducing more complex forest stand structures 
was economic, despite its apparent reliance on ecological arguments. This approach is 
not treated by its proponents as involving classical silvicultural systems, such as group 
selection or irregular shelterwood. Instead it uses a “less formal approach” (Helliwell, 
1999: 379). 
 
Alternatives to the classical high forest system, with clear-cutting, were reassessed in 
the wake of the depression experienced in Germany and other central European 
countries after World War I.  Silvicultural ideas of that time were typical of the 
Zeitgeist. They contrasted with the rigid rationality of nineteenth century forestry, 
with its formalistic and schematic principles. The underlying perception of nature as a 
collection of mechanistic objects suitable for scientific scrutiny was succeeded by an 
elegiac philosophy, with roots in romanticism, in which nature was conceived of as an 
organism. The ideas of the German professor of forestry, Alfred Möller (1922), are 
expressive of this philosophy. He treated the forest as a coherent entity and stressed 
the interactions between elements of this entity (Kremser, 1976). In a way, this 
approach is similar to the present conception of the forest as an ecosystem. The term 
‘ecosystem’ – itself a contraction of ‘ecological system’ – was coined much later and 
is usually ascribed to Tansley (1935: 299). According to Möller, the forest had value 
in itself as an autonomous organism. Ecological equilibrium and continuous forest 
cover were key features of his silvicultural theory of (what he called) the 
“Dauerwald”. He therefore ruled out the use of clear-cutting before regeneration and 
abandoned the prevailing age class system.  
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 Möller had problems defining his terms. The substantiation of some of his claims and 
the validation of certain profitability calculations also presented difficulty. For these 
reasons, not to mention the premature death of Möller, and his general lack of 
recognition by the forest science establishment in Germany, there was a decline for 
the Dauerwald movement in the mid-1920s (Wobst, 1979). The forest-science 
establishment also confused the principal ideas of Dauerwald (and hence associated 
Möller) with a more specific silvicultural system used in parts of Switzerland and 
France called Plenterwald. But this system was considered unfit to be operated in the 
German forests in the north (Heyder 1986). In view of this it is important to stress that 
Möller was not advocating the (re)introduction of Plenterwald – which he had 
characterised as a “dream, not even a nice one” (Möller quoted in Heyder, 1986: 
433). The general idea of the forest as independent system possessing more than 
instrumental value, and the idea of harmony, can be found in later conceptions of 
nature as a system in ecological balance. 
 
The concept of close-to-natural, near-natural or nature-based silviculture is not an 
adaptation of the notion of Dauerwald, but certain Dauerwald silvicultural principles – 
in particular, the idea of continuous forest cover – can be found in it. The first more 
systematic description of the principles of near-natural silviculture has been ascribed 
to Krutzsch and Weck (1935). Krutzsch and Weck’s description followed several 
decades of investigation at the German forest estate Bärenthoren (Krutzsch, 1926). 
Roughly speaking, the objective here was to maintain a species-rich, natural, healthy 
and productive forest. This objective had a mixed reception. In scientific periodicals, 
fellow foresters and scientists objected to it, claiming that it was unrealistic and based 
on false assumptions and incorrect calculations (Heyder, 1986). Moreover, the basic 
principles were controversial and readily disputed. The situation indeed resembles the 
discussion of sustainable forest management practices that is taking place now, fifty 
years later.  
 
Immediately after the war, the debate about forestry intensified in Germany. The 
close-to-natural approach was rejected. It suffered from its association with the Nazi 
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regime after 1933. A so-called natural forest was seen as stronger, and as being of a 
healthier race than alternatives, and the nature-based approach to silviculture was 
required by law (Duchiron, 2000). Forests were conceived of as an important societal 
good, capable of providing recreational opportunities while at the same time providing 
high quality timber (Heyder, 1986). However, there was a huge demand for timber 
and wood for fuel in the immediate aftermath of the war (Wobst, 1979). Moreover, 
large areas of the German forests were cleared for use by the allied forces after the 
war. This ensured that afforestation and plantation silviculture were key imperatives in 
post-war German forestry. 
 
In the post-war period, attempts to apply the principles of nature-based silviculture 
were nonetheless made, but they were infrequent and sporadic, and generally modest 
in scale (Wobst and Wobst, 1975). One notable development was the foundation of a 
silvicultural forum for discussion called ANW (Arbeitsgemeinschaft naturgemässe 
Waldwirtschaft). As a result of political opposition, ANW was not formally 
established in Germany before 1950. Mainstream foresters regarded it as a group of 
romantic missionaries with a limited following (Duchiron, 2000). Today, the work 
initiated by ANW is carried out on a European basis under the auspices of a new 
federation of foresters called ‘Pro Silva’. Like ANW, Pro Silva encourages the 
exchange of ideas about forest management (Pro Silva, undated).  
 
After decades of neglect among the mainstream of foresters, nature-based forest 
management received growing attention in Europe in the 1990s owing to its potential 
to deliver sustainable forestry (Touzet, 1996). It continues to provoke interest today. 
This back to nature trend has now moved beyond the German-speaking and French-
speaking countries. As a result, it has been given many different names in English, 
some of which reflect substantive differences in approach and others of which amount 
to no more than nomenclatural variation. Among the more common names we find 
“close-to-nature silviculture” (Dolinšek, 1993; Motta et al. 1999; Schutz, 1999), 
“nature-based silviculture” (Bradshaw et al., 1994; Emborg et al., 2000), “nature-
oriented silviculture” (Fähser, 1995; Koch and Skovsgaard, 1999; Nabuurs and 
Lioubimov, 2000), “near-natural silviculture” (e.g. Tarp et al., 2000) and the 
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“continuous cover approach” (Peterken, 1996; Kuper, 1996). Some terms, such as 
“biodiversity-oriented silviculture” (Parviainen et al., 1995; Björse and Bradshaw, 
1998; Lähde et al., 1999), emphasise goals associated with nature conservation. Other 
terms denoting practices closely related to the back to nature approach include 
“ecological silviculture” (Benecke, 1996) and “natural silviculture” (Zerbe, 1997). 
Similar terms have been suggested by Frivold (1992), Orazio and Nocentini (1997), 
Bergeron and Harvey (1997), Fries et al. (1997) and Kerr and O’Hara (2000).  
 
Approaches to forest management, and indeed forestry, within the back to nature 
scheme include: “ecosystem management”, “ecoforestry” (Drengson and Taylor, 
1997), “new forestry” (Franklin, 1989; Clark and Stankey, 1991), “sustainable, 
economical and ecologically sound forestry” (Fryk, 1993) and “wholistic forest use” 
(Hammond, 1991). The notion is thus applied on the silvicultural level as well at a 
more general managerial level. In the following section, we shall examine the notions 
of the natural and nature invoked in back to nature silviculture. After this we will try 
to clarify the relationship between the back to nature trend and sustainability post-
Brundtland.  
 
 
3. The concept of nature in the back to nature approach 
Back to nature forestry is not a ‘no use’ option adopted in response to an ‘any use’ 
policy. It does not involve returning the forest back to nature, that it to say is does not 
entail complete non-intervention. The proposals of the advocates of back to nature 
forestry are quite modest: to reform current practices so that they are more 
environmentally benign, and more sensitive to the values of nature conservation and 
the demands of sustainability, by mimicking natural forest structures, processes and 
dynamics.2 Three definitions, or rather interpretations, can be singled out. Back to 
nature could imply approximating a certain forest structure or composition at a given 
                                          
2  It must be noted that back to nature refers to the active, but the active use in question here is not 
the same as that which figures in what is known as Pinchot’s ‘wise-use’ policy. The active use 
Pinchot explores is associated with the more productionist perspective that dominated early 
twentieth-century forest management (Norton, 1991) and was prevalent in agriculture 
(Thompson, 1995). 
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point in time. This is a temporal interpretation. Another way to interpret it is to say 
that back to nature implies changing the way we intervene, not advocating a reversion 
to a certain point in time. A third way is to state that it merely implies a desire to 
revert to a more simple form of forestry or silviculture. We will now concentrate on 
the two first interpretations where the conception of nature is prominent. 
 
One might well wonder whether back to nature silviculture is not a contradiction in 
terms if used in the two first senses described above. The answer depends on how 
nature and silviculture are perceived. Nature in the sense of life can be defined as “all 
the animals, plants, rocks, etc. in the world and all the features, forces and processes 
that happen or exist independently of people, such as the weather, the sea, mountains, 
reproduction and growth” (Cambridge International Dictionary). Such a definition can 
be interpreted in different ways. On one interpretation, humans may be seen as 
excluded, and natural is taken to mean not involving anything made by people, and 
thus any natural kind of silviculture will appear to be inherently contradictory. Using 
such an interpretation as the basis for back to nature silviculture may prove somewhat 
problematic since there are virtually no forests left which have not been subject to 
human intervention or indirect impact on earth, let alone in Europe. The majority of 
forests in Europe is managed, is influenced by people. On another interpretation of the 
above definition, humans can be included. Here, nature is seen as something also 
including the activities of humans, occupying a position somewhere on a spectrum for 
the untouched to the overtly designed, planned and planted. Such an interpretation 
seems more plausible to use when advocating back to nature silviculture. However, 
this would still leave a more practical problem concerning the selection of an 
appropriate blueprint state – something that can be aimed or copied from – in the, 
mostly, managed forests of Europe. Changes in, for example, climate and soil are 
known to have an influence on the structure of natural woodland vegetation. Thus, at 
best the remnants of natural forest vegetation will be a proxy to copy from and the 
processes, structures and dynamics to imitate will be estimates. 
 
The term back to nature implies not only a search for a return to an original position, 
it also implies that present types of forestry do not meet the perceived standards of 
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what is (in the context of forestry) natural. When we advocate a back to nature 
approach, a certain perception of nature and the natural is invoked. Thus, there is a 
normative content in the back to nature concept. The natural becomes a value that is 
considered worth promoting as part of the good. But here, good can be understood in 
two fundamentally different ways: for something may be good in its own right, or 
good because it is conducive to human well-being.  
 
According to a human-centered (anthropocentric) position, a forest, and indeed nature 
conservation practice, are ultimately for the benefit of man (Norton, 1991). On this 
approach a natural forest may be deemed more desirable because it possesses certain 
use values which eventually adds to human well-being. It also is recognised that 
forestry is a long-term project and that sustainability considerations therefore need to 
be taken into account. But nature conservation concerns, which are prominent features 
of back to nature silviculture, now become a question of prioritising different human 
interests and values. In this account, then, an erosion of biodiversity resulting from 
the adoption of certain forest practices could be interpreted primarily as a loss of a 
resource for current and future generations.  
 
In an alternative and non-human centered approach – e.g. the land ethic of Aldo 
Leopold (1949) – nature is conceived of as something possessing value in itself, 
independently of man. The terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘inherent’ value are sometimes used 
in this context. Now there are many accounts of intrinsic and inherent value (O’Neill, 
1992). Intrinsic value is sometimes treated as non-instrumental value, so that its 
possessor (in this case nature) is an end itself and not a means to some other end. On 
this interpretation we would need to explain why we have a responsibility not to 
damage forest ecosystem for the sake of the forest (or nature) itself. Talk about the 
conservation of a forest for its own sake is sometimes rather loose, or indiscriminate, 
and so such talk does not necessarily signal acceptance of a profound environmental 
ethical theory in which nature is ascribed interests and non-instrumental value.  
 
In using a forest we may disturb its balance. However, granted that it is possible to 
talk about a balance, the question is whether the disturbance of this balance is 
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equivalent to damaging nature in itself. According to an interest model, where humans 
can have an interest in promoting one balance rather than another, nature has to been 
seen as an independent subject with well defined interests. But, even if nature can be 
seen as something that has interests of its own, one might still ask whether it has an 
interest in being balanced in one way instead of another. The idea of balance in nature 
has in any case been replaced by a theory of shifting dynamic equilibria, or temporary 
structures, and related processes recognised as balances. The central question here 
concerns the plausibility of the claim that nature has an interest in being in one state of 
balance instead of another. To answer this question affirmatively is, as Jensen (1994) 
points out, to suppose that one of the shifting balances is more natural than (and thus 
preferable to) one of the others.  
 
Another approach is to say that nature does not ‘need’ to be ascribed interests to be 
‘damaged’. Instead, it might have a well defined value, sometimes referred to as value 
in itself, and a decrease in value is possible. Here, it could be argued, disturbance to 
the forest should be avoided for its (i.e. the forest’s) own sake. However, the 
expression ‘for its own sake’ may be used to indicate that people derive something of 
value from nature and that nature has more than mere resource value. On this 
approach, nature-based silviculture can be seen as a prudent response to the shifting 
demands we make on a forest as a result of newly recognised needs and different 
systems of value and belief. Perhaps as such it is more likely to become a lasting 
trend. But this still leaves the following question: to what extent can the back to nature 
approach be regarded as sustainable in a contemporary, post-Brundtland sense? 
 
 
4. Is back to nature sustainable in a post-Brundtland sense ? 
The back to nature approach, with its reliance on the natural forest’s structures, 
processes and dynamics, is seen as a promising way to meet the criteria for 
sustainable forest management (Franklin, 1995; Larsen, 1995; Koch and Skovsgaard, 
1999; Emborg and Larsen, 1999). The principles of sustainable forest management 
have evolved over the past three centuries in central Europe (Baader, 1933; Zürcher, 
1965; Schanz, 1996). Currently, four major forest functions are believed to be 
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important in sustainable forest development: the conservation of ecosystems, the 
protection of soil and climate, the production of timber and other products, and the 
provision of recreational and other social and cultural amenities. It is often stressed 
that these functions are interdependent. The protection function, for example, is an 
integral part of the production function. Building on the ideas of the ANW, the Pro 
Silva federation has set out a range of principles intended to ensure that a forest 
performs its desired functions. These are listed in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Principles of nature-based silviculture prepared by the European federation of 
foresters, Pro Silva 
 
− Soil productivity: Maintaining and 
protecting soil productivity through 
continuous forest cover and 
maintenance of forest biomass 
(including dead wood). 
 
− Vegetation: Maintaining natural 
forest vegetation, although the forest 
is used for production purposes. 
 
− Energy and mineral cycles: 
Maintaining and protecting natural 
energy and mineral cycles, and 
improving carbon storage and forest 
climate. 
 
− Regeneration: Using natural dynamic 
forest processes, including using 
spontaneous forest renewal (i.e., 
natural regeneration). 
 
− Mixed forest: Propagating mixed 
forest with attention to rare species. 
 
 
− Fertilisers: Minimising use of 
fertilisers, pesticides and drainage 
 
− Use of non-native species: Restricting 
the use of non-native species to cases of 
economic necessity provided they can 
be mixed with native species, which are 
generally favoured. 
 
− Diversity: Adding value and enhancing 
diversity in forest structure through 
forest regeneration, stand tending and 
exploitation as a means of obtaining 
niches in time and space. 
 
− Felling methods: Using selective felling 
to avoid clear-cutting and other 
methods destroying forest conditions. 
 
− Target-diameter felling: Abolishing 
rotation age as an instrument for 
determining when a tree should be cut, 
and adopting methods based on a 
target-diameter felling 
 
Source: Based on Pro Silva (undated). 
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The general principles listed in Table 1 do not imply a specific silvicultural system. 
They can be used for broad guidance in the utilisation and control of natural processes 
in the forest. The principles are meant to be flexible. Their ranking can be altered, 
according to shifting priorities and underlying values. The more important matter is 
how they relate to different sustainability criteria. In 1994, at the First Expert Level 
Follow-up Meeting of the Ministerial Conference (1993) in Helsinki, one set of 
criteria – six European criteria – of sustainable forest management were agreed upon 
as a way to make sustainability more operational: 
 
(1)  The maintenance and appropriate enhancement of forest resources and their 
contribution to global carbon cycles. 
(2)  The maintenance of the health and vitality of forest ecosystems. 
(3)  The maintenance and encouragement of the productive functions of forests (vis-à-
vis wood and non-wood products). 
(4)  The maintenance, conservation and appropriate enhancement of biological 
diversity in forest ecosystems. 
(5)  The maintenance and appropriate enhancement of protective functions in forest 
management (notably pertaining to soil and water). 
(6)  The maintenance of other socio-economic functions and conditions. 
 
So what is the relationship between nature-based silviculture and each of these 
criteria? Let us address each criterion in turn. (1) Nature-based silviculture involves 
greater standing volumes than traditional management. This is mainly due to the 
absence of clear-cuts and the support of continuous forest cover. One way to interpret 
this criterion is to say that an enhancement of the forest’s resources, and increases in 
wood and carbon storage, should be facilitated, in keeping with the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
(2) Here the fact that there is no clear-felling contributes to the improvement of the 
forest’s climate and mitigates the impact of climatic extremes. One of the guiding 
objectives for nature-based management is the maintenance and enhancement of so-
called ecosystem health and vitality. One of the ideas is to use tree species and 
provenances that are well adapted to the site conditions. Contrary, perhaps, to what 
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might be expected, back to nature silviculture does not exclude the use of introduced 
species, provided that they have proven to be adapted to the environmental conditions 
and seem adaptable. Moreover, supplementation of the native vegetation patterns by 
introduced tree species may be justified inasmuch as it increases the adaptability of the 
forest to climate change and enhances economic profitability. In the restoration of a 
degraded forest, where natural regeneration can prove rather troublesome, non-
indigenous tree species are also an option in nature-based silviculture. For this, 
however, certain conditions have to be met according to the, for example, Pro Silva 
principles listed in Table 1. The introduced species must be able to regenerate 
naturally and should neither suppress nor eliminate indigenous species. They must not 
impoverish the soil, or make stands more susceptible to wind damage, or promote the 
spread of disease. 
 
(3) The question whether production is enhanced by nature-based silviculture has been 
much discussed. Productivity is at the core of both the old sustained yield and 
intermediate multiple-use paradigms. Critics maintain that as long as volume, and not 
quality, is the main factor in pricing timber, the level of production is an index of 
profitability. Basically, the continuous forest should have higher levels of production 
than that attainable with the classical clear-felling system. However, not all of the 
presently high yielding, introduced conifers are adapted to their sites, and of course 
this can lead to a decrease of productivity. Nonetheless, it could be argued that an 
increase in functional flexibility justifies a decrease in the level of production by 
ensuring that wood produced in the forest remains marketable, whatever needs emerge 
in an intergenerational perspective. Furthermore, the contribution to stability and the 
ecosystem’s health, as well as flexibility, can be considered of major importance for 
sustainability in its economic dimension (Lohmander, 1992; Reed, 1993; Thorsen, 
1999). 
 
(4) Throughout the world, forest ecosystems are seen as valuable reservoirs of 
biodiversity. Nature-based silviculture seems to conserve biodiversity more effectively 
than systems in which stands of even-aged trees of a single species are clear-cut. 
Increased stability and continuous forest cover, in combination with the predominant 
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use of deciduous, indigenous tree species and either no, or little, use of pesticides may 
enhance the type of biodiversity that thrives in an undisturbed forest. Although nature-
based silviculture can encourage biodiversity by alleviating the pressure on some 
animals (such as insects) and plants, it is less conducive to light-dependent species and 
species occurring in the early stages of succession. Nature-based silviculture does not 
necessarily involve wet forest, dead trees and deciduous old-growth, but these 
conditions help to establish many tree-dependent mosses, lichens and mycorrhiza 
fungi. The build-up of deadwood debris also provides habitats for hole-nesting birds, a 
large range of insects and saprophytic fungi. In nature-based forestry, standing dead 
trees and some deadwood on the forest floor are retained. Some, however, will be 
cleared. Most back to nature approaches are production-orientated. They therefore 
have to balance the goals of production and biodiversity. This means that fewer old 
trees, which are valuable economic assets, are retained. Standing dead trees, from 
which insects may attack living trees, may need to be removed, for instance. Other 
production-enhancing methods are used in back to nature silviculture, such as the 
planting of native, or non-native species, to complement natural regeneration. In 
conclusion, nature-based management generally supports biodiversity by integrating 
the conditions that foster it in the production paradigm. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the biodiversity of a managed forest is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from that of natural, non-intervention forest (Christensen and 
Emborg, 1996), and that additional measures are needed to protect biodiversity 
specifically connected with deadwood and both the late and early successional stages. 
 
(5) The protective functions of a forest depend largely on its stability and perpetuity, 
and these latter features are a central objective in nature-based management. See (2) 
and (4). 
 
(6) This socio-economic criterion can be met in part through nature-based 
management. Many European forests have a substantial recreational role. In 
Denmark, surveys of the recreational use of forests over the last 25 years have 
consistently shown that mature beech monocultures – which, mindful of the limited of 
biodiversity therein, environmentalists refer to derogatively ‘green deserts’ – are 
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among the most favoured forest types (Jensen, 1999). On the other hand, encounters 
with wildlife are also highly valued, as is general appreciation of nature. Nature-based 
silviculture seems to be able to cater to these values. 
 
The close-to-natural approach, then, appears to have the potential to meet several of 
the sustainability criteria. However, there are evidently some problems to be faced. 
We presently need more precise economic assessments of the nature-based approach 
and broader types of cost-benefit analysis (see Tarp et al., 2000). We also need a 
better understanding of the implementation and adaptation of such nature-based 
principles in local conditions, and in particular an understanding of how to avoid 
procedures associated with the classical silvicultural systems. Clearly, this calls for 
fresh planning initiatives and new tools of forest management and control.  
 
When these steps are taken, and when the classical silvicultural systems has been 
challenged, it may be interesting to examine whether there are any novel variants of 
back to nature forestry, especially in a forest with inherently low production capacity, 
low profit potential, but high nature conservation value. Nature-based management is 
traditionally labour intensive. If current developments within forestry continue, it is 
likely to become more difficult to get people to do manual forestry work. The 
question is whether a variant of nature-based approach of the kind just mentioned – 
more natural kind of forest, involving less control and possibly more natural 
biodiversity – could in fact become a sustainable option. 
 
 
5. What are the alternatives? Towards sustainable exploitation 
If the objective of forest management were to disturb and disrupt the forest ecosystem 
as little as possible, non-intervention in some form would be the logical answer: we 
might, for instance, simply set up forest reserves, and indeed this has been done 
already. However, if the intention is to harness the forest’s ecosystem in management 
for timber and non-timber forest products, while at the same time trying to maintain 
the natural structure and dynamic of the forest, a better understanding of the ecology 
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of the natural forest is needed. In particular we need to be able to predict ecological 
consequences of management practice (Emborg et al., 2000). 
 
Although it is conceptualised by its advocates as a non-formal alternative to 
silvicultural systems that are formal in the classical sense, back to nature silviculture is 
still prescriptive in character by setting up certain principles to follow (compare Table 
1). Perhaps it has more in common with traditional methods where good silvicultural 
practice is regarded more as a form of craftsmanship, or art, than it has with the 
science-based, and intensive, classical silvicultural systems. However, traditional 
approaches were based on naturally regenerated forests to a greater extent than is the 
case today. Back to nature foresters today have to convert existing plantation forests to 
more naturally structured forests. This is a kind of restoration process. Alternatively 
they can wait for natural succession to occur on non-forested land. Beyond back to 
nature forestry, we might secure forests with a more natural forest structure and 
dynamic by practising sustainable exploitation as a modern equivalent to pre-forestry 
silviculture. This approach would represent a development of nature-based silviculture 
in the sense that it would build solely on existing plant material – native as well as 
introduced – and use natural regeneration. 
 
Different models of the evolution of forestry and related management practices have 
been developed (Peterken, 1996; Kimmins, 1997). A rough sketch showing phases in 
the development of forestry practice, including sustainable exploitation, appears in 
Figure 1. The first phase corresponds to existing models. Later phases depict possible 
developments. Here, the dotted lines running across the circle indicate ways in which 
other regions might bypass the European development, avoiding the loss of forest 
areas and the degradation of remaining woodland. 
 95
 1.
6.
2.
5.
3.
7.
4.
Natural forests
(no forestry)
Traditional methods
(forestry)
Multiple-use
(forestry)
Nature-based
(forestry)
Sustainable exploitation
(post-forestry)
Exploitation
(pre-forestry)
Sustained yield
(forestry)
 
 
 
Figure 1. The historical development of forestry in Europe, sketched in seven phases, 
including a projected ‘post-forestry’ seventh phase. The dotted lines inside the circle 
suggest possible short cuts for countries or regions that do not conform to this 
developmental pattern. 
 
 
The first phase involves co-called baseline natural forest, defined as forest (relatively) 
untouched by man where no extraction has taken place. The next phase involves 
aggressive exploitation of natural forest, its clearance for other land development and 
selective, uncontrolled cutting. Pre-silvicultural exploitation involves the clearance of 
natural woodland and selective felling. This leads to the demise of the natural 
woodland and can therefore be characterised as a pre-forestry phase.  
 
The third phase includes so-called traditional forestry, which is an all-encompassing 
term covering practices such as coppicing, wood pasture and more or less controlled 
selection systems. In this phase, only existing, native species are used. The fourth 
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phase is characterised by increased control. One of its main objectives is sustained 
yield. In this phase, even-aged plantations of predominantly non-native species are 
often clear-cut to provide high yields of timber and non-timber products. Levels of 
control and manipulation are at their highest, and there is almost no remnant of the 
original, natural forest. The phase is, then, largely one of afforestation. In the fifth 
phase, the initial afforestation process is complete and the plantations can be managed 
according to a multiple-use, sustained yield principle. 
 
In the sixth phase, a return to the perceived structures, functions and dynamics of the 
once natural forest is aimed at. Here, restoration plays an important role, converting 
existing plantations into more diverse and structurally varied, mixed forests. Careful 
selective cutting in a mixed forest of predominantly native trees and the preservation 
of continuous forest cover typify this silvicultural approach. Finally, in the anticipated 
seventh phase, managerial intervention decreases to a sustained minimum. The main 
goal of sustainable exploitation would be to offer a more flexible approach in 
circumstances where more conventional silvicultural measures cannot be afforded or 
objectives besides wood production play an important role.  
 
There are similarities between this roughly sketched system of sustainable exploitation 
and the pre-silvicultural approach: extensive use, selective felling and the grounding 
of regeneration on existing natural conditions are shared features. But there are also 
some notable differences. One of these concerns the degree of control over the 
selective felling process. This will be considerable in the sustainable exploitation 
approach, since here it is expected that greater control will be exerted and that no 
clearing of the woodland will occur. (Purposive control of existing, natural conditions 
of the kind associated with nature-based silviculture would, however, be entirely 
abandoned.) A second contrast is that, whereas the original exploitation was based 
solely on the utilisation of natural, primary woodland, sustainable exploitation would 
involve secondary, and at most semi-natural woodlands or converted plantations with 
non-native species. Wood and other non-timber forest products would still be 
extracted, but through an extensive, controlled selection system.  
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Essentially, this last phase represents the dividing line between actual forest 
management and silvicultural practice, on the one hand, and non-intervention, where 
core use and passive use values of the forest are maintained, on the other. Arrival at 
this phase could therefore be characterised as the conclusion of a full circle in the 
silvicultural development of the natural forest. The development can be described by 
invoking one or more of a number of parameters, such as use of technology, 
regeneration methods, and so on. Schütz (1997, 1999) suggests that different varieties 
of close-to-nature silviculture can be defined in terms of the degree of naturalness, 
diversity and intervention; and to some extent these factors correspond to those we 
have chosen to single out, that is: controllability, the intensity of usage and the degree 
of modification of natural conditions required to achieve management objectives. The 
relations of these factors to different phases of forestry are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. The development of silvicultural approaches / dominant forest management 
objectives characterised by three factors: control, usage and modification. High (***), 
intermediate (**), low (*), absent (–) 
 
Forestry phase 
 
Controllability 
 
Intensity  
of usage 
 
Degree of 
modification of 
existing natural 
conditions1
 
 
Exploitation 
 
– 
 
*2
 
*2
Traditional methods ** ** ** 
Sustained yield *** *** *** 
Multiple-use, sustained yield *** *** *** 
Nature-based ** ** ** 
Sustainable exploitation 
 
* * * 
1 Prior to the extraction of wood and non-wood products. 
2 It may well be argued that in some cases, where the forest is completely cleared, the intensity of usage 
and degree of modification of the existing natural conditions are both high. 
 
 
As Table 2 shows, there is a gradual development from the pre-forestry stage to the 
most intensive types of use encountered in the fourth and fifth phases. Here, the 
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modification of natural conditions is most comprehensive. The higher the intensity of 
usage, and the more complete the modification of the existing natural conditions, the 
lower natural diversity is likely to be. The same is plausibly the case with naturalness. 
However, to establish this link one needs to determine more carefully what kind of 
naturalness is being referred to. It must be noted that the speculation about future 
developments mainly rests on a supposed continuation of the current back to nature 
trend. It tries to take this trend one step further. But other possibilities obviously exist. 
One envisages more intensive silvicultural systems that use genetically engineered 
trees to obtain a more environmentally benign type of silviculture with less need of 
fertilisers. (This might apply to the cultivation of Christmas trees, for example.) Here 
higher levels of control are evident, but they are not necessarily accompanied by a 
greater intensity of usage. Any determination of the degree of modification of the 
natural conditions will be part of a more comprehensive discussion about levels of 
interference and the manipulation of nature. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Back to nature can be understood in at least three different ways. First, in a temporal 
sense where back to nature refers to the structure or composition of forest at a special 
point in time. Secondly, back to nature can also be seen as referring to the way we 
intervene in the forest. In both cases, and especially in the first sense, a well defined 
baseline is needed. However thirdly, back to nature can also be understood more 
broadly as the wish to revert to a  ‘simple’ way of forestry or silviculture in 
particular. The implication of the last interpretation is that the need to operate with a 
very specifically defined blueprint state is not as pronounced as in the other 
interpretations. Instead, measures to simplify operations and practices should be 
considered. 
 
Back to nature approaches seem to fulfil – at least partly – the requirements of 
sustainable forest development in a post-Brundtland sense by meeting socio-economic 
and nature conservation concerns. In a sustainability context, nature-based silviculture 
has been suggested as preferable, ethically speaking, to a system in which there is a 
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sharper division between production and preservation (Ortloff, 1999). Nature 
conservation through non-intervention or set-aside management produces no wood. 
Nature-based silviculture, by contrast, generates wood while at the same time seeking 
to address wider concerns and interests.  
 
As an overarching management philosophy incorporating insufficient flexibility to 
adapt to shifting demands, productionism is on a receding path. On the other hand, an 
approach in which the notion of a natural forest is defined so as to exclude the original 
or the cultural is conceptually inadequate, especially in a European context. Hence, a 
strict, or purist back to nature approach is unlikely to be conceptually acceptable. As 
Larsen (1997) stresses, the concept of functional flexibility is more important. The 
concept of back to nature forestry may suggest that habitual thinking and the creation 
of dogmatic systems should be avoided within silviculture. Moreover, it may not be 
productive to project one’s “dreams about lost nature to the artificial [i.e. cultivated] 
forests” (Oldeman, 1990: 742). Instead, the inherent creativity aspect of forest 
management, and (more especially) of any kind of silviculture, should be emphasised.  
 
An important thing to stress is that, in adopting nature-based silviculture, foresters are 
bound to address nature conservation concerns more seriously. They must now meet 
society’s changed demands on a forest and forestry practice. More broadly, forest 
stakeholders need to discuss the ways in which the natural is perceived or enquire into 
what the ‘proper’ use of a forest is, and what constitutes a ‘genuine’ forest. However, 
this is part of a discussion about which values to promote and which concerns are to 
be considered ethically relevant. The latter is especially relevant if back to nature is 
understood primarily as a desire to revert to a ‘simpler’ way of forestry or 
silviculture. Moreover, such a discussion may help to highlight the process of 
balancing of costs and benefits, as well as concerns and values, inherent in the concept 
of sustainability and in modern forest management. 
 
It might be difficult to pinpoint what a sustainable future for forestry entails, but it is 
clear that a sustainable future for forestry will require us to balance these values both 
against one another and against any concerns felt to be ethically relevant by the 
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various stakeholders. In this way, the dialogue between foresters or resource 
conservationists, on the one hand, and environmentalists or nature conservationists, on 
the other, can become more constructive. The debate about changing silvicultural 
practices is, after all, be more than a technical, scientific and managerial matter. 
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Designer trees, exotic species  
and the ethics of manipulating nature 
 
  
Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandøe1
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the connection between modern biotechnology and forest and 
landscape management. One of the current centres of interest in the debate about 
modern gene technology focuses on the use of this technology to produce food crops. 
But the commercial use of genetically modified trees is now being discussed as well. 
In the forestry context, the concern is not about human health. It is about interference 
with existing ecological relations. At the same time, amid growing concern about 
natural biodiversity, extensive use of introduced species in forest and landscape 
management is beginning to be queried. One way to connect these debates is to view 
them both – gene technology and species introduction – as examples of the 
manipulation of nature. This manipulation occurs at different levels: the micro and 
macro-level, respectively. Both species and gene introductions should be assessed by 
asking how much manipulation they involve. Such an approach would help to clarify 
the way in which manipulation at one level has ramifications at another level. It is 
suggested that we should consider methods, production systems and practices at the 
micro- and macro-level from a combined non-human bioethical and environmental 
ethical perspective 
 
Keywords: bioethics, breeding, environmental ethics, forest management, genetic 
modification, introduced species, manipulation, values 
                                          
1  Peter Sandøe, Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment, The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural 
University. Submitted to Environmental Values. 
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1. Introduction 
The European landscape is an ancient, culturally shaped landscape, heavily marked by 
human enterprise. It has been altered by among other things the reclamation of wet, 
low-lying inlets and shallow lakes for agricultural use, the clearing of natural 
woodland, and the transformation of old coppices and moors to productive plantations. 
As a result of successive waves of human activity and the subsequent impoverishment 
of habitats, some species have become extinct (Pimm, 1998; Abrams, 1996). With 
increasingly sophisticated skills and techniques the natural environment has been 
modified to satisfy our shifting needs. For at least 250 years, exotics have been used 
in forestry. Species of tree have been introduced from other regions, other countries, 
and even other continents, to supplement the relatively poor native array of species 
found in most of Northern Europe (Godfray and Crawley, 1998). Moreover, over the 
past 75 years, attempts to improve varieties of forest tree by selective breeding have 
been common in many European countries; new varieties now complement the 
traditional use of wild forms. Through these developments forest management 
practices have become more independent of the site-specific conditions and the plant 
material available. 
 
Over the last decade, and following the engineering of the genome, more advanced so-
called designer trees have become a reality. These genetically modified trees have also 
been called ‘GM trees’, ‘transgenic trees’ or ‘super trees’. The commercial 
application of genetically modified trees in forestry is now imminent. In principle, it 
ought become possible to grow species of tree with specifically installed traits, in a 
way that is not limited by species boundaries (Damgaard et al., 1998). This promises 
substantial advances in disease and growth control and improvements in productivity 
and/or quality. 
 
However, the public are apprehensive. They suspect that genetically modified trees 
will not come without costs such as disturbance to the existing ecological balance 
(Owusu, 1999). The results of genetic engineering in the forest context have been 
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disapprovingly dubbed “Frankenstein forests” or “Frankentrees” (Warwick, 1999).2 
Moreover, in many European countries, increased attention to native species and the 
role of natural biodiversity in modern forest and landscape management has rendered 
these developments in some ways obsolete. The current trend in European forest and 
landscape management seems indeed to be toward, not just increased interest in native 
species, but a “native only policy” (Kendle and Rose, 2000). This preference is 
influenced by the belief that native species are better than non-native alternatives in, 
for example, their growth, stability and biodiversity value. However, exceptions can 
be found where introduced species are as successful in these respects.  
 
Plainly, both the native versus non-native issue and the question whether to use 
genetically modified trees are in part empirical. They can therefore be tackled to some 
extent using natural sciences. Here, questions such as the following need answering. 
How do the introduced species disperse their seed? What are their main competitors? 
What ecological factors influence the degree of invasiveness of a particular species? In 
part, however, the issues here are non-empirical, or conceptual. We need, that is to 
say, to address fundamental questions about values − to ask, for example, what can be 
considered a ‘proper’ use of the natural environment, and why non-native species are 
thought to constitute a ‘threat’ to the natural environment. Often these two levels of 
the debate are conflated. When this happens, the fact underlying value judgements are 
being used in conjunction with, or as an indirect support for, scientific opinions about 
gene technology and forest and landscape management can be hard to discern. 
 
A connection between gene technology, on the one hand, and forest and landscape 
management, on the other, is that both can be seen as manipulations of nature − 
although obviously, at different levels. Throughout the present discussion, the word 
‘manipulation’ is used as a convenient general term for any purposive human impact 
on the development of a forest. The manipulation of nature involves more or less 
skilful change of natural structures, elements and conditions in pursuit of some 
                                          
2  Other current topics include patenting of genetically modified organisms, labelling of products, 
and the possibility of exerting democratic control on the development and application of 
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specified purpose. As such, gene technology and forest and landscape management 
should be considered and evaluated by way of the same line of reasoning and 
according to the same kinds of ethical thinking. Currently, there seems to be a 
division between bioethics, which deals with matters at the micro-level (e.g. 
conventional selective breeding and gene technology) and environmental ethics, which 
deals with matters at the macro-level (e.g. landscape management and silviculture). 
However, bioethics can include environmental concerns. Potter (1971:4), who is 
usually said to have coined the term, defined bioethics as the combination of “biology 
with humanistic knowledge from diverse sources . . . [to] forge a science of survival 
that will be able to set a system of priorities.” Potter (ibid.) speaks of “acceptable” 
survival in relation to, especially, medical and environmental priorities. Today, the 
concept of acceptable survival has been supplanted by the concept of sustainable 
development. In the 1980s, non-human bioethics developed into addressing questions 
about the use of modern biotechnology, especially in relation to agriculture and animal 
husbandry. Increasingly, more general issues related to the use of the natural 
environment have been taken up. 
 
While environmental ethics and bioethics have developed largely independently of 
each other since the beginning of the 1970s, a certain convergence of the two 
disciplines is noticeable now (e.g. Frey, 2000; Gillon, 1998). Environmental ethics 
has undergone development from more theoretical discussions about the natural 
environment – e.g. species loss, the value of wilderness and how to value nature – 
into a discussion of more applied issues related to the use of the natural environment 
 
Manipulation at the micro-level often has repercussions at the macro-level. Here, the 
problem is not simply one of quantifying the associated risks and perceived utility of 
these types of manipulation. We have beliefs, indeed strong convictions, about what is 
right and fair in our social arrangements. Sentiments in one area can improve our 
understanding of what appeared to be a separate issue. For example, disapproval of 
the idea that genetically modified trees should be used in forestry might help us to 
                                                                                                                         
biotechnology (see e.g. Holland and Johnson, 1998; Rexroad, 1998, Holland and Pratt, 1995 
and Thompson, 1998). 
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clarify the animosity, now becoming apparent, towards non-native tree species. It is 
necessary to discuss the values at stake, for instance, when genetically modified trees 
are rejected and conventional breeding practices and non-native species are used in 
forest and landscape management. In what follows we look at different types and 
different levels of manipulation in the managed forest. We examine some of the value 
judgements involved in common consequentialist and non-consequentialist responses 
to the manipulation of nature. 
 
 
2. The managed forest and manipulation 
The manipulation of natural forest ecosystems was described by forest ecologists, 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s, in systems terminology: phrases such as ‘harming 
natural processes’, ‘disconnecting natural nutrient and energy cycles’ and ‘disrupting 
nature’s ecological integrity’ were often used at this time. In many cases, these 
phrases referred to contemporary forestry practices that were proved questionable in 
the light of the new sustainability paradigm introduced by Brundtland (WCED, 1987) 
and after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. 
Following these developments, official criteria and indicators of sustainable forest 
management were in introduced in Europe (Ministerial Conference, 1993).  
 
In essence forest management is about making use of, changing or regulating the 
natural environment so that certain well-defined aims – centrally, the production of 
timber – can be achieved. With increasingly sophisticated skills, scientific knowledge 
and technical expertise, the possibilities where the manipulation of nature is concerned 
have become greater and greater, particularly over the last few centuries. 
 
We will, then, distinguish between two levels at which forests can be manipulated: the 
macro and the micro-level (Figure 1). 
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 Forest-related manipulation
Micro-level Macro-level
Genetic 
modification
Conventional 
breeding practices
. . .
Ecosystem levelLandscape level
Clearing
of forest
Afforestation
E.g. selection of 
´plus trees’,
controlled cross-breeding
Plantation
design
E.g. introduction
of species, 
drainage
Woodland
management
E.g. selective 
felling,
clear-cutting
Reserve
maintenance
E.g. removal
of invasive 
species
. . .E.g. Inserting novel genes(including across 
the species barrier)
 
Figure 1. Manipulations of the forest at the micro- and macro-level, with examples, 
where applicable, in italics. 
 
 
Manipulation at the macro-level – for example, the landscape level – includes forest 
clearance and the subsequent conversion of the cleared land to other land-uses. 
Alternatively it might involve the afforestation of abandoned fields or moors. At the 
level of the forest ecosystem three types of manipulation can be distinguished: (1) 
maintenance of nature reserves, (2) management of native (broadleaved) forests and 
(3) design and management of (coniferous) plantations.  
 
(1) The maintenance of nature reserves, i.e. nature conservation, is usually connected 
with a low degree of intervention, and so-called ‘natural’ forest ecosystems are 
normally characterised as ecosystems with little or no direct man-made intervention. 
Deadwood is left to improve biodiversity (Hodge and Peterken, 1998). A common 
objective is to maintain the ecological status quo. Manipulating species composition – 
for example, by removing invasive, exotic species, or eradicating naturalised species 
(e.g. Acer pseudoplantanus), or reintroducing native species – is not uncommon. 
These species are apparently removed or returned to keep the ecosystem as ‘natural’ 
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as possible. Here, the natural is equated with the ‘original’, i.e. whatever was present 
before the non-original species invaded the ecosystem. 
 
(2) The second type of manipulation at the level of forest ecosystem involves 
managed, sometimes semi-natural, forests. In semi-natural forests, stands consist 
mainly of native species that were not planted and are naturally regenerated. 
Moreover, changes in structure and species composition are often more recognisable 
than they are in the natural forest. These forests can be managed under, for example, 
coppicing and high forest silvicultural systems. Felling, including clear-cutting, and 
occasionally drainage are examples here of manipulation. At present, more 
ecologically benign, nature-based types of forest management that build on a 
“continuous cover approach” are becoming popular (Kerr and O’Hara, 2000). The 
aim here is to minimise direct manipulation of the ecosystem by exploiting the natural 
regeneration of native tree species for the most part. 
 
(3) The third type of intervention in the forest ecosystem involves the highest degree 
of manipulation. These specifically designed ‘artificial’ forest ecosystems are often 
made up of uniform plantations of same-age trees and are characterised by a high 
degree of continuous management. Species, age composition and distribution are 
examples of factors that are regulated through silvicultural measures such as planting 
and especially cutting. It is often said that the only thing needed in silviculture is the 
blazing of trees. In this way, essential growth factors such as light can be regulated. 
The trees can be spaced out in their youth and thinned at the maturation phase, and the 
best specimens can be cut when they reach maturity, leaving behind shelter and seed 
trees. Moreover, artificial drainage and introduced species are common in plantation 
forestry. In the last hundred years, the use of improved (i.e. bred) material, fertilisers 
and pesticides has been frequent. However, it should be noted that fertilisers and 
pesticides are used in much smaller quantities than they are in intensive agriculture.  
 
Manipulations of nature at the micro-level can be divided into two prominent types: 
conventional improvement and, more recently, genetic engineering. Conventional 
improvement might involve, for example, so-called ‘plus tree’ selection and controlled 
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selective breeding techniques. Genetic modification involves the insertion of novel 
genes.  
 
In practice these distinctions between the different types of manipulation may not be 
as clear-cut as they appear. Manipulations at both levels are likely to have impact on 
the ecosystem. Moreover, it would seem that the manipulation of ecosystems through 
management, at least, is virtually inevitable, regardless of the state of the forest 
ecosystem at hand. In fact, in most cases it is not a question of whether, but rather 
what degree of manipulation to allow. The decision will depend on many factors: the 
objectives of the forest in question, and economic, ecological, social and legal 
desiderata are all taken into consideration. Often, economic calculations of associated 
costs and estimated benefits are the key determinants of manipulation of the forest. 
Here, the profitability of different management schemes is analysed, and these 
analyses are coupled with ecological considerations. However, these analyses do not 
cover all the matters at stake. In the following we will take a closer look at two 
examples of nature’s manipulation, one at the macro-level (species introduction) and 
the other at the micro-level (genetic modification), and ask whether similarities which 
would permit a common ethical analysis obtain. 
 
 
3. Manipulation at the macro-level: species introduction 
An exotic species is an introduced, non-native species. It is a species that has reached 
areas where it did not previously occur by means of human intentional or accidental 
transportation (Allaby, 1998). Botanists distinguish between two types of non-native, 
or non-indigenous, species. Non-natives introduced (roughly) before AD1500 and now 
considered to be established elements of a region’s flora, are called archaeophytes. 
More recent introductions are called neophytes. Many neophytes are very common 
and do not conform with the general conception of an exotic as being unusual or 
foreign-seeming. The terms ‘neophyte’ and ‘archaeophyte’ are not used much outside 
specialised scientific literature. Instead, incoming plants and animals are described as: 
introduced, non-native, non-indigenous, exotic or alien. They have also been labelled 
bioinvaders, immigrants and colonisers. Clearly, these terms become less descriptive 
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as we move to the end of the list (Eser, 1998). Some introduced species have become 
naturalised. A naturalised species is one originally introduced by human agency but 
now wild in invaded native communities and able to maintain itself without human 
assistance. 
 
In traditional low-cover forest countries such as the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, the majority of commercial forest tree species have been introduced to 
replace or complement natural regeneration. There are few native forest species in 
Europe, and this contrasts with the situation in the same latitudes in other parts of the 
world (Bradshaw, 1995). This is a result of the relative recentness, in geological 
terms, of the last ice age. Most of the introductions to species-poor countries in 
Europe with diverse growth conditions, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the 
UK, took place between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries; but there were further 
introductions in the twentieth century. The trees included conifers as well as 
broadleaved deciduous varieties. Some of these introductions (e.g. Acer 
pseudoplatanus, Picea abies) have been little more than an extension of the natural 
European range, whereas others (e.g. Pseudotsuga Menziesii, Abies grandis) are 
trans-continental.3 These species have been introduced for a variety of reasons, such 
as making possible afforestation or reforestation under difficult environmental 
conditions (Rackham, 1990). Introduced species may grow more rapidly, provide 
higher yields of wood and possess greater resistance to local diseases and other 
damaging agents (Zobel et al., 1987). From a management perspective, a diverse 
range of species gives more choice and opportunity when planning. Table 1 shows the 
kinds of species typically found in the three types of managed forest that were 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
 
                                          
3  Even trans-hemispheric species have been introduced, e.g. Nothofagus spp. to the UK (Peterken, 
2001). 
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Table 1. Tree species typically found in three types of managed forest 
 
Species 
 
 
Managed forest 
  
Nature reserve 
(Maintenance) 
 
 
Woodland 
(Management) 
 
Plantation 
(Design and 
management) 
 
 
Native 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Naturalised 
 
(X) X X 
Reintroduced 
 
X (X)  
Introduced  
 
 X 
 
 
Table 1 shows that introduced species are almost always found in managed plantation 
forests, although some can be found as naturalised species in semi-natural woodlands 
and nature reserves. Plantation is the dominant type of managed forests in many 
European countries with low forest cover. 
 
The degree of manipulation associated with the introduction of species can be 
described in several different ways. An important way is to characterise the ecological 
effects of the introductions on other tree species, on the relationship between the tree 
species, on the site and on biodiversity (Sutherland, 1998). Here the ability of an 
introduced species to spread through pollination and seed dispersal is a highly 
significant ecological effect. As Engelmark et al. (2001) point out, as the seeds are 
disseminated and spread, and trees are regenerated beyond the initial plantations, there 
may be negative consequences for biodiversity in the future. In the 1970s, lodgepole 
pine (Pinus contorta) was systematically introduced in Sweden to meet a predicted 
timber shortage (Elfving et al., 2001). In general in Sweden, however, the use of 
introduced species is limited and 95% of the growing stock are native species. In the 
UK, introduced species are more frequently used, particularly in upland areas 
(Rackham, 1990). In a small forest country like Denmark, roughly two-thirds of the 
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forested area is covered with introduced species (Danmarks Statistik, 1994). Here the 
use of native species of non-local provenance – e.g. oak stands originally established 
using masts from Dutch roadside trees, or beech stands originating from Swiss beech 
masts – is not uncommon.  
 
Examining the case of introduced tree species in the UK, Peterken (2001) stresses that 
well-documented knowledge of ecological impact is in fact quite limited. The majority 
of introduced species have been present for less than 200 years, and most are not 
abundant where they do occur. The tentative conclusion Peterken draws is, however, 
that introduced trees have in general been ecologically damaging to biodiversity. The 
damage is done through loss of semi-natural habitats and site degradation – for 
example, through drainage. Other types of ecological damage depend to some extent 
on the invasiveness of the species. It is claimed that indigenous species, by contrast, 
offer ecological advantages such as straightforward adaptation to the environment, and 
the ability to fill ecological niches and conserve native flora (Nyland, 1996). 
 
However, some points can be made in mitigation of the damage done by introduced 
species. In relation to the last criticism mentioned above, it should be pointed out that 
mature trees are generally valued in the landscape irrespective of origin. Similarly, 
when more diverse structures develop in stands consisting of introduced species, they 
become more acceptable in the eyes of the public (Peterken, 2001). Furthermore, the 
reduction in biodiversity has not been severe or large-scale, and wildlife has in several 
cases benefited from the introduction of forest tree species. Perhaps more importantly, 
forest expansion has been facilitated by introduced species, and in this way erosion 
control programmes and wildlife habitats have, for example, been created. In any 
case, these afforestation measures are less destructive of biodiversity than intensive 
agriculture: “If nature conservationists had to choose between replacing semi-natural 
vegetation with arable land or plantations of introduced trees, they would choose 
plantations” (Peterken, 2001: 41). 
 
In any given case, it is bound to be questionable whether an erosion of biodiversity is 
due to the introduction of non-native species or plantation afforestation and/or changes 
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in forest management and silvicultural practice. Types of change include the alteration 
of composition (from deciduous to coniferous trees and from mixed stands to 
monocultures) and structure (from multi-strata stand to more uniform plantations and 
from mature and mixed-aged trees to same-age trees). There may also be changes in 
site conditions relating to the local hydrology and soil.  
 
The acceptance of macro-level manipulation using introduced species depends not only 
on present and foreseen ecological effects, but also the cultural associations of an 
introduced species. Perhaps, then, signs of management connected with the use of 
introduced species amount to a special category of damage. However, introduced tree 
species seem to undergo a process of assimilation in the habitats they arrive in. As 
they become more mature their reception is influenced by changes in the perception of 
nature. The kinds of manipulation considered acceptable from an ethical point of view 
thus appears to change over time. We will examine this issue more closely in 
connection with the acceptance of manipulation at the micro-level; but before we can 
do this, we need to characterise manipulation at the micro-level more fully. 
 
 
4. Manipulation at the micro-level: selective breeding and genetic 
modification 
Manipulation at the micro-level designed to improve forest trees has been going on for 
the last 70 years. The purpose of such improvement is to breed trees with ideal 
characteristics that are capable of replacing or supplementing those that would emerge 
through natural regeneration. Examples of so-called ideal characteristics include 
improved (e.g. accelerated or larger) growth, more desirable structure, and increased 
resistance to diseases, pests and drought. Tree improvement makes use of inherent 
genetic differences between trees in a population and the tendency of inherited traits to 
control factors such as growth and development of the progeny (Larsen, 1956). As 
explained below, improvement strategies operate at a basic silvicultural level; they 
also operate at a more advanced level, using fairly intensive selection and propagation 
methods (Nyland, 1996). 
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At the basic level, artificial regeneration can make use of local seeds from, for 
example, seed collection stands or seed production areas. Another way of 
complementing local stock is to use non-local and introduced species. This was 
examined in the previous section. Intensive strategies include the establishment of seed 
orchards where cuttings from select trees called ‘plus trees’ are artificially propagated. 
Other strategies exploit controlled selective breeding programmes to create hybrids 
and use a variety of clonal propagation methods. The clones are tested and selected 
for a relatively small, well-defined geographical area. Clonal temperate forestry was 
envisaged, especially in the 1970s, as having a promising future in the mass 
production of, for example, wood for pulping.4 However, the expected benefits of 
using clones in terms of enhanced growth and wood quality did not materialise. 
Moreover, clonal methods turned out to be uneconomical. Clonal plantation forestry 
has been used mainly in fast growing, short rotation coppice in the Mediterranean 
countries and (especially in Sweden) in the production of wood for fuel.  
 
The difficult task for those seeking to improve trees is ensuring that trees with good 
phenotypes – that is, the interaction between a tree’s genetic makeup, or genotype, 
and specific environmental factors – pass on these traits to their progeny. Moreover, 
trees that do well in one area often show poor growth in other areas (Nyland, 1996). 
Comprehensive suitability tests are therefore necessary. Certain risks are associated 
with very intensive improvement programmes in which a relatively small proportion 
of the total population is used for propagation and breeding. These risks include 
reduced genetic diversity and reduced tolerance to environmental factors (Zobel and 
Talbert, 1984). Given the considerable time a forest tree species takes to mature, the 
testing of whether desired traits have been passed on or not, and of the suitability and 
adaptability of a tree to different site conditions, can obviously be a long-term project 
– one spanning decades. Immediate verification is impossible here.  
 
Over the last decade, novel ways of manipulating the traits of species of forest tree 
have been developed in an effort to remedy some of the drawbacks of conventional 
                                          
4  A clone is a group of “genetically identical cells or individuals derived from a common 
ancestor” (Allaby, 1998:88). 
 121
tree improvement methods. Two of the chief advantages of genetic engineering over 
conventional cross-breeding techniques are the speed by which new varieties can be 
developed and the ability to cross species barriers. Genetic modification has been used 
to manipulate the genetic material of a cell in order to produce new traits. In 
principle, recombinations of genes coming not only from related tree species but also 
from other plants, and indeed microbes and animals, can be introduced. Thus, 
genetically modified, or transgenic, trees are trees that have had genes from other 
species inserted in their genome. (A genome is the full complement of an organism’s 
genes.) The term ‘genetically modified’ is primarily used in Europe; in North 
America ‘transgenic’ is more common.5  
 
Over the last few years, genetically modified fruit and forest trees have been 
developed a good deal, although the absolute number of trials here is very small 
compared to the number of trials conducted with agricultural crops (Bajaj, 1999). 
Since 1988 there have been 116 confirmed GM fruit and forest tree trials around the 
world.6 The second half of the 1990s witnessed a considerable growth in the number 
of trials; in 1998 alone, 44 new trials were recorded. At the time of writing 31 field 
trials were registered in a comprehensive EU database of GM tree field trials. These 
trails are carried out predominantly by academic or state research institutions.7  
 
Some of the anticipated benefits of genetically modifying trees are similar to those of 
conventional forest tree improvement: faster growth, higher yield, and differences in 
wood composition such as lowered lignin content in order to reduce the amount of 
                                          
5  Lappé and Bailey (1999) argue that there is a semantic difference between calling a genetically 
altered organism ‘transgenic’ or ‘genetically modified’. ‘Transgenic’ is considered scientific 
jargon, which is just confusing to the general public, whereas ‘genetically modified’ more 
readily conveys the message (ibid.). 
6  The first field trial on trees, using genetically modified poplars, was in Gent, Belgium in 1988 
(Owusu, 1999). 
7  According to Owusu (1999), three private companies have established trials in the UK; Shell 
Forestry, Zeneca and Stora Celbi. 
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chemicals used for pulping the wood.8 However, most work is presently aimed at 
conferring herbicide, cold and drought resistance as well as insect resistance.  
 
The risks associated with genetic modification of trees are the same as those 
associated with conventional tree improvement. For example, by changing 
fundamental characteristics of the wood, such as the lignin content or the growth 
speed, the general resistance of a tree to various types of biotic damage (e.g. by insect 
attacks) and abiotic damage (e.g. by storms) may be affected. Environmental 
problems may also arise if unwelcome insects or pests become resistant to the 
insecticides the genetically modified tree produces. To cope with this more and/or 
other insecticides might be required. Because a tree is a long-lived perennial with 
complex flower biology, there is also a risk of spreading novel genes to wild relatives 
through species invasion or gene flow. The weakening or removal of part of the food 
chain in a forest is another ecological risk connected with genetically modified trees. 
This can have an adverse effect on local animal and plant life: for example, the 
widespread use of insect resistant trees is likely to create problems for birds that feed 
on insects and worms. Finally, wherever there are plantations of fast growing 
genetically modified trees with increased soil nutrient and water demand there is the 
risk of over-intensive land use.  
 
A principal difference between the risks associated with genetically modified annuals 
and perennials, such as trees, is the time factor. Christmas trees grow for 8-10 years 
and willow or poplar in short rotation coppice has a rotation period of 20 years. A 
conventional plantation of spruce has a lifespan of 50-80 years before final harvest and 
a stand of oak takes 120-140 years to reach its economically optimal rotation age. A 
genetically modified insect resistant oak tree might be attacked by a bark beetle which, 
after 30-40 years, has developed resistance to the genetic modification. In general, the 
long-term effects of modification on bird and insect life are difficult to assess. Since 
trials have only just started, there is little evidence to back up any worries. 
                                          
8  Of more doubtful usefulness is the kind of genetic modification of Christmas trees that five 
British students have come up with: a fluorescent tree with genes from a jellyfish, perhaps to 
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 One of the main conclusions of a Danish study of the feasibility of using genetically 
modified trees in forestry (Kjær and Jensen, 2000) is that, unlike agricultural crops, 
GM trees offer few real benefits. Coniferous plantation forestry and broadleaved 
woodland management are the most common types of Danish forestry. The majority 
of Danish forests are genetically and functionally diverse – that is to say, most forests 
are managed under some form of multiple-use management. At present, the expected 
benefits do not seem to justify the economic costs and environmental risks associated 
with genetically modified trees. Because of the considerable length of time it takes 
before a tree flowers, and because of the long lifespan of a tree, it is difficult to test 
the stability and expression of changed genes, and equally hard to assess a gene’s 
long-term effects on the ecosystem. Moreover, many of the desirable traits in forest 
tree species, such as health, quality and adaptability to climate change, are 
polygenetic. At present, these traits are too complex to be genetically engineered in a 
desired direction. Moreover, the value of genetic diversity renders reduction of the 
gene pool undesirable.  
 
In some cases, however, genetically modified trees may bring real gains. Possibilities 
include short rotation coppices for wood for fuel and Christmas tree plantations. At 
present, it is difficult to obtain economies of scale in short rotation coppices owing to 
the high cultivation costs and low profitability. However, Christmas tree and greenery 
plantations occupy approximately 5% of the Danish forested area. These plantations 
are intensively managed, with a considerable input of energy, fertilisers and 
pesticides, to create a highly value-added niche product. Here, the reduction of 
herbicide and insecticide use is an interesting possibility (Kjær and Jensen, 2000). 
Efforts are being made in Denmark to insert a gene into the most commonly used 
Christmas tree species (Abies nordmanniana). The gene codes for the production of a 
natural insecticide that will make the Christmas tree resistant to certain insect attacks.9 
                                                                                                                         
prevent children being burnt from candles and to prevent trees going up in flames. It must be 
noted, however, that is just a thought experiment as yet.  
9  In this case, involving a non-food product, there is no worry about direct effects on human 
health. The gene in question comes from the snowdrop, a small plant with white bell-shaped 
flowers (Saitz, 2000). The British researcher Dr Arpad Pusztai used this gene in his now 
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In this particular case, the economic costs are more likely to be justified, testing is 
easier, and the existing genetic diversity of the stand is not very great. The ecological 
effects are also easier to assess because of the short rotation age.  
 
In forestry, biotechnology has not (yet) been subjected to anything like the intensity of 
debate it has received where agricultural products, and in particular, genetically 
modified crops such as soya beans, are concerned. There are several reasons for this. 
To begin with, fewer trials have been conducted with genetically modified forest 
trees. Consequently, data on the ecological effects of genetic modification in this field 
are currently scarce. Secondly, no commercial use has been made of genetically 
modified trees in forestry – as yet. In Denmark, and probably throughout Europe, 
genetically modified trees are unlikely to appear for the time being except in 
specialised plantations. A Christmas tree plantation, however, has more in common 
with agriculture in its modification of the natural environment, degree of control and 
general managerial intensity. Thirdly, and probably more importantly, trees are not 
food crops, and this means that their modification poses no direct risk to human health 
of the kind that arises when we eat toxic or allergenic substances.10 The worry about 
genetically modified trees instead concerns their potential to have an irreversible 
negative impact on the natural environment. This worry is intensified by the longevity 
of trees (as compared with food crops such as maize), since this makes it more likely 
that there will be unknown implications. All concerns here have to be seen in 
connection with how a forest is perceived by the public. Forests, unlike agricultural 
fields, are seen as ‘uncultivated’. So the concern about modification may be rooted in 
unacknowledged disapproval of the management of forests as such. 
 
At any rate, concerns about genetic engineering in forestry relate in an interesting way 
to two currently recognisable and opposing trends in forest management. One trend is 
technological. It is represented by developments in tree improvement, including 
genetic modification, and the continued use of introduced species; and 
                                                                                                                         
notorious experiments with genetically modified potato plants that seemed to cause illness to 
rats.  
 125
characteristically, followers of this trend attempt to mitigate ecological, environmental 
and economic problems using modern (bio)technology. The other trend is the organic, 
‘ecological’ or ‘back to nature’ trend. This trend is especially pronounced at present in 
agriculture and animal husbandry. In forestry, it is exemplified by so-called nature-
based silviculture (Emborg and Larsen, 1999). The second of these trends is generally 
regarded as more straightforwardly acceptable in ethical terms than the first. Surveys 
have shown that European citizens are critical of applications of modern 
biotechnology to, specifically, agriculture and food applications; and it has been found 
that this attitude is linked to the usefulness of the application, the perceived risks 
associated with it, and its ethical implications (Biotechnology and the European Public 
Concerted Action Group, 1997).11 In the next section we will sketch the main ethical 
responses to the GM debate and introduced species. Hitherto, the developments at the 
macro-level, such as species introduction, have been discussed largely in terms of 
consequentialist objections. In contrast, the GM debate has in general provoked what 
might be called non-consequentialist concerns and objections.  
 
 
5. Summing up: two views on manipulating nature 
It is often said or implied that the use of introduced species, or the application of 
genetic engineering, is neither good nor bad in itself. This view is based on 
consequentialist assumptions. On it, concerns might relate to the consequences of 
sustaining introduced species in ‘artificial’ or man-made forest ecosystems; or they 
might be connected with the long-term impact of GM forest trees. Ethical 
acceptability depends on the extent to which introduced species or GM trees can be 
expected to add to human welfare (or more broadly: human well-being). It may be 
that, while the benefits of introduced species in increased productivity and thus 
profitability are reaped, the true costs of introducing non-native species, i.e. of 
manipulation at the ecosystem level, are yet to emerge. In the case of GM trees, 
                                                                                                                         
10  Here fruit bearing-trees such as orange trees, papaya and walnuts are excluded. These types of 
trees raise more or less the same questions about risk and utility as agricultural crops. 
11  In connection with other applications, such as medicine, modern biotechnology is considered 
acceptable, according to the survey (Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action 
Group, 1997). 
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predictions regarding the long-term ecological impacts are perilous. Increased 
susceptibility to storm damage, insect attacks, lack of regeneration and acidification of 
the soil are some of the signs of poor adaptation to the surroundings.  
 
This view focuses on results. In a forest, decreased functionality (from a human use 
perspective) and lower levels of stability may affect human welfare both now and, 
especially, in future. A forest may be negatively affected by the use of GM trees or 
non-native species. However, it may also be the case that these somewhat speculative 
concerns cannot be backed up by substantial evidence. The possible risks have to be 
determined through risk analysis: before any decision as to their acceptability is made, 
they must be balanced against expected utility, in a broad sense of that term. For 
instance, where a certain level of ‘natural’ biodiversity was considered good, the 
introduction of non-native species that might oust other naturally occurring species, 
thereby lowering the biodiversity of a given area, would be considered morally 
unacceptable.  
 
From a non-consequentialist perspective – a perspective that is almost inherently 
sceptical about the use of genetically modified trees and introduced species – so-called 
natural processes should form the basis of any intervention in the forest’s natural 
development. When species are introduced, or when GM trees are used, existing 
ecological relations may be disturbed. Species introduction as well as genetic 
modification is unacceptable because species integrity, as non-consequentialists see the 
matter, is degraded. There is at least one clear sense in which genetic modification is 
not seen as a continuation or refinement of conventional breeding practices. Namely 
because it makes the insertion of genes across species boundaries possible – species 
which otherwise would not be able to interbreed. 
 
Moreover, it is not sufficiently recognised that the history of an ecosystem is disrupted 
by introductions. However, following natural, unassisted migration, a species ‘new’ to 
an area or region in question is normally considered ethically acceptable. This 
process-based view might in part explain the rejection of manipulation at the 
species/ecosystem level. Once it is accepted, any introduction of species, any case of 
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so-called biological invasion where non-native species invade native ecosystems, and 
indeed any case of use of genetically modified trees, will give rise to (non-
consequentialist) moral concern. 
 
This concern has to been seen in the context of a formerly prevalent but now receding 
theory in ecology known as the balance-of-nature theory. In this theory, questioned by 
Peretti (1998), the concept of stability “inside” and “outside” ecosystems is an 
important feature. Peretti challenges what he calls “purist biological nativism” and 
poses an important question: “If peaceful coexistence in a multicultural society is a 
good goal for humans, why not for other species?”(Peretti, 1998: 190). It might be 
suggested that this question has an immediate answer. The evidence we have from 
most continents on the invasive character of introduced species suggests that peaceful 
coexistence among non-humans may not always be achievable (see e.g. Weidema, 
2000). To some observers an international mix of species would in any case be 
undesirable, because it would be a step towards the global homogenisation of 
biodiversity and the natural environment (Mooney and Hobbs, 2000; Williamson, 
1996; Cronk and Fuller, 1995). Instead of indigenous, well-adapted species we will 
end up with a group of omnipresent species, some of which, in deference to the past, 
we persist in calling alien invasive species. Each of these non-native species “becomes 
established in natural or semi-natural ecosystems or habitat, is an agent of change, and 
threatens native biological diversity” (IUCN, 2000). However, according to Evans 
(1998:199), native-only policies can best be described as, “a thinly disguised 
xenophobia – a form of ecological imperialism which determines what should be 
‘natural’ based on human preferences.” This viewpoint essentially calls for a 
discussion about how nature should be characterised. Nature could be seen, as Peretti 
(1998) points out, either as consisting of closed, co-evolved communities of native 
species, or as systems subject to frequent migration with a cosmopolitan species 
composition. A conception of nature along the second of these lines ought to have 
various ramifications in policies on introduced species and GM trees relating to 
managed forests. 
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6. Conclusions 
There are several similarities between species introduction and genetic modification. 
Both types of manipulation, that is to say any purposive human impact on the 
development of a forest, involve the introduction of new material. At the macro-level, 
species are introduced to an ecosystem, thereby potentially changing that ecosystem’s 
character. At the micro-level, genes are introduced to a species genome, thereby 
altering that species’ character. Eventually, however, any changes to the character of 
a species may influence the character of the ecosystem in which it lives. Hence, from 
an ethical point of view both kinds of introduction should be analysed as examples of 
the manipulation of nature.  
 
From a non-consequentialist perspective, the extent of manipulation involved in 
species and gene introduction could be determined with reference to certain principles 
and rights. The question would be: which of these is violated, and how much? 
However, this approach may prove difficult, because it requires the relevant principles 
and rights to be ranked in some way. From a consequentialist perspective, on the 
other hand, balancing is both possible and a key issue. In this perspective, the 
impacts, costs and benefits, as well as risks, should be assessed, ranked and ultimately 
balanced – perhaps on a case-by-case basis. This, according to the consequentialist, is 
the only way to determine whether species or gene introduction involves the greatest 
degree of manipulation in any given case. In some cases, species introduction would 
represent a greater manipulation of nature than gene introduction. In others, the 
opposite would be true.  
 
To encompass both kinds of assessment, a combined ethical approach to micro and 
macro-level cases is needed. It is necessary to treat the application of modern gene 
technology as well as modern forest and landscape management as manipulations of 
nature. However, it may be difficult to pinpoint where manipulation at one level 
begins and ends. Manipulation at one level is likely to have consequences at another 
level. For example, micro-level manipulation of the genome of a given species of tree, 
followed by the introduction of that species to a natural ecosystem, may impact at the 
macro-level upon the role, distribution and performance in the relevant ecosystem of 
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another species of tree. Consequently, there seems good reason, from an ethical 
perspective, to treat the use of gene technology and forest and landscape management 
(e.g. using introduced species) as joint problems.  
 
However, a combined ethical perspective is not merely a question of semantics. It is 
not, that is to say, a mere broadening of the definitions of bioethics or environmental 
ethics to encompass each other. It calls for a substantial rethinking of the conventional 
division of bioethical and environmental ethical theory; and it requires us to apply 
scientific, legal and sociological approaches that have been used in bioethics to 
environmental ethical issues. Bioethics and environmental ethics are branches of 
applied ethics, i.e. the study of ethical issues that arise or might be expected to arise 
from real activities. Consequently, it seems reasonable to demand that they should 
reflect the nature of real activities and be capable of fully addressing any associated 
problems. If this demand is met, bioethics and environmental ethics will be able to 
make a significant contribution to the resolution of the real issues to which gene 
technology and forest and landscape management give rise. A thoroughgoing approach 
may, moreover, improve our understanding of any underlying value judgements.  
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Beavers and biodiversity:  
the ethics of ecological restoration 
 
  
Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandøe1
 
 
Abstract 
This paper is about the value conflicts that lie behind ecological restoration initiatives. 
We focus on a case of beaver reintroduction in southern Scandinavia. We ask: what 
assumptions about the value of nature and biodiversity underpin nature restoration, 
and in particular species restoration? Beavers have been reintroduced not only to 
ensure their long-term survival as a species, but as agents that foster biodiversity and 
promote variation in the natural environment. In the paper, we show that appeals to 
biodiversity are made by both advocates and opponents of species restoration, but with 
very different results. We suggest that this is because two quite different conceptions 
of biodiversity are at stake. On one conception, biodiversity is constituted by certain 
“end-states”. On the other, it is defined by a certain kind of “historical” process. 
 
Keywords: beaver, biodiversity, castor fiber, ecological restoration, end states, ethics, 
historical process, natural, reintroduction, values. 
                                          
1  Peter Sandøe, Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment, The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural 
University. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Biodiversity. Okksanen, M. (ed.). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. Please note that American English spelling and punctuation is used 
in this paper. 
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1. Biodiversity and ecological restoration 
Ecological restoration has recently been portrayed as process capable of reversing the 
loss of natural biodiversity now occurring in many densely populated areas and 
intensively managed landscapes in Europe (Throop, 1997; Hobbs and Norton, 1996). 
Species restoration schemes operate throughout Europe and in parts of North America 
as well. For example, they have involved the lynx in Poland, and the wolf and the 
moose in New York State. Human subsistence activities, such as hunting and 
agriculture, have resulted in losses of wildlife species. Natural environments have 
been intensively utilized for many centuries, especially in Western Europe and parts 
of North America; and a high level of productivity characterizes these domesticated 
environments (Nash, 1989). As a result of these efforts to transform the natural 
environment into a highly efficient growth medium, variation is lacking and natural 
biodiversity has declined. 
 
Species have died out regionally, and their opportunities to return to former haunts 
have been seriously limited by intensive management of the natural environment 
(Thomas, 1992). Moreover, man-made artifacts such as roads, towns and bridges, as 
well as the straightening of rivers, block the paths of migrating wildlife. New policies 
on the conservation of wildlife, and on the general management and protection of the 
natural environment, are pursued in many affluent industrialized countries. These aim 
to recreate and maintain the dynamics and variation of natural ecosystems (Kane, 
1994; OECD, 1999). This presents new opportunities for the conservation discipline 
(Pickett and Parker, 1994). According to Jordan (1994), ecological restoration may 
well become just as important as a conservation tool as wilderness preservation.  
 
Restoration is the attempt to reverse human impact by restoring, or returning, an 
ecosystem or habitat to an earlier state – its so-called ‘predisturbance situation’. In this 
sense, it has been described as trying to turn back the environmental clock. In other 
words, restoration attempts to copy a specific historical structure. Certain restoration 
efforts are perhaps most aptly characterized not as turning back the environmental 
clock but ‘making it tick again’ (Cowell, 1993). For this reason restoration has been 
viewed as a variety of “creative conservation” (Sheail et al., 1997). Standard 
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examples of restoration practice include the elimination of introduced (i.e. technically 
exotic) animal or plant species, the reintroduction of formerly native species, and the 
large-scale alteration of entire landscapes. 
 
However, while it is generally recognized that biodiversity has been lost, and 
continues to be lost (Tilman, 2000), and while it is widely acknowledged that steps 
must be taken to resolve this problem, experts disagree over whether ecological 
restoration in general, and more specifically reintroduction, are effective remedies. 
The issues raised by the use of restoration ecology to protect biodiversity cannot be 
settled solely on the basis of prudential considerations. We argue that disagreements 
pertaining to species reintroduction which superficially appear to be about ‘factual’ 
biological and managerial issues really stem from fundamentally different conceptions 
of the value nature in general and biodiversity in particular. 
 
In the paper we will use the case of beaver reintroduction in southern Scandinavia to 
illuminate the philosophical issues underlying the value of biodiversity. First, we 
rehearse some of the main types of argument relating to the practice of ecological 
restoration. This is followed by a description of the case study, and by a summary of 
what we take to be the main positions in the ongoing debate over reintroduction of 
beavers. We then interpret these different positions, asking in each case how 
‘biodiversity’ is being understood. In this way, we try to establish the causes of the 
disagreement. It is important to distinguish between disagreements caused by 
conflicting interests and disagreements caused by conflicting values. We shall focus on 
a special type of disagreement where there seems to be a genuine conflict of values 
pertaining to biodiversity. Finally, we show how the claim that biodiversity should be 
protected is made by several participants in the debate and taken to have remarkably 
different implications: the need to protect biodiversity has been invoked both in 
attacks on, and defenses of, reintroduction and other forms of ecological restoration.  
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2. Three attitudes to ecological restoration 
One of the first modern and comprehensive definitions of ecological restoration was 
given by the Society for Ecological Restoration: “the intentional alteration of a site to 
establish a defined indigenous, historic ecosystem. The goal of the process is to 
emulate the structure, functioning, diversity and dynamism of the specified 
ecosystem” (Aronson et al., 1993). 
 
Species reintroduction can be seen as a limited type of ecological restoration − a type 
used where a particular species is missing. According to guidelines developed by the 
World Conservation Union Re-introduction Specialist Group, reintroduction is an “. . 
. attempt to establish a species in an area which was once part of its historical range, 
but from which it has been extirpated or become extinct” (IUCN, 1995).2 The overall 
aim of reintroduction is to establish viable, free-ranging populations in the wild of 
species that have become globally, or locally, extinct in the wild, and to do so with 
minimal commitment to long-term management. The term reestablishment is 
according to IUCN (1995) a synonym, but implies that the reintroduction has been 
successful. Sometimes, distinctions are drawn between restoration, rehabilitation and 
reclamation. Definitions of these terms vary, and the differences between them are 
often not entirely clear. Rehabilitation may defined as encompassing “a range of 
options which do not aim at exact fidelity to a predisturbance system” (Throop, 2000: 
13). However, the functioning and species composition of a rehabilitated system may 
be similar to the way they once were. Reclamation, on the other hand, is a process of 
conversion involving radical shifts in the structure of a system. 
 
A more recent definition of ecological restoration, adopted by the Society for 
Ecological Restoration in 1996, reflects a shift in the goal of restoration from 
establishing a historically defined ecosystem to recovering ecological integrity: 
“Ecological restoration is the process of assisting the recovery and management of 
ecological integrity. Ecological integrity includes a critical range of variability in 
biodiversity, ecological processes and structures, regional and historical context, and 
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sustainable cultural practices”.3 This more process-oriented goal undermines some of 
the criticisms that have been leveled at the previous definition. Instead of placing 
value specifically on the recovery of ‘natural balance’, or on the recreation of a 
predisturbed state, the emphasis is, perhaps more modestly, on the repair of past 
damage. It has been claimed that, understood in this way, ecological restoration 
cannot be used as readily as an argument to justify current or forthcoming degradation 
(Cowell, 1993). 
 
These differing conceptions of ecological restoration have at times stirred up a rather 
harsh debate, especially among environmental philosophers (Woolley and McGinnis, 
2000).4 Some negative views of the so-called ‘restoration thesis’ are recapitulated by 
Elliot and Katz. The restoration thesis is the claim that any loss in the value of an area 
is only temporary and can  in principle be compensated for later by the recreation of 
something of equal value. Elliot (1982) rejects this thesis and, using an analogy from 
the art world, describes restored areas as ‘fakes’. One of his main claims is that 
naturalness cannot be restored if ‘natural’ is defined as unmodified by human activity. 
According to Elliot (1997) an ecosystem’s value is dependent upon its history – its 
having evolved out of natural processes. 
 
Katz (1992), while accepting Elliot’s main view, discusses some of the limitations in 
the art analogy. One of his claims is that the restorationist’s use of the terminology of 
‘repairing’ ecosystems presupposes anthropocentrism and involves a fondness for 
technological fixes. According to Katz, restoration is part, not of the solution, but the 
problem of continuing human domination. Katz (2000) argues that the human 
intentionality is what creates the distinction between human artifacts (e.g. restored 
ecosystems) and natural entities. We should understand “that there is a realm of value 
with which we should not interfere . . . We cannot be the masters of nature, molding 
nature to our wishes and desires, without destroying the value of nature” (ibid:38). 
                                                                                                                         
2  It may also concern a lower taxonomic unit, for example sub-species, if that can be 
unambiguously defined.  
3  http://www.ser.org/definitions.html. 
4  Examples include Mannison (1984); Elliot (1984); Katz (1991); Gunn (1991); Elliot (1994) and 
Katz (1996). 
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 According to Light (1991), however, a more productive response to the problem of 
restoration is to distinguish between so-called ‘benevolent’ and ‘malicious’ 
restorations. From this more pragmatic perspective, Light argues that Elliot’s case 
focuses on malicious restoration. Such restoration acts in effect as an excuse for the 
deliberate damage of the natural environment. But benevolent restoration need not be 
a sign of human domination, as Katz has claimed. Instead it may signify an intention 
to heal the relationship between human beings and nature. Moreover, Attfield (1994) 
asserts that our role in relation to nature is a dual one. First, we must act as preservers 
and restorers, because the full value of a predisturbed system can be recovered 
provided that an array of former species can flourish in accordance with their nature. 
Second, our flourishing is important as well, and it is not necessarily a sign of 
domination. Rolston (1994) also supports the idea of restoration as part of a 
relationship with nature where intervention is inevitable. He claims, in contrast with 
Elliot, that ecological restoration can help to salvage values, and that natural values 
and naturalness do return. However, he concedes that for obvious reasons historical 
continuity cannot be recovered. Another important point is that many ecological 
restoration projects do not in fact attempt to restore ecosystems that are natural in the 
sense implying that the systems are humanly undisturbed and spontaneous. They aim 
to restore ecosystems that are natural in a culturally dependent way. 
 
In order to clarify the case study, we will distinguish between three standard attitudes 
to reintroduction (see Table 1).  
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Table 1. Three attitudes to the introduction and reintroduction of species 
  
Attitude 
 
  
Wise use 
 
Pragmatic 
 
Respect for 
nature 
 
 
Accepts species introduction 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Accepts species reintroduction 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
The first, which we call the wise-use attitude, has not been prominent in this particular 
debate. It is rooted in Pinchotian conservationism and represents an essentially 
anthropocentric ethical outlook, stressing the value of nature’s use. According to this 
position, any species can in theory be introduced, or reintroduced, depending on its 
associated benefits and harms. First, the foreseeable negative consequences of a 
proposed introduction – for example, the damage done by the reintroduced species to 
forests and fields – should be determined. Secondly, perceived benefit of the 
introduction, i.e. its use-value, should be assessed and balanced against the predictable 
negative consequences to decide whether introduction can be recommended. This 
attitude is the underlying rationale in game management, where the anthropocentric 
commitment is both evident and has justified the hunting of introduced species, as well 
as forest management and farm practices, throughout the last hundred years. Many of 
present arguments for ecological restoration are in essence based on this attitude.5
 
At the other end of the spectrum is an approach that might be named the respect for 
nature attitude. On this approach species introduction is opposed a priori.6 Proponents 
of respect for nature look upon the human interference involved in restoration as yet 
                                          
5  See Throop (2000). 
6  We do not use the phrase ‘respect for nature’ in the way Taylor does (1986). Given respect for 
nature in Taylor’s sense, certain principles of distributive and restitutive justice could permit 
reintroduction. 
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another sign of human domination of nature.7 Reintroduction breaks up the historic 
continuity of a specific habitat or landscape. Both the reintroduction and (more 
seriously) the introduction of species, amount to meddling with nature, and neither 
can be morally justified.8  
 
Thirdly, a combination of the two previous attitudes, a pragmatic attitude, can be 
discerned. Pragmatists oppose species introduction. However, they accept 
reintroduction, partly on wise-use grounds. In effect they apply a form of 
environmental impact assessment here. From the philosophical point of view, 
reintroductions may be of a malicious or benevolent kind.9 On the other hand, 
pragmatists agree with those who demand respect for nature that species introductions 
are neither acceptable nor desirable, whatever benefits arise. Reintroduction is seen as 
an exception to otherwise standard nature conservation practices. This somewhat 
radical departure could, for example, be justified where it is difficult for the species in 
question to migrate naturally to the country. 
 
In the following discussion, we will, as we have said, consider a real case. We shall 
review some of the actual reasoning attending this case and relate this to the three 
attitudes we have identified. Conflicts of interest are rampant in questions of 
reintroduction. An example would be the conflict between the interests of sports 
hunters and those of fish farmers. But the focus in the case study is on value conflict. 
True value conflicts occur when, for example, an environmentalist acknowledges 
intrinsic value in nature and a natural resource manager conceives of nature as only 
having instrumental value. The recognition of these differences in underlying value 
assumptions can contribute to our understanding of crucial differences in opinion 
regarding species restoration. Another fundamental clash is illustrated by the way 
                                          
7  See Katz (2000). 
8  It important to note that those who almost never expect environmental and socio-economic costs 
to be met by sufficient benefits share views on species introduction and reintroduction, but for 
entirely different reasons. Conservative farmers and urbanites may exemplify this NIMBY (Not 
In My BackYard) attitude. 
9  See Light (2000). 
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biodiversity is used as an argument. The wise-use and extreme respect for nature 
positions both use it, but with entirely different outcomes. 
 
3. Case study: reintroduction of the Eurasian beaver 
The Eurasian beaver (Castor fiber) is a semi-aquatic herbivorous rodent with webbed 
hind feet and a characteristic broad flat scaly tail. It is well known for constructing 
dams, dens and partially submerged lodges, and was once abundant in forest zones 
and wooded river valleys in Europe and Asia (Andersen, 2001). In the course of the 
last millennium, beavers have died out in many European countries. In Denmark, 
where our case study is located, beavers died out probably more than 2,000 years ago, 
in the Bronze Age (1,800 to 500 BC). With increasing cattle husbandry the prime 
beaver habitats, the wild meadows along small streams, were lost through the use for 
grazing and hay harvest (Aaris-Sørensen, 1998). Moreover, habitats were generally 
degraded or disappeared as a result of population increase and subsequent growth in 
agricultural activity. These required extensive clearing of natural woodlands. 
Excessive hunting also contributed to the decline (Fritzbøger, 1998). Beavers 
disappeared in Italy and Britain in the sixteenth century and in Sweden and Finland in 
the second half of the nineteenth century (Nolet and Rosell, 1998). There were only 
five small populations of 700 animals in total in Europe at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.10 Today, bans on hunting, the establishment of wildlife sanctuaries 
and, since the mid-1920s, species reintroduction, have boosted the Eurasian beaver 
population to c.350,000 animals. Most European countries where the beaver was once 
native have now reintroduced animals from the few surviving populations in Europe.11
 
In Denmark a number of more or less directly involved interest groups have a stake in 
the beaver’s reintroduction.12 First, there is the Danish Ministry of Environment and 
                                          
10  Beaver hunting provided pelts, meat and chemical substances derived from its castor sacs that 
were used both for medicine and as a base aroma in perfume. 
11  See for example Nolet and Baveco (1996); MacDonald (1995); MacDonald et al. (1995); Halley 
(1995); Mammal Society  (1999). 
12  The case study is based on, among other things, drafted reintroduction policies, proposed 
management plans, and statements from special interest groups, lot owners, and a governmental 
advisory council. The case is mainly based on the Danish process, but similar types of argument 
can be found in discussions of species reintroduction in other countries in Europe. 
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Energy. This ministry has supported the reintroduction plan. Secondly, there is the 
National Forest and Nature Agency, a government body responsible for drafting 
management plans, implementing these, and organizing public consultation. Thirdly, 
landowners, such as woodland owners and farmers, are likely to be directly affected 
by any plans involving reintroduction. And finally, special interest groups and nature 
conservation bodies represent the interests of those, among the public, who desire 
input to the issues affecting the natural environment.  
 
3. 1 Reasons offered in favor of reintroducing beavers 
The National Forest and Nature Agency is responsible for the beaver reintroduction 
scheme. It offers two major reasons why the beaver should be reintroduced (Asbirk, 
1998) First, there is an international legal responsibility to consider reintroduction if 
the beaver is unlikely to be able to migrate naturally to part of its former range. The 
Eurasian beaver has a fragmented distribution across its potential range, and this is 
interpreted as a sign of non-favorable conservation status. Secondly, several benefits 
appear to arise from reintroduction. The beaver is considered a keystone species. Such 
as species plays a vital role in an ecosystem, for example by maintaining the diversity 
of the ecosystem (Gilpin, 1996). Beavers and their activities are likely to render 
recreational enjoyment of nature more colorful.  
 
The legal responsibility arises from the Bern Convention. Article 11(2) of this 
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats stipulates 
that: 
 
Each Contracting Party undertakes: (a) to encourage the reintroduction of native 
species of wild flora and fauna when this would contribute to the conservation of 
an endangered species, provided that a study is first made in the light of 
experiences of other Contracting Parties to establish that such reintroduction 
would be effective and acceptable. 
 
The beaver is listed in Appendix III of the Bern Convention, which means that 
appropriate and necessary legislative and administrative measures should be taken to 
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ensure its protection. However, this does not necessarily entail restoration in countries 
where it has become extinct. But in view of the biodiversity goals enshrined in the 
EEC Council Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and 
Flora, a case for species restoration can be made (EEC Council Directive 92/43/EEC 
of 21 May 1992). Restoration should be considered with regard to species listed in 
annexes II and IV – that is, where the conservation status is judged “not favorable” 
and strict protection is needed. Implementing the provisions of this directive, member 
states shall, according to Article 22(a): 
 
Study the desirability of re-introducing species in Annex IV that are native to 
their territory where this might contribute to their conservation, provided that an 
investigation, also taking into account experience in other Member States or 
elsewhere, has established that such re-introduction contributes effectively to re-
establishing these species at a favourable conservation status and that it takes 
place only after proper consultation of the public concerned. 
 
The status of the Eurasian beaver on the global IUCN red list is not endangered but 
“Low risk: near threatened” (Asbirk, 1998: 15). According to the IUCN (1994) Red 
List categories, a taxon is Lower Risk when ‘. . . it has been evaluated, but does not 
satisfy the criteria for any of the categories Critically Endangered, Endangered or 
Vulnerable.’ The subcategory, Near Threatened, includes taxa which ‘. . . do not 
qualify for Conservation Dependent [another subcategory in Lower Risk], but which 
are close to qualifying for Vulnerable.’ A taxon is Vulnerable when it is ‘. . . facing a 
very high risk of extinction in the wild in the medium-term future’. Here, it is a 
matter of debate whether the best conservation strategy is to repopulate most of the 
natural range or to concentrate on certain key areas (Nolet and Rossell, 1998). It is a 
question of spatial scale – a question of whether to reintroduce in each of the countries 
in which the beaver once lived. Reintroduction is deemed necessary because it is 
almost impossible for the beaver to migrate naturally to certain countries in which it is 
absent. Sea surrounds Denmark on three sides, and the only possibility of natural 
migration is from the south, via Germany. However, this might prove difficult, 
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because all the waterways run East-West or West-East, and many man-made artefacts 
such as roads, towns, and dry cultivated land block the way (Asbirk, 1998).  
 
Besides the legal reasons, a few moral arguments in favor of beaver reintroduction 
have been given. Most other European countries have already reintroduced the beaver 
during the past 80 years, and now, the government suggests, Denmark should follow 
suit. The Eurasian beaver is native to the country. According to the government’s 
National Forest and Nature Agency, it has a “right” to live there (Klein, 1999b:5).  
 
But not only does Denmark have a legal, and perhaps moral, obligation to consider 
reintroduction; several expected benefits are connected with the reintroduction of 
beavers. It is a well documented empirical fact that beavers will foster variation and 
stability because they are a keystone species in wetland habitats (Nolet and Rossell, 
1998; Andersen, 1999). One of the main arguments put forward by the National 
Forest and Nature Agency is that the beaver will help to create more dynamics in 
nature: “It is not the beaver as a species which is the deciding factor, but the beaver 
as one of the most powerful driving forces in the most characteristic, original Danish 
nature types” (Klein, 1999a: 6, our translation). 
 
Beavers create open areas in wet woodland and thus help to increase a diversity of 
light-dependent flora. Threatened insects and mushrooms dependent on dead wood 
(which is rarely found in modern hardwood plantations) benefit from their tree-felling 
activity. The beavers might also prove useful as a new, sought after game species, 
since relatively large numbers of people hunt for sport today. And in a broader 
perspective, beavers are likely to generate high quality recreational experience of 
nature of the kind currently in demand by the public at large in many Western 
European countries: “The beaver is an interesting animal that it is exciting to 
experience in nature. The beaver is able to habituate to boat traffic and the outdoor-
life of human beings, so there are good opportunities to see or find its tracks” 
(Asbirk, 1998:23, our translation). In a situation where true wilderness areas 
characterized by natural dynamics are hard to find, other ways of making it possible 
for the public to enjoy so-called ‘quality nature experiences’ need to be considered. 
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The reintroduction of beavers will help to create natural dynamics and thus 
wilderness-like areas. 
 
The main justification for the artificial return of beavers may be summarized as the 
fulfillment of legal, and to some extent moral, responsibilities; the prospect of benefits 
such as increased variation in nature; and the possibility of improved recreational 
experience of nature. According to opinion polls, animal rights groups, nature 
conservation groups and a substantial sector of the public at large want to “help” 
threatened animal species and add variation to nature (Klein, 1999b). However, while 
many have this general attitude, some serious reservations about reintroduction are 
also discernible. 
 
3.2 Reasons offered against reintroducing beavers 
Opposition to species restoration comes from several quarters. Some opponents, such 
as farmers and recreational fishermen, fear the environmental impacts of the beavers. 
Others, such as some nature conservation groups, believe that beavers will have too 
little impact on the landscape and call for solutions that could lead to more substantial 
ecological change. These groups do commend beaver reintroduction, but they think 
comprehensive reintroduction policies need to be thought through first. An 
independent government advisory council also finds that policies need to be thought 
trough before initiating reintroduction (Naturrådet, 1998). The council generally 
argues that species restoration breaks natural continuity. Let us take a closer look at 
these arguments. 
 
Landowners – for example, those with farms adjacent to proposed release sites –worry 
that beavers will do direct or indirect damage to trees, or, by causing flooding, wreck 
cultivated fields and fish farms. Some woodland owners and farmers fear that beavers 
will change the general appearance of old cultural landscapes. Special interest groups, 
such as the sports anglers, are concerned that fishing will be disturbed, and oppose 
reintroduction of beaver. Moreover, the sports anglers want the current population 
beavers removed from the country (Thygesen, 2000). Even hunters, who generally 
welcome new game species, point out that considerable regulation might be needed, 
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since the beaver’s main natural enemy, the wolf, is absent in most parts of Western 
Europe: “[W]e will not be the authorities’ ‘dustman’ . . . we like to go hunting, but 
we will not be human scavengers . . . it is important that a new species gets the 
opportunity to act naturally”(Steinar, 1998: 8, our translation). 
 
Nature conservation groups assert that beaver reintroduction, even if the beaver is a 
keystone species capable of bringing variation into ecosystems, is too limited. It will 
not lead to a much-needed general habitat improvement, as the blocking of drainpipes 
on old woodlands might. These groups question the argument that, as an ecologically 
important species, the beaver will be a significant generator of habitat restoration. 
 
At a conceptual level, some conservation groups have claimed that the reintroduction 
of beavers by artificial means will leave no room for natural dynamics. They interpret 
natural dynamics as dynamics without human interference. From this it follows that 
the resulting dynamics created by artificially brought in beavers cannot be regarded as 
natural. Implicitly, of course, the non-natural is regarded as less valuable here than 
the natural. The claim is that non-natural migration is meddling with nature, which is 
presently not called for. National Nature and Forest Agency biologists have countered 
that, on the contrary, it is not natural that the beavers can no longer be found in the 
wild (Asbirk, 1999, pers. comm.) Regardless of the soundness of this viewpoint, a 
governmental advisory body, the Danish Nature Council, and some nature 
conservation groups have argued that, lacking a consistent policy, ‘random’ species 
restoration will fail to deliver a ‘naturally’ functioning ecosystem. Instead, a member 
of the Council argues, such restoration turns nature into an open zoo or theme park: 
“Some of us get a feeling that isn’t real . . . when I see that beaver, I will think of the 
originator of the idea . . . if I come to the Silkeborg lake district and see a beaver 
swimming around, maybe even with a collar, then it is a zoo” (Stensgaard, 1998a: 3, 
our translation). Thus, it is stressed that historic continuity is imperative for the 
appreciation of beavers, for the valuing of biodiversity, and for admiring nature in 
general. The independent advisory government council points to the fact that for the 
last thirty years, habitat improvements have formed the basis of Danish conservation 
practices. The Council denies that species reintroduction can be justified on the 
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grounds that it is likely to be difficult for beavers to migrate naturally to Denmark. 
The fact that there is a theoretical, albeit slim, possibility that some beavers would 
overcome the obstacles is sufficient to show that reintroduction should be opposed.13
 
 
4. The ongoing debate and the three attitudes to reintroduction 
From a management perspective – that is, either the wise-use or the pragmatic attitude 
–the ecological value of the beaver is very important. Restocking an animal such as 
the Eurasian beaver will not only protect a flagship species, it is argued, but enhance 
threatened biodiversity within the habitat. The beaver is considered part of the 
‘original’ fauna. Its presence will, it is claimed, help to restore the ecological integrity 
of a natural ecosystem. This notion of an ‘original’ habitat type depends on an 
underlying value assumption. As part of a restoration scheme of the Eurasian beaver 
and subsequent restoration of wetland ecosystems, the reintroduction of the beaver is 
believed to lead to a more original habitat involving a higher level of biodiversity. 
This habitat is believed to be typical of the region’s natural environment, i.e. the 
situation before human settlement and over-hunting occurred. 
 
By contrast, from a user standpoint direct and indirect use-values, such as recreational 
and aesthetic values, are emphasized. It is evident that here it is not solely the 
protection status of the Eurasian beaver which is decisive. The beavers are 
reintroduced to habitats that are hardly prime beaver habitats and are in need of 
substantial restoration. Human presence is seen as a constant, a condition to which the 
beavers will have to become accustomed. At the same time beavers are treated as 
means to satisfy the human need, or desire, for nature-based recreational experience. 
 
From an environmental policy perspective, it is our obligations to the international 
community and future generations (described above) that matter. Arguments drawing 
on these factors differ from justifications of reintroduction that focus on a species’ 
instrumental value to humans. They stress the cultural and historical value of the 
                                          
13  Unlike in, for example, the UK, where it is most unlikely that beavers will arrive by means of 
natural migration (MacDonald, 1995).  
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beaver as part of the native wildlife heritage of Europe. Moreover, many of the legal 
justifications rest on the assumption that beavers are granted existence-value. It is 
apparently this that explains why measures against threatened species should be 
pursued. The underlying argument seems to be that if part of nature is destroyed – in 
this case, if an animal species is exterminated as a result of human activity – 
restoration is required. This view is shared by a Danish environmental NGO called 
Nepenthes. A member of Nepenthes argues that restoration ecology, which admittedly 
differs from natural processes, can in fact help to alleviate a shared sense of moral 
guilt over the destruction and degradation of the natural environments: “We say, we 
want this and that! It is not self-created nature, but it is exciting anyway. I find it far 
more constructive to go out and do something, instead of sitting back being ashamed” 
(Stensgaard, 1998b:4, our translation). 
 
A moral rationale for the restoration process would attach significance to the making 
good, or correction, of some injury – in this case, damage inflicted by us on natural 
ecosystems. However, it is not entirely clear who the beneficiaries of such correction 
are. Are they contemporary humans, or future generations, or the populations of 
animals and plants in the restored ecosystem?  
 
The reintroduction of the beaver forces us to ask whether restoration of the entire 
species array from the period following the last ice age is called for as part of a 
biodiversity conservation scheme. Should wolves be reintroduced, notwithstanding the 
fact that, in many European countries, wolves were regarded as pests and culled less 
than a century ago because of the threat they posed to livestock? There is no 
comprehensive, clear policy on mammal and predator reintroduction and natural 
migration. However, when it comes to questions of reintroducing predators such as 
the wolf, concerns over potential harm to humans feature prominently. Likewise, the 
migration of wild boar to a country like Denmark, which has large exports of 
agricultural products, forces us to consider the risk of spreading disease to livestock 
animals. 
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The argument that restoration practices turn natural environments into zoos is 
expressive of the respect for nature attitude. It presupposes that the evaluation and 
appreciation of natural areas and the biodiversity they contain depend upon a minute 
knowledge of local history and ecological processes. This knowledge has been 
described as “. . . knowledge that can be acquired through education and experience, 
just as one learns the history of art” (Katz, 1991:92, cf. Elliot, 1982). Historic 
continuity is broken when species are restored, and in this way spontaneity and 
authenticity are lost, according to this view. Instead, natural restoration – natural, in 
the sense that it occurs without human assistance – is opted for, even if it takes 
decades, or perhaps centuries, for the animal in question to migrate across national 
borders unassisted. 
 
It is clear from this analysis that the arguments in favor of reintroducing beavers are 
not purely ecological, but have underlying value assumptions. The opponents of 
species restoration question these assumptions and insist that the reintroduction issue 
cannot be settled on the basis of the instrumental value of the beaver. The value of the 
biodiversity the beaver might support, and the value of the landscape the beaver might 
shape, have to be considered carefully. 
 
 
5. Values and notions of biodiversity 
This last claim prompts us to ask what is meant by ‘biodiversity’. It is evident from 
the preceding analysis of the beaver case that many types of value are at stake when 
species reintroduction is advocated or opposed. The values include use-values (e.g. 
relating to the beaver’s pelt and hunting as such) and aesthetic values (e.g. relating to 
the ‘cute’ appearance of the beaver). Moreover, the ecological value of the beaver as a 
keystone species, its less tangible existence-value as a species, and the possible 
attribution of intrinsic value stressing its right to live, are also occasionally invoked. 
 
The question is: which value counts when we are discussing species reintroduction, or 
more generally ecological restoration, in relation to biodiversity preservation? Are the 
relevant values of a non-intrinsic kind only? Such values are commonly associated 
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with traditional management of the natural environment and the attempt to balance 
(direct or indirect) benefits against costs. Or do we have to include values other than 
the non-intrinsic kind when deciding whether to restore? These differences in 
underlying value questions are reflected in different notions of biodiversity. 
 
Ecological restoration, including species restoration, is a tool to conserve biological 
diversity. Its advocates appeal to a notion of biodiversity in which species richness is 
stressed. The conservation goal here seems to be twofold, as the case with beaver 
reintroduction illustrates. One goal is the conservation of the beavers as a species. 
This assumes that establishing beavers in their entire former range will improve their 
long-term conservation status. The second objective concerns the conservation of the 
various threatened species that depend on the variation in wetland habitats which 
beavers are able to create and maintain. In this second objective, the value of the 
beavers is instrumental and dependent on the improvement of biodiversity.  
 
The ultimate value of biodiversity is also instrumental, however. For biodiversity is 
valued as a means of improving the ecosystem’s integrity, stability, and resiliency. It 
is therefore questionable whether it is imperative that it is a former native species that 
performs these tasks. If the important factor is the role a species plays in maintaining 
biodiversity, there should be no problem in introducing some other species, provided 
the ecological role is the same. In relation to these issues the wise-use and pragmatic 
attitudes appear in effect to take the same view.   
 
In addition to an ecological counter-argument stressing the need for a keystone 
species, another objection can be raised against this suggestion. Opponents of 
ecological restoration emphasize that the conservation of biodiversity is of importance 
only where it relates to the maintenance of natural processes. It is only where 
authenticity is preserved that the respect for nature attitude views biodiversity as 
valuable in itself. Thus, natural processes have to be retained as the basis for 
biodiversity, and historic continuity with the past must be upheld. 
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In effect, the advocates and antagonists of restoration invoke two quite different 
notions of biodiversity. One is linked to species richness and ecosystem integrity, and 
the other is connected with authenticity and natural processes. Advocates appeal to a 
notion of biodiversity stressing species richness, where the value of biodiversity is 
instrumental. Biodiversity is seen as a means of improving the integrity of the 
ecosystem integrity. Opponents refer to a notion of biodiversity linked closely with the 
concept of authenticity. They emphasize the importance both of retaining natural 
processes as the basis for biodiversity and of maintaining natural continuity. These 
different notions of biodiversity influence the way in which a given ecosystem or 
species is valued, and indeed evaluated. A conceptual framework originally developed 
in political philosophy might prove useful in tackling questions about how best to 
understand the different notions of biodiversity. 
 
5.1 Valuing biodiversity: ‘end-state principles’ and ‘historical principles’ 
In his theory of distributive justice, the political philosopher Robert Nozick (1974) 
distinguishes what he calls end-state principles from historical principles. According 
to Nozick, a social situation is fair and just, judged by end-state principles, only if it 
involves a distribution of goods which, irrespective of origin, displays a certain 
structure.14 Thus, in order to assess whether a state of affairs concords with an end-
state principle we require no information about the way this state of affairs was 
brought about. On historical principles, by contrast, whether a state is legitimate 
depends on its historical evolution, or the way it was brought about. Here information 
on how the given state has arisen is not just relevant but essential to a determination of 
justice.  
 
This distinction can be applied to the biodiversity issue. In wise-use and (to a certain 
extent) pragmatic approaches to reintroduction, end-state principles focusing on 
structure, stability and functionality are used to determine the value of a specific 
ecosystem. A certain number and distribution of species will be indicative of the 
                                          
14  Utilitarian accounts of justice make use of an end-state principle: the classical formulation treats 
a distribution as just if it maximizes the overall quantum of happiness. Nozick’s own theory of 
just acquisition deploys historical principles. 
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functionality, stability and resiliency that is characteristic of the ecosystem. As long as 
this is secured, positive value can be assigned to the ecosystem and the biodiversity 
contained within it. In the respect for nature approach, on the other hand, end-state 
principles alone are insufficient to determine the value of an ecosystem, and historical 
principles have to be applied. Here, the value of the ecosystem depends on its history, 
how it came to be as it is. 
 
Table 2 shows the relationship between these principles of evaluation and the differing 
conceptions of biodiversity presupposed in the wise-use and respect for nature 
approaches to restoration. 
 
 
Table 2. Conceptions of the nature and value of biodiversity and principles of 
evaluation: their relationship to three attitudes to restoration 
  
Wise use and pragmatic attitude: 
 restorationists 
 
 
Respect for nature attitude:  
anti-restorationists 
 
Conception of 
biodiversity 
 
 
Species richness 
 
Authenticity, natural 
processes 
 
The value of 
biodiversity 
 
 
Instrumental:   
adds to ecosystem integrity 
 
Intrinsic 
 
Principle of 
evaluation 
 
End state principle:  
ecosystem’s stability,  
structure and functionality 
 
 
Historical principle:  
ecosystem’s history and  
evolution 
 
 
According to restorationists, a wet woodland habitat with reintroduced beavers and 
other typical, but perhaps previously endangered, faunal and floral elements should be 
judged against a suitable, selected reference. A reference is here understood as an 
ecosystem exhibiting certain structural or functional elements believed to be 
representative of a ‘natural’ ecosystem with minimal human intervention. Thus, the 
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habitat may be judged favorably, regardless of any breaks in historical continuity, 
following restoration efforts. Anti-restorationists disagree with this. Facts about how 
the beavers actually came to be at the site would seriously affect their evaluation of 
the habitat. If the beavers were introduced, or reintroduced, that habitat would not 
possess the same value as it would have done, had the beavers migrated to the area 
without direct human interference. The beavers would presumably still add to the 
stability and resiliency of the ecosystem in the long term. They would probably help 
to conserve biodiversity as well. But the historical fact that introduction, or 
reintroduction, once took place would for them be a critical difference. Judged by 
historical principles the ecosystem would be, if not worthless, then at least less 
valuable than an authentic ecosystem. 
 
However, the appeal to authenticity in cases of reintroduction in domesticated 
environments causes problems. If domesticated environments relate to wilderness 
areas in the same way as domesticated animals relate to wildlife, is an authentic dog 
best represented by a wolf? Clearly, it is difficult to decide where the demarcation line 
should be drawn. There is a long tradition of heavy utilization and manipulation, for 
example, drainage in many post-industrial societies. Since, it is difficult, and in a 
European context in many cases futile, to restore an ecosystem to an early pristine or 
pre-settlement condition, ecological restoration is at best an exercise in approximation 
(Cairns, 1995).  
 
Moreover, many species that are now considered native were introduced just a few 
centuries ago (Agger and Sandøe, 1998). The current paradigm in ecology has 
replaced the idea of a ‘balance of nature’ with an idea of a ‘flux in nature’, and this 
too makes it difficult to identify authenticity (Picket and Parker, 1994; Aronson et al., 
1995).  The distinction between ‘nature’ and culture has also become obscure, which 
again renders the notion that a habitat is authentic, or natural, or original 
problematic.15 In many cases the best option seems to be to repair damage, or return 
an area to a former condition, and to acknowledge that this condition, being 
historically defined, is to some degree arbitrary. 
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6. Conclusions 
At first glance, species reintroduction addresses biological, technical and managerial 
issues. Beaver reintroduction has been justified primarily on an ecological basis: that 
is to say, it is defended on the grounds that it restores species richness and maintains 
evolutionary and ecological processes. However, as this case study illustrates, basic 
ethical questions regarding the origin and character of nature’s value bear upon these 
factual issues. Appeals to the powerful concept of biodiversity are made both by the 
advocates and opponents of restoration, but as we have seen, with significantly 
different results.  
 
In our view restoration practices can be as acceptable, and in many cases as 
necessary, as preservation efforts or wise-use policies involving minimal intervention, 
say, to protect certain species. However, the main lesson from the beaver case 
concerns the values underlying debates about restoration. Greater awareness of these 
values is required if they are to be properly promoted. We suggest that a careful 
examination of the conflicting notions of biodiversity invoked in discussions of 
restoration policy and management will prove helpful in deciding whether, where and 
what to restore. 
                                                                                                                         
15  Compare with Light (2000), who talks about the “culture of nature”. 
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Economic and ecological approaches to assessing  
forest value in managed forests – ethical perspectives 
  
 
Christian Gamborg and Flemming Rune1
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, ways of assessing a forest’s value are examined. With the trend towards 
greater integration of production and nature conservation in forestry, traditional economic 
approaches to assess forest value have come to be regarded as inadequate in the 
determination of forest policy and the setting of forest management objectives. In the last 
few decades other types of economic as well non-economic method to the assessment of 
forest value have gained a foothold. From an ecological perspective, approaches using 
novel concepts such as ‘ecosystem health’ and ‘nature quality’ to assess forest value in a 
non-economic way are being developed. The use of these approaches requires careful 
consideration of how nature and the natural can be understood. Moreover, to arrive at a 
sound and attractive account of forest value we will need to clarify how value is 
understood from an economic and ecological perspective. Two things are at stake. One is 
the attempt to capture values besides more well-defined use or utility values. The second 
thing is the effort to try to make these values measurable. Such clarification, and the 
critical discussion it requires, will help to make the process of ascribing value to a forest, 
and indeed good forest management, more transparent. 
 
Keywords: forest management, nature quality, health, values, ethics, sustainability 
                                                 
1  Flemming Rune, Danish Forest and Landscape Research Institute, Department of Forestry. 
Submitted to Society and Natural Resources. 
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1. Introduction 
The conservation of remaining natural biodiversity in managed forests is considered to be 
one of the major challenges facing Europe in the twenty-first century (Tilman, 2000). It 
has been claimed that the concept of sustainability will be undermined through the loss of 
“biological capital” if this challenge is not met (Pinchot, 2000). During the twentieth 
century the main aim in managed forests was to define and implement multiple-use, 
sustained yield forest management. Towards the end of the century, however, and under 
the influence of sustainability considerations, ways to balance and integrate nature 
conservation and economic development became a more pressing concern (Kennedy et 
al., 1998).  
 
How can we assess the ‘true’ value of the semi-artificial, engineered or domesticated 
forests that occupy a large proportion of the forested area in Europe? It is often claimed 
that forests of high, or higher, value ought to be prioritised in management (e.g., Wedell-
Neergaard, 2001), but which forests are the most valuable, and from which perspective? 
These forests are not managed entirely for timber production. Nor are they put wholly to 
other forms of sustained multiple-use, but they contain a considerable range of natural 
features that can be conserved.  
 
Traditionally, purely economic types of valuation have been central to the setting of forest 
management objectives. Here, determinations of what is considered good or bad, or 
valuable or worthless, are essentially based on assessments of public and individual 
preferences. The preferences also inform the most common way to weigh, for example, 
different management alternatives (More et al., 1996). In the last few decades, in addition 
to direct use value new kinds of preference-based value, such as ‘existence’ or ‘bequest’ 
value, have been suggested in attempt to assess the ‘full’ or ‘true’ value of forest. 
Inclusion of such values, it is argued, should assist in reflecting concern for nature 
conservation issues in relation to future generations more adequately. 
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But outside economics, other types of valuation have gained a foothold as a result of 
increased emphasis on environmental and nature conservation values (Averill et al. 1998). 
An example is an ecological perspective on value. From an ecological point of view, two 
of the main concepts employed at present to assess forest value are ecosystem health and 
nature quality. Very crudely, the better a forest’s systemic health, or the higher its nature 
quality, the greater is its value from the point of view of ecological assessment. Often 
high value is equated with being ‘natural’. However, concepts such as that of the natural 
are sometimes defined quite loosely, especially in Europe with a high proportion of 
domesticated or engineered forests. Two issues are at stake here. One is what set of 
conditions is considered conducive to ‘good’ health or ‘high’ quality. The other issue is 
how to measure such conditions and subsequently assessing forest value in an adequate 
way.  
 
A third way to capture the ‘true’ or ‘full’ value of the forest has come from 
environmental ethicists with a non-human-centred (or non-anthropocentric) ethical view. 
They suggest that we ought to treat nature, and therefore forests, as things that possesses 
intrinsic value. Only in this way, it is argued, adequate consideration is given to nature 
conservation issues. This approach is fundamentally different from the two approaches 
mentioned above, because it does not require any measurements. 
 
The objective of the paper is to examine these views on forest value. We argue that there 
are two issues, which needs to be addressed, related to attempts of capturing the ‘true’ or 
‘full’ value. One issue is what happens when more well-defined utility or use values are 
complemented by other kinds of value. Another issue is the measurement and assessment 
of such values. We describe typical welfare-economic and ecological conceptions of 
forest value. We realise that new approaches within economics have tried to 
accommodate ecological, and – to some extent – ethical elements. However, the intention 
of the paper is not to champion a single perspective. We examine some of the concepts 
deployed in these ecological approaches. These are concepts such as wildness, 
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naturalness, authenticity and originality. First, however, we need to briefly review the 
relation between managed forests and the concept of forest value. 
 
 
2. Forest value in relation to managed forests 
Forest values are relatively enduring concepts of what is good and desirable about forests, 
or conversely bad and undesirable (Bengtson, 1994). However, the term ‘value’ can be 
used in several distinct ways. In one sense, the value of forests relates to the functions or 
purposes they have in human use. For instance we speak of forests providing things of 
value such as timber, clean water and recreation. In another sense, values denote the 
scales, or standards, used for specific judgements in decision-making. They are the basis 
of criteria used to evaluate certain management practices. Both senses of the term ‘value’ 
are currently used. 
 
Much of the research on forest value and its relationship to forest management and 
natural resource management in general has been done in North America. The bulk of 
this research is in good part empirical. Its aim is to identify the values, relating to forests, 
that are currently held by various individuals and groups with differing objectives and 
backgrounds (Forbes, 2000). Xu and Bengtson (1997) examined the development of the 
core forest values of three parties − foresters, environmentalists and news media − each 
of which will play an important role in public debate about the design and management of 
forests over the coming years. Bengtson et al. (1999) confine themselves to US national 
forests. Their studies show that, in the United States at least, a gradual evolution in 
dominant forest values has taken place over recent decades. Forest values of growing 
importance include amenity values and recreational values, as well as aesthetic spiritual 
values. All of these are seen as enhancers of human well-being (Patel et al., 1999). This 
is in contrast with the attitude, often taken in commercial forest management, that forests 
are valuable solely as a source of commodities. As a result of this evolution, differences 
between the public and commercial foresters over what is considered acceptable in forest 
management practice are pronounced. In North America, particularly, silvicultural 
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practices such as clear-cutting and pesticides use have now been opposed by the public 
(Wagner et al., 1998). 
 
Forest values can be traced back to different ethical outlooks or belief systems. Empirical 
studies of US forests are carried out to try to measure the extent of public support for 
specific forest values and their ethical underpinnings (McFarlane and Boxall, 2000). 
However, as Minteer and Manning (1999) point out, the public is a very diverse group of 
stakeholders. According to Shindler and Cramer (1999), people’s interactions with, for 
example, forest agencies can be measured by the extent to which the values and concerns 
expressed by the public are given consideration in decisions. To facilitate this 
measurement, different types of classification system relating forest values and 
environmental ethics have been developed (Manning et al., 1999). Not surprisingly, 
almost the whole spectrum of value concepts has been considered − including, at one 
extreme, strict resource use values and, at the other, for example, aesthetic values. The 
ethical views found in a study by Manning (2000) included human-centred 
(anthropocentric), life-centred (biocentric) and ecosystem-centred (ecocentric) views.  
 
Many of these studies concern (relatively) unspoiled or untouched nature: so-called 
wilderness. But in a European context this focus is inappropriate, since here the 
(intentional and unintentional) interventions of human beings have influenced the 
composition and structure of nearly all forests. Substantial areas of original forest have 
been converted to plantations, sometimes with an intervening period of agriculture or 
some other use. Forest plantations seem to have gained a bad reputation (List, 2000). The 
claim is often made that, like industrial agriculture, industrial plantation forestry damages 
the natural environment (Maser, 1994). Fertilisers and herbicides, both of which 
potentially end up in streams and drinking water, allegedly cause this damage. But it also 
occurs when the soil is impoverished through the planting of non-native species that are 
unsuitable for the ecological conditions of the plot. Again, it occurs when habitats are 
destroyed (e.g., when wetlands undergo extensive drainage). In every case, there is a 
cost: biodiversity suffers.  
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 Thus silviculture of the kind incorporating even-aged stands that are clear-cut and with 
marked unifunctionality are perhaps a moribund type of forestry. Sagoff (1992:59) poses 
an important question: “Why should we care about wild forests, for example, as distinct 
from faster-growing biotechnology-based silvicultural plantations?” Plantations have been 
called ‘tree farms’. Perhaps it is the last hundred years of association between intensive 
plantation forestry and agriculture (e.g., Jacobi, 1908) that has caused this alleged 
difference between so-called wild forests and plantations.  Aldo Leopold (1949: 259) 
crystallised this attitude with his distinction between ‘group A’ and ‘group B’ foresters. 
Group A regards the land merely as a growth medium whereas group B regards the land 
from a broader, ecologically sensitive point of view: 
 
[G]roup A is quite content to grow trees like cabbages, with cellulose as the basic 
forest commodity. It feels no inhibition against violence; its ideology is agronomic. 
Group B, on the other hand, sees forestry as fundamentally different from 
agronomy because it employs natural species and manages a natural environment 
rather creating an artificial one. Group B prefers natural reproduction on principle . 
. . It worries about a whole series of secondary forest functions: wildlife, 
recreation, watersheds, wilderness areas. To my mind, Group B feels the stirrings 
of an ecological conscience. 
 
The management ideology of group A foresters lead to, in the words of one observer, 
plantations which are “as carefully tended as cornfields – and as ecologically sterile” 
(Williams, 2000:1). Another way to distinguish is between ‘false’ and ‘genuine’ forests. 
A ‘false’ forest does not necessarily apply to plantations where aesthetics and recreational 
use are prioritised over ecological concerns. Those who use the term ‘false’ forests 
disapprove of plantations which are presented as, or made to look like, genuine forests. 
Often, the term ‘genuine’ here refers to the type of forest once natural to the region in 
question.  
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In Denmark and in several other European countries, however, plantations have many 
functions and are managed according to a multiple-use regime. They are located at 
different points along a continuum, from so-called false forests to genuine forests, 
although there are of course few genuine forests, or from tree farms to managed natural 
environment or wild forests. It is these plantations − plantations that are variously 
‘artificial’ or ‘non-natural’ − that form the main topic in what follows. (We say that this 
is the main topic because we shall also attend to semi-natural woodlands.) We shall ask: 
in what way is value generally being ascribed to these plantations to reflect concern for a 
broader range of issues than mere timber production – issues such nature conservation or 
aesthetic considerations? 
 
 
3. An economic view on forest value 
Within neo-classical welfare economics, it is generally accepted that value is based on the 
interaction between the valuer (a human subject) and the valued (an object). According to 
this line of thinking, individually held values are the basis of individual preferences, and 
these preferences confer value on their objects. It has been described as essentially a 
consumer-based theory, tracing the value of things to values which people derive while 
partaking of them (Goodin, 1992).  
 
Much environmental economic research has focused on developing methods to measure, 
or estimate, these individually assigned values.2 Besides private preferences, there are 
public preferences which can be based on a set of social norms, i.e. principles of 
behaviour that ought to be followed. Consistently with this economic conception of value, 
forest value can be thought of as consisting of different preference-based types of value. 
This way of looking at things is elaborated in Figure 1. 
                                                 
2  Approaches to measurement include replacement cost or opportunity cost methods, revealed 
preference methods such as travel cost methods or hedonic property methods where indirect proxy 
price variables are used, and expressed preference methods such as contingent valuation methods 
(see e.g. Pearce and Turner, 1990) 
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Forest Value
Use value Non-use/passive use value
Direct use
value
Indirect use
value
Option
value
Bequest
value
Existence
value
Examples Timber
Fuelwood
Hunting
Recreation
Carbon
storage
Future
personal
recreation
Future
generations
Nature
conservation
Biodiversity
conservation
Preference-based value
(economic, anthropocentric)
 
Figure 1. The varieties of forest value. The total economic value consists of secondary 
values, i.e. values relating to functions and services of a forest. Based on Turner et al. 
(1994: 112). 
 
 
Direct and indirect use value, together with passive use (also known as non-use) value, 
make up preference-based value. Direct use values are marketable, i.e. possess a market 
price. Indirect use values are non-marketable, i.e. possess no market price. In some 
cases, the term ‘indirect value’ refers to what are known as ecological functions of the 
forest, such as carbon storage (Turner et al., 1994). Passive use values consider the 
possibility for future use. An example of a passive use value is option value. Option value 
represents an individual's willingness to pay to maintain the option of utilising – in a 
broad sense – a forest in the future. Other examples of passive use value include so-called 
existence and bequest value ascribed to woodland. Existence value may represent an 
individual's willingness to pay to ensure that some forest exists. If the willingness is 
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especially motivated by the desire to bequest the resource to future generations, such a 
value is sometimes called bequest value (Pearce, 1995). This is done well knowing that 
one may never in fact use the forests, and benefits accrue just from the knowledge of the 
existence of a forest or certain species or habitats in a particular forest.  
 
What is the relationship between these types of value and forest management? Direct use 
value, such as timber revenue, was once assumed to be the main value of a forest and is 
often considered expressive of an anthropocentric outlook. The objective here is to 
maximise profit by maximising the direct use value of the forest under certain internally 
or externally posed restrictions. The management paradigm likely to be associated with 
this outlook is sustained yield. This is what the proponent of resource conservation (or to 
use his own terminology, ‘wise-use’) Gifford Pinchot (1905:10) argued: “The question is 
not of saving trees, for every tree must inevitably die, but of saving the forest by 
conservative ways of cutting the trees”. Even-aged monocultures and intensive plantation 
forestry are typical of this management paradigm. Within it, it is considered acceptable to 
use pesticides, fertilisers, introduced species and specially bred plant material. Rotations 
are determined according to their economic value, and regeneration is most often 
accomplished by planting after clear-cutting.  
 
Where both direct and indirect use value are emphasised − and so where, for example, 
recreation plays an important role − the likely associated management paradigm is 
multiple-use, sustained yield. In this paradigm wood production is normally integrated 
with other concerns, such as recreational objectives. These direct and indirect use values 
are measurable to various degrees and can be subject to trade-offs. Where managers 
attach more weight to passive use values such as existence value and bequest value, a 
management paradigm that is sensitive to sustainability considerations, in a modern sense, 
is likely to be applicable. The management paradigms typically found in many European 
countries today are probably best characterised as a combination of these three schemes. 
Most national forest schemes in Europe include multiple-use and sustainability objectives, 
even if these objectives allow of more than one interpretation.  
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 Commonly, the values mentioned above are referred to as secondary. Secondary values 
are defined as the functions and services of the forest. Secondary values contrast with 
primary values. The latter are defined as life supporting functions. These functions and 
the web of interaction they constitute are sometimes referred to metaphorically as the 
‘glue’ of the forest ecosystem. It is argued that the true economic value of the forest 
ought to be composed of secondary and primary values. It is also argued that the latter 
have been underestimated so far in economic valuation and ought to be reflected in 
connection with sustainability concerns. The idea here is that in order to obtain true 
economic and ecological sustainability, we need to recognise both the primary and 
secondary values of the forest.  
 
The practical difference between these types of value is illustrated in the following case. 
Suppose an inconspicuous forest species becomes extinct. This will not be registered as a 
loss of secondary values unless the relevant species is either marketable as game or in 
some other (direct or indirect) way contributes to the services and functions of the forest. 
A species that is inconspicuous is not very likely to possess an existence value, and it is 
therefore unlikely that anyone will be willing to pay for the preservation of the species 
with which we are concerned. However, from an ecosystem perspective − a perspective, 
that is to say, in which primary values are treated as significant − the now extinct species 
might be recognised as having been instrumental in the life supporting functions of the 
forest ecosystem.  
 
Primary and secondary values can also be invoked in a non-economic perspective to help 
explain the concept of intrinsic value in relation to forests. Intrinsic value is here defined 
broadly as the forest is seen as having value in itself, regardless of its perceived 
usefulness to humans.3 From an ethical point of view, some of the so-called passive use 
values, such as existence value, could be seen as problematic because these values are 
tried to be made measurable or assessable before they are fully conceptualised, and to 
 170
some, intrinsic value is precisely non-measurable. In the following passage Maser 
(1996:176) outlines the consequences of the claim that the forest, as part of nature, has 
intrinsic value:  
 
Nature has only intrinsic value. Thus, each component of the forest, whether a 
microscopic bacterium or a towering 800-year-old tree, is therefore allowed to 
develop its prescribed structure, carry out its prescribed function, and interact with 
other components of the forest through their prescribed interrelated, interactive, 
interdependent processes. No component is more or less valuable than another; each 
may differ from the other in form, but all are complementary in function. 
 
In contrast with this, for example, Norton (1991) states that when we value nature by 
supporting the preservation of plant and animal species, or even entire ecosystems, we do 
not need to embark on non-anthropocentric environmental ethics: it is unnecessary to 
posit, or recognise, intrinsic value. However, on this view a forest is also more than a 
mere resource. It is a source of aesthetic or spiritual gratification and a provider or a 
wider range of ecological services.  
 
Another way to try to capture these forest values could be through the development 
indices, or ecosystem-related concepts. With these concepts we can try to characterise, 
and in some cases attempt to measure, forest value from an ecological perspective. 
 
 
4. An ecological perspective on forest value 
There are a number of relatively new ways of conceptualising forest value from an 
ecological perspective. Of these, we shall examine just two. The first (discussed in 4.1) 
makes us of the technical concept of ecosystem health. The second (4.2) uses the concept 
of nature quality. 
                                                                                                                                                    
3  For an overview on intrinsic value, see e.g. O’Neill (1992). 
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 4.1 Forest health, the natural and naturalness 
Views on how to define health in connection with forests, and therefore forest 
management, vary widely. From a classical perspective, sometimes called a ‘utilitarian’, 
health is defined at the level of the individual tree or stand. The definition of health 
closely relates to management objectives. If the management objective is to produce 
timber, trees that are free of pests and in other ways productive are considered healthy. 
Effectively, then, a forest is considered healthy where, and to the extent that, 
management goals are attained. It follows from this that dead tree need not to be a health 
problem in itself when the objectives include aims other than timber production, such as 
watershed management or biodiversity preservation (Kolb et al., 1994).  
 
Drawing on a metaphor from medicine, where sick or unhealthy individuals merit 
treatment, it is plausible to characterise individual plants − for example, trees − as 
unhealthy. Here, the unhealthiness refers, perhaps, not to an abnormal situation, but 
situations where coexistence with other species groups, such as parasites, weakens the 
plant’s normal physiological functions. (Precisely what counts as normal would of course 
need to be clarified here.) For instance, the pathogen Ophiostoma novoulmi adversely 
affects water-conduction in the vessels of the xylem, causing branch dieback, premature 
defoliation and, potentially, the death of the entire tree. In certain species of elm tree its 
presence is referred to as Dutch Elm disease. This is part of a metaphor, and one that is 
extended when research into ways to avoid the attacks is described as finding a ‘cure’.  
 
From what is sometimes called an ecosystem perspective, health is defined at the level of 
the ecosystem or landscape (Kohm & Franklin, 1997). Health depends not only on 
society’s objectives vis-à-vis the forest but also on the interaction of the biotic and abiotic 
processes that create the basis for native species habitat. Here a healthy forest is one that 
maintains its complexity, structure and resilience (Kimmins, 1996; 1997). Ecosystem 
health has a number of advocates, and indeed its maintenance is at the core of the new 
trend of ecosystem forest management. Leopold (1949) included ecosystem health as a 
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part of his Land Ethic, which was seen as a way of reflecting a so-called ecological 
conscience. He defined the health of the land as “the capacity for self-renewal” (ibid.: 
259). According to Leopold, conservation involves precisely the ability to maintain this 
capacity. As such, health is seen not so much as a static condition, but as a process of 
self-maintenance and regeneration (Callicott, 1992). One of the beneficial consequences 
of applying the concept of ecosystem health, it may be argued, is that considerations on 
management practices more readily become comprehensive. 
 
A conceptual prerequisite of our talking about an unhealthy ecosystem is the notion of 
land as an organism. An ecosystem contains the “complexity of living organisms, their 
physical environment within a defined unit of space, through which matter and energy 
flow” (Gilpin, 1996). A problem arises when the metaphor of health originally applied to 
the individual organism is used of groups of species, ecosystems, or the landscape as 
such. The sickness of one group of species − for example, parasites − that are part of the 
‘land organism’ can be associated with the good health of the land. However, the very 
existence of other species might indeed depend upon this sickness (Zeide, 2000). 
Furthermore, if land were regarded as an organism, any loss of species would be 
detrimental to the organism in the long run, and any kind of manipulation, such as 
introducing species, would be tantamount to an attack. It may be argued that the concept 
of ecosystem health makes it impossible to regard particular organisms, or groups of 
organisms, as undesirable or of negative value, and a problem arises over the 
measurement of a forest’s ecosystem health (Costanza, 1992). As such, it may prove 
difficult to prioritise in the process of management decision making. One solution could 
be to distinguish between ‘naturally’ and ‘non-naturally’ occurring organisms, for 
example, defined in terms of whether they are introduced or not. 
 
In this connection, and in the context of domesticated and heavily used forests in Europe, 
we need to ask how the notion of a natural habitat is to be understood. The term ‘natural’ 
is generally troublesome to use and demands clarification. Terms like ‘natural’ are often 
used in attempts to characterise valuable forests from an ecological perspective. 
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However, the terminology is confusing, as the following example from Gilpin (1996) 
shows: 
 
Natural forest (old-growth forest): With the dominant trees being older than a 
certain age, depending on the species involved, native or old-growth forest is 
important as it provides wildlife habitats in many areas, offers variety in the trees 
and the vegetation, and presents nature least affected by human activity. 
 
‘Natural forest’ and ‘old-growth forest’ are synonymous in this passage; and the latter 
appears to be being used synonymously with ‘native forest’. ‘Natural’ means something 
like least affected by human activity. If we equate the natural with old growth, many 
forests with no or little management − forests, that is, which are not exploited and which 
lack structural characteristics such as having dominant trees that are older than a certain 
age − will not be considered natural. This does not seem right. The confusion stems from 
an underlying unclarity about how to categorise ecosystems in (especially) domesticated 
environments. The categorisation is based mainly on biological criteria, but it also 
depends on some culturally determined attitudes towards the natural environment. Labels 
like ‘natural’ and ‘virgin’ are often used without the user realising the underlying 
biological and ethical implications.4 The concepts natural and nature are some of the most 
difficult and ambiguous concepts to define. Attempts at definition often involve a circular 
argument in which terms such as ‘nature’, ‘natural’ and ‘wild’ are deployed in rotation. 
In an ecological sense, ‘natural’ is used to pick out vegetation and landscapes. It indicates 
self-sown and self-grown vegetation, uncultivated landscapes and unconstrained 
environmental processes. ‘Natural’ denotes something that exists in nature in an 
                                                 
4  “[No-one] has yet described for me the difference between that wild forest which once occupied our 
oldest townships, and the tame one which I find there to-day. It is a difference which would be 
worth attending to. The civilized man not only clears the land permanently to a great extent, and 
cultivates open fields, but he tames and cultivates to a certain extent the forest itself. By his mere 
presence, almost, he changes nature of the trees as no other creature does… It has lost its wild, 
damp, and shaggy look, the countless fallen and decaying trees are gone, and consequently that thick 
coat of moss which lived on them is gone too.” (Thoreau 1864:115)  
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unregulated way, without control. It therefore presupposes a conception of the ‘ordinary 
course’ of nature.  
 
In one sense (often called a wilderness sense) vegetation can be described as natural if 
natural factors alone are responsible for the present appearance of the vegetation in 
question. According to the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary wilderness’ is “a 
tract or region uncultivated and uninhabited by human beings” or “an area essentially 
undisturbed by human activity together with its naturally developed life community”’. In 
the wilderness sense, a natural environment is true to nature and original, but devoid of 
direct human involvement. ‘Natural’ is also often used to denote vegetation that has been 
at a specific locality from time immemorial. In this sense, the notion of ‘virgin habitat’ 
coincides with ‘natural habitat’.  
 
In another sense, natural can be explained by defining it in opposition to the urban. Given 
this type of definition, often called a ‘rural’ definition, a cultivated landscape may very 
well be natural.5 In this sense, human impact is accepted as an influential factor. 
Normally, in a farmed landscape, the ‘natural’ vegetation refers to self-grown native 
species in for example, hedges. But annual and perennial woody crops would normally 
not necessarily be included as ‘natural’.  
 
The ideas of nature and the natural have evolved a good deal historically. In the ancient 
world, nature was conceptualised as a process or principle of development. The Latin 
nascere means ‘to be born’, and this points to both origin and development at the same 
time (Olwig, 1984). In this sense of ‘natural’, any state developing from an originally 
natural state will be considered natural. The ancients considered the pastoral landscape 
natural, although that landscape was influenced heavily by man and no longer in a 
primitive condition, because humans were considered as part of nature. However, in 
modern times, the use of ‘natural’ has been restricted: excluding human influence, it 
                                                 
5  ‘Natural’ can also be defined within an urban setting to denote natural objects such as park trees as 
opposed to benches and pavement. 
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applies only to ‘original’ or pristine conditions. Hence, the wilderness interpretation of 
nature can be seen as modern and the rural definition can be seen as classical. 
 
It is difficult to say what constitutes natural, as opposed to artificial, woodland. 
Plantations rely on natural processes regardless of occasional human interference. In the 
wilderness sense, natural woodland is woodland that grows without direct management or 
exploitation. However, this sense is virtually inapplicable, since all woodlands are the 
result of precarious interactions between the native vegetation, natural processes and the 
local people (Clark et al., 1989). Perhaps we should adopt Peterken’s view that we do not 
need to define the natural  “any more than we need to define the precise limits of ‘close 
to’ in describing, say, the position of a house in relation to a church.” (1996:12) 
Following this suggestion, we would retain the modern meaning of natural as involving 
separation from people, but regard some forests as more or less natural: that is, treat 
natural as a continuous variable. 
 
This approach is indeed reflected in the development of the concept of ‘naturalness’. The 
concept of naturalness can initially be defined as a state of ecosystem without human 
interference. The term ‘naturalness’ denotes somehow the result of wildness, and 
Anderson (1991) even considered naturalness to be ‘conservation potential’. This 
potential could be assessed by determining the degree to which a system would change if 
humans were removed from it; alternatively, and from a management point of view, one 
could try to determine the amount of cultural work that would be needed to fulfil the 
potential. More systematically, Peterken (1981) operates with five categories of 
naturalness. These are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Five degrees of ‘naturalness’ displayed by forests  
  
1. Original-naturalness 
The state that existed before people became a 
significant ecological factor. Thus, in Europe 
a forest with original-naturalness will have 
the species composition and structure etc it 
would have had c.11,000 years ago, after the 
last Ice Age. 
 
4. Potential-naturalness 
What a site at present containing native 
species would develop into if the influence of 
human beings were removed and succession 
were accomplished in a single instant. A 
hypothetical test of knowledge of secondary 
succession with the present species array, 
focusing on native species. 
 
2. Present-naturalness 
The state that would prevail now if human 
beings had not interfered, taking into account 
changes in temperature, in CO2 level, and in 
climate in general, and any resulting changes 
in soil. So present-natural forests would not 
be the same as the forests of, e.g. 5,000 
years ago. 
 
5. Future-naturalness 
The state that would eventually develop if the 
impact of human beings were zero, but 
allowing that other species might colonise, 
and that soils and climate might change, e.g. 
as a result of that colonisation. 
3. Past-naturalness 
A combination of original- and present-
naturalness when woods have components 
inherited directly from the original-natural 
forests. 
 
 
Source: based on Peterken (1981). 
 
 
This system of classification is mainly based on management intensity: the less managed 
and/or the longer unmanaged a site is, the higher score of naturalness. This poses 
problems where intensity has fluctuated. In order to use the proposed terminology, we 
need to address several questions. First, how should we quantify naturalness in a forest 
context − that is, which characteristics ought to be included? Stand age, structure and 
functionality are obvious candidates, but what about stand history? Secondly, granting 
that it is possible to quantify degrees of naturalness, different characteristics still have to 
be balanced. For example, which of these has the greater degree of naturalness: a 200-
year-old, non-intervention pine plantation, or a 100-year-old, self-sown managed birch 
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stand? In many cases, we need recourse to the term ‘semi-natural’. In a European 
context, hardly any forest can be described as purely original-natural, although some 
could be described as close to original-natural. In North America, the term ‘original-
natural’ has been used to describe woodland as it appeared before European settlements.  
 
In many cases, faithful characterisation of a particular wood will require a combination of 
the various qualities of naturalness; and generally speaking, no woodland could be 
entirely original-natural in Europe − the human influence here has been too great. Thus, 
in a European context, the concept of ‘nature quality’ has been developed. 
 
4. 2 Nature quality 
Nature quality, as a concept, is a relatively new invention. It is an approach that can be 
used to “describe essential biological and geomorphological qualities of natural and semi-
natural ecosystems” (Nygaard et al., 1999: 7). Synonyms seem to include ‘biological 
quality’, but it is worth pointing out that the term ‘habitat quality’ is narrower in its 
application and not used in connection with the landscape as such. Nature is regarded by 
those who use the concept of nature quality as involving not only organisms, things and 
substances created without human interference, but also culturally dependent ecosystems, 
organisms, spontaneous processes and ecological interactions (ibid.). Thus, nature is not 
defined exclusively in a wilderness sense but contains also elements of a classical 
definition. The concept of quality entails a process of defining and measuring – or 
assessing – certain, e.g. structural elements.   
 
In order to apply the concept of nature quality in practice − in relation to forest 
management − Møller (1999) has set up an index based on structural indicators (see Table 
2). On a somewhat crude basis, this index shows the correlation between degrees of 
nature quality and types of forest.  
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Table 2. The relationship between degree of nature quality and type of forest, with 
examples 
 
Nature quality 
 
 
Type of forest 
 
* 
 
Young, intensively managed, planted stand, for example on 
former agricultural land (e.g., Christmas tree plantation) 
 
** Even-aged, younger monoculture 
 
*** Managed, uneven-aged, older forest composed of native tree 
species, preferably under a selective silvicultural system 
 
**** Relatively untouched, semi-natural forest with structural 
variation, old trees and deadwood 
 
***** Virgin forest and large areas of old-growth forest with high 
variation, old trees, coarse woody debris and a history of long 
continuity 
 
Source: based on Møller (1999). 
 
 
Møller’s index (1999) allows us to get an overview of the status of a forest in relation to 
the criteria of nature quality. However, preparing such an index is time consuming 
because it requires a full inventory. The method has also been criticised for involving 
subjective assessments, especially in relation to the weighing of the different elements is 
concerned. Apart from the more practical (and economical) problem of time 
consumption, the problem with assessment of elements is not the assessment in itself, but 
perhaps more a lack of transparency of the procedure and criteria for balancing. 
 
Another approach has been suggested by Rune (1997). This involves the assessment of 
nature quality at three levels: the landscape level, the stand level and the plot level. The 
following are some examples of the assessments. At the first level forest edges, age 
distributions and wetland areas are recorded. At the second level the number of large 
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trees and deadwood are recorded. At the third level, biodiversity is assessed through a 
recording of vascular plants, fungi and so on. At each level between three and five 
specially adapted indices are calculated. These express selected thematic aspects of nature 
quality in forests, such as forest age mosaic, the presence of coarse woody debris, and the 
development of epiphyte growth. This approach can be used to help set management 
priorities for cultivated forests, but it is not designed to be used as a tool for prioritising 
nature protection measures at the policy level. It is a method of assessing the relative state 
of forest values according to specific criteria in order to document overall ‘improvements’ 
or ‘aggravations’ in relation to approved nature quality objectives in the forest’s 
management. The method is, then, a specific implementation of the general concept of 
nature quality.  
 
The application of the general concept of nature quality is not restricted to forests, as used 
by Nygaard et al. (1999) and presses into service four criteria: wildness, originality, 
continuity and authenticity.  
 
Wildness is here defined as natural processes without human interference. This definition 
resembles the modern notion of nature described above. (The quality, then, of nature 
turns out to be natural!) It is, however, not entirely clear whether this includes natural 
processes only. In a situation in which human beings have influenced the natural 
ecosystems significantly, not all types of management are considered to have an adverse 
effect on wildness criteria. Somewhat paradoxically, the creation of wildness through 
planned ‘natural’ disturbances, such as fires, sometimes requires intervention 
management as a prerequisite.  
 
An original landscape is basically one that is unchanged by human activity. But owing to 
natural dynamics (i.e., without direct human interference), there are always changes in 
species composition, soil structure and so on. Hence, when it is pushed to its logical 
conclusion, ‘originality’ can be used as a criterion of nature quality only when applied to 
an imagined successional stage that might have developed if human beings had not 
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intervened. Although forest is an original type of vegetation (or natural climax vegetation) 
in, for example, Denmark, a given forest needs not to be original. The originality 
depends on factors such as hydrology, soil, regeneration patterns and, most importantly, 
species composition. A plantation of an introduced, highly bred species of Christmas tree 
in short rotation would have limited originality, because the native species that might 
have been expected to be there have been replaced by another, non-native species through 
human intervention. In other words, an emphasis on originality is a priority where native 
species are concerned.  
 
The third criterion is continuity in time and space. However, as Nygaard et al. (1999) 
point out, the timescale here is not the same as it was in the originality criteria. A shorter 
period is involved, especially on nutrient-poor, sandy soil (Dzwonko and Loster 1990). 
An area with long-standing continuity is not necessarily original. But continuity in time is 
thought to be an important prerequisite of variation and complex structure. Obviously, 
continuity in space requires areas that are undisturbed by human beings. During the 1980s 
and 1990s lists of between 500 and 1,000 continuity-indicating forest species (of both 
plant and animal) were elaborated for northern European forests (Rune 2001). Forest 
management practices such as clear-cutting, intensive soil preparation and the application 
of fertilisers and pesticides break continuity. In heavily domesticated landscapes such as 
those in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, forest continuity is quite limited. 
 
The fourth criterion, authenticity, relates to what is considered ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ as 
opposed to ‘false’ or ‘fake’. Nature can be authentic without being original in the sense 
used above. Authenticity, in contrast with wildness, originality and continuity, cannot be 
determined through empirical surveys of degradation (or habitat loss) or through an 
assessment of the proportion of introduced species. The ways in which species interact 
are more important than the actual species themselves, and maintaining these interactive 
processes is the most important factor in sustaining authenticity. A man-made type of 
nature (for example, fields lying fallow) can be authentic if it fulfils our expectations as to 
origin, composition and species interaction. Reintroductions of locally extinct species 
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compromise authenticity because they do not conform to our expectations regarding 
origin. Thus authentic species must be natural migrants to an area, even if their presence, 
and continuing survival, is the result of human support.  
 
In the vicinity of these four criteria of nature quality there are several terms with similar 
meanings.6 Biodiversity can be used as another measure of forest value. A forest of high 
value could accordingly be defined in terms of high levels of (natural) biodiversity. Not 
all kinds of biodiversity are considered equally valuable (Agger and Sandøe, 1998). A 
given level of biodiversity in introduced species would perhaps not yield the same value 
as a similar level of biodiversity in indigenous species. Any use of biodiversity is likely to 
rest, then, on certain value judgements. As Nygaard et al. (1999) note, a high level of 
biodiversity is not equivalent to a high level of nature quality. Natural ecosystems with a 
characteristically low level of species diversity can have a high level of nature quality if 
they possess sufficient wildness, originality, continuity or authenticity. 
 
As an alternative to the emphasis on forest structures and characteristics such as wildness, 
originality or authenticity, factors such as stability, functionality, flexibility and 
adaptability have been suggested to take into account when assessing forest value from an 
ecological perspective – although it may have economic ramifications (Larsen, 1995). A 
forest with a high degree of continuity may contain several organisms adapted to specific 
micro-habitats which themselves enter into complex interactions, and where this is so the 
forest is not very flexible or adaptable. From this particular ecological perspective, then, 
forests of great value may contain well-adapted but introduced species. A highly valued 
                                                 
6  Another concept rather closely related to the concepts of ecosystem health and nature quality is 
biological, or ecological, integrity is. Frey (1975) proposed a definition, later amended by Karr and 
Dudley (1981), which runs thus: “Biological integrity is the capability of supporting and maintaining 
a balanced, integrated, adaptive community of organisms having a species composition, diversity, 
and functional organisation comparable to that of a natural habitat”. Biological integrity comprises 
elements of both composition and process, but it focuses primarily on a system’s capacity to generate 
diversity (Rune, 2000). The concept of rarity is also often brought into discussions of nature quality. 
In a simple way, the number of rare species found in a forest could be considered a measure of that 
forest’s value. Likewise, the rarity of each species found could be used as an accumulative measure. 
However, rarity does necessarily indicate a high level of nature quality, because it is merely a matter 
of relative occurrence and can have many causes.  
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type of forest management would be flexible in response to the shifting needs and 
potentially different priorities of future generations. So-called nature-based silviculture is 
claimed to be such an approach (Emborg and Larsen, 1999). Enhanced nature quality 
would involve features, such as stability and flexibility, that support economic and 
ecological sustainability (Thorsen, 1999). 
 
Forests with impressive nature quality may be greatly valued, but they are far from 
essential to sustainable development (Arler, 2000b). Ecological sustainability does not 
necessarily lead to a high level of nature quality, and a high level of nature quality is 
hardly a prerequisite for long-term sustainability.7 However, forests with high levels of 
nature quality may be considered valuable, not because they are useful, but for other 
reasons relating to, for example, beauty, character, biodiversity, narrative content and 
autonomy (Arler, 2000a). The economic and ecological perspective could perhaps 
coincide where a preference for high levels of nature quality has been expressed.  
 
It may seem peculiar that the concept of nature in nature quality is defined broadly to 
include humanly created, or dependent, ecosystems; and this may seen especially odd 
when the criteria address qualities primarily of humanly undisturbed ecosystems. 
However, some of the criteria do in fact permit the broader definition. For instance, 
authenticity can be applied to a gravel pit (one that we are not pretending is anything 
else). Moreover, an approach covering humanly created types of ecosystem recognises 
the role of humans in, and as a part of, nature. This need not prevent us from valuing 
nature with less human interference more highly than humanly disturbed nature. But 
problems arise because no matter how conscientiously we try to fix the originality 
criterion by referring to an imagined successional stage, as discussed above, we cannot 
                                                 
7  According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Article 2, sustainable use means “the 
use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term 
decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of 
present and future generations”. If this is accepted, a forest’s value will be determined by its ability 
to maintain the potential to meet the needs of present and future generations, regardless of it’s nature 
quality as defined by Nygaard et al. (1999). 
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fully characterise a baseline scenario. Reference to a past natural situation may turn out to 
be irrelevant, given, for example, the current climate or level of pollution.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The term ‘forest value’ can refer to what is good or desirable about forests. From an 
economic perspective, the idea of good forest management determines what a good forest 
is. Traditionally, good forestry has been defined as profitable forestry. Today, however, 
it is widely accepted that ‘good’ forestry may also involve optimising more than 
immediate profit defining values. The ‘true’ value of the forest seems also to be 
determined by other, essentially preference-based so-called non-use or passive use, values 
such as option or existence value. From an ecological perspective, it seems that the tables 
are turned: notions of a good forest determine what good forest management is. What is 
good is defined as what is either natural or has strong affinity to the natural, explained 
and measured through concepts such as ecosystem health or nature quality. Factors to 
consider include authenticity, wildness and naturalness. This, however, requires us to 
specify the type naturalness at issue. Combined, the approaches within economics and 
ecology may be seen as attempts to characterise and capture part of the notion of intrinsic 
value, espoused by certain environmental ethical theories. 
 
To arrive at a sound and attractive account of forest value we will need to clarify how 
value is understood from an economic, ecological as well as ethical perspective. Two 
things are at stake. One is the attempt to capture value besides more well-defined use or 
utility value. Here, one of the problems concerns conceptualising these values. The 
second thing is the effort to try to make these values measurable. Here, a problem is 
making it clear when values are in fact estimated or assessed and not measured. Such 
clarification, and the critical discussion it requires, will help to make the process of 
ascribing value to forests, and indeed good forest management, more transparent. 
 
 184
References 
Agger, P. and Sandøe, P. 1998. Use of ‘red lists’ as an indicator of biodiversity. In: 
Cross-cultural protection of nature and the environment. Arler, F., Jensen, J. and 
Svennevig, I. (eds.). Odense: Odense University Press, pp. 61-70. 
Anderson, J.E. 1991. A conceptual framework for evaluating and quantifying 
naturalness.Conservation Biology 5: 347-352. 
Arler, F. 2000a. Bæredygtighed og naturkvalitet. I: Dansk naturpolitik - i 
bæredygtighedens perspektiv. Holten-Andersen, J., Pedersen, T.N., Christensen, 
H.S. and Manninen, S. (eds.). Temarapport nr. 2. Naturrådet, pp. 36-50. 
Arler, F. 2000b. Aspects of landscape or nature quality. Landscape Ecology 15: 291-302. 
Averill, J., Stanat, P. and More, T. 1998. Aesthetics and the environment. Review of 
General Pschycology 18(2): 101-125.  
Bengtson, D. N. 1994. Changing forest values and ecosystem management. Society and 
Natural Resources 7: 515-533. 
Bengtson, D.N., Fan, D.P. and Celarier, D.N. 1999. A new approach to monitoring the 
social environment for natural resource management and policy. The case of US 
national forest benefits and values. Journal of Environmental Management 56: 181-
193. 
Callicott, J.B. 1992. Aldo Leopold’s metaphor. In: Ecosystem health. New goals for 
environmental management. Costanza, R., Norton, B.G. and Haskell, B.D. (eds.). 
Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 42-56. 
Clark, J.S., Merkt, J. and Müller, H. 1989. Post-glacial fire, vegetation, and human 
history on the northern Alpine uplands, south-western Germany. Journal of Ecology 
77: 897-925. 
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992. United Nations. 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp.  
Costanza, R. 1992. Toward an operational definition of ecosystem health. In: Ecosystem 
health. New goals for environmental management. Costanza, R., Norton, B.G. and 
Haskell, B.D. (eds.). Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 239-256. 
 185
Dzwonko, Z. and Loster, S. 1990. Vegetation differentiation and secondary succession 
on a limestone hill in southern Poland. Journal of Vegetation Science 1: 615-622. 
Emborg, J. and Larsen, J.B. 1999. How to develop plantations into forests – in order to 
achieve stability and functional flexibility? A North European perspective. In: 
Proceedings from international experts meeting on the role of planted forests in 
sustainable forest management. Barros, S. and Campodónico, M.I. (eds.). 
Santiago: Corporación Nacional Forestal (CONAF), Ministerio de Agricultura, pp. 
133-147 
Forbes, W. 2000. Values research in natural resource management. Journal of Forestry 
98(7): Focus 1-4. 
Frey, D. 1975. Biological integrity of water: a historical perspective. In: The integrity of 
water. Ballentine, R.K. and Guarraia, L.J. (eds). Washington, DC: Environmental 
Protection Agency, pp. 127-140 
Gilpin, A. 1996. Dictionary of the environment and sustainable development. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Goodin, R.E. 1992. Green political theory. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Jacobi, C. 1908. Forstæstetik. Forstlig diskussionsforening 1907-1908 14, Februar 1908. 
Karr, J.R. and Dudley, D.R. 1981. Ecological perspective on water quality goals.  
Environmental Management 5: 55-68. 
Kennedy, J.J., Dombeck, M.P. and Koch, N.E. 1998. Values, beliefs and management 
of public forests in the Western world at the close of the twentieth century. 
Unasylva 49(192): 16-26. 
Kimmins, J.P. 1996. The health and integrity of forest ecosystems: are they threatened by  
forestry? Ecosystem Health 2: 5-18. 
Kimmins, J.P. 1997. Biodiversity and its relationship to ecosystem health and integrity. 
The Forestry Chronicle 73: 229-232. 
Kolb, T.E., Wagner, M.R. and Covington, W.W. 1994. Concepts of forest health. 
Journal of Forestry 92(7): 10-15. 
Larsen, J.B. 1995. Ecological stability of forest and sustainable silviculture. Forest 
Ecology and Management 73: 85-96. 
 186
Leopold, A. 1949. A Sand County almanac with essays on conservation from Round 
River. New York: Ballantine Books. 
List, P. (ed.) 2000. Environmental ethics and forestry. A reader. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Manning, R. 2000. Convergence in environmental values: An empirical and conceptual 
defense. Ethics, Place and Environment 31: 47-60. 
Manning, R., Valliere, W. and Minteer, B. 1999. Values, ethics and attitudes toward 
national forest management. Society and Natural Resources 12: 421-436. 
Maser, C. 1994. Sustainable forestry: philosophy, science, and economics. Florida: St. 
Lucie Press. 
Maser, C. 1996. Salvage logging. The loss of ecological reason and moral constraint. 
International Journal of Ecoforestry 12(1): 176-178. 
McFarlane, B.L. and Boxall, P.C. 2000. Factors influencing forest values and attitudes 
of two stakeholder groups: The case of the foothills model forest, Alberta, Canada. 
Society and Natural Resources 13: 649-661. 
Minteer, B. and Manning, R. 1999. Pragmatism in environmental ethics: Democracy, 
pragmatism, and the management of nature. Environmental Ethics 21: 191-207. 
More, T., Averill, J. and Stevens, T. 1996. Values and economics in environmental 
management. A perspective and a critique. Journal of Environmental Management 
48: 397-409. 
Møller, P. F. 1999. Naturkvalitet i skov bedømt med hovedvægt på urørt skov. 
Naturkvalitet i skov bedømt med urskovsagtig naturskov som reference. 
Arbejdsrapport. Danmarks og Grønlands Geologiske Undersøgelse. 
Norton, B.G. 1991. Toward unity among environmentalists. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nygaard, B., Mark, S., Baatrup-Pedersen, A., Dahl, K., Ejrnæs, R., Fredshavn, J., 
Hansen, J., Lawesson, J., Münier, B., Møller, P.F., Risager, M., Rune, F., 
Skriver, J. and Søndergaard, M.  1999. Naturkvalitet – kriterier og 
metodeudvikling. Faglig rapport fra DMU nr. 285. DMU, Ministry of Environment 
and Energy. 
 187
O’Neill, J. 1992. The varieties of intrinsic value. The Monist 75: 119-137. 
Olwig, K. 1984. Nature’s ideological landscape. The London Research Series in 
Geography 5. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Patel, A., Rapport, D.J., Vanderlinden, L. and Eyles, J. 1999. Forests and societal 
values: comparing scientific and public perception of health. The Environmentalist 
19: 239-249. 
Pearce, D.W. 1995. Blueprint 4: capturing global value. London: Earthscan. 
Pearce, D.W. and Turner, R.K. 1990. Economics of natural resources and the 
environment. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Peterken, G.F. 1981. Woodland conservation and management. London: Chapman and 
Hall. 
Peterken, G.F. 1996. Natural woodland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pinchot, G. 1905. A primer on forestry. Part II: practical forestry. Bullentin 24, Bureau 
of Forestry, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. Washington, DC: Government printing 
office. 
Pinchot, P. 2000. The perennial challenge for forestry: sustaining biological capital. 
Journal of Forestry 98(11): 64. 
Rune, F. (ed.) 2001. Biodiversitet i dyrket skov. Skovbrugsserien nr. 27. Hørsholm: 
Danish Forest and Landscape Research Institute. 
Rune, F. 1997. Naturkvalitet i skov. Statusrapport. In: Naturovervågning. Indikatorer for 
naturkvalitet. Midtvejsrapport.  Dahl, C., Jensen, J.P., Larsen, H.S., Lawesson, 
J., Mark, S., Mogensen, B., Münier, B., Møller, P.F., Rune, F., Skriver, J., 
Søndergaard, M. and Wind, P. (eds.): Arbejdsrapport fra DMU nr. 42. DMU, 
Ministry of Environment and Energy, pp. 1-36. 
Rune, F. 2000. Nature quality in Danish managed forests. A discussion of the nature 
quality concept and proposal of a hierarchical quality assessment model. 
Manuscript. Danish Forest and Landscape Research Institute. 
Sagoff, M. 1992. Has nature a good of its own? In: Ecosystem health. New goals for 
environmental management. Costanza, R., Norton, B.G. and Haskell, B.D. (eds.). 
Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 57-71. 
 188
Shindler, B. and Cramer, L.A. 1999. Shifting public values for forest management: 
making sense of wicked problems. Western Journal of Applied Forestry 14(1): 28-
34. 
Thoreau, H.D. 1864. The Maine Woods. Edited by J.J. Holdsworth, (1972 edition). 
Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. 
Thorsen, B.J. 1999. Studies in stochastic decision analysis in forest management and the 
behaviour of roundwood prices. Ph.D. Dissertation, Royal Veterinary and 
Agricultural University, Department of Economics and Natural Resources. 
Tilman, D. 2000. Causes, consequences and ethics of biodiversity. Nature 405: 208-211. 
Turner, R.K., Pearce, D. and Bateman, I. 1994. Environmental economics. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Wagner, R.G., Flynn, J., Gregory, R., Mertz, C.K. and Slovic, P. 1998. Acceptable 
practices in Ontario’s forests: Differences between the public and forestry 
professionals. New Forests 16: 139-154. 
Wedell-Neergaard, C. 2001. Anbefalingernes betydning for den private skov- og 
landskabsforvaltning. In: Skov & Landskabskonferencen 2001. Hørsholm: 
Forskningscentret for Skov & Landskab, pp. 21-25. 
Williams, T. 2000. False forests. Mojo Wire May/June 2000. 
http://www.motherjones.com/mother_jones/MJ00/false_forests.html
Xu, Z. and Bengtson, D.N. 1997. Trends in national forest values among forest 
professionals, environmentalists, and the news media, 1982-1993. Society and 
Natural Resources 20: 43-59. 
Zeide, B. 2000 An ill concept? Journal of Forestry 98(11): 1, 53. 
 
 
 
 189
 
The acceptability of forest management practices:  
An analysis of ethical accounting and the ethical matrix 
 
  
Christian Gamborg1
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper the feasibility of using stakeholder approaches to assess forest 
management practices is examined. The paper focuses on two such approaches: the 
idea of ethical accounting developed for livestock farming and the so-called ethical 
matrix. More extensive accounting is needed in forestry. The public is increasingly 
sensitive to, and aware of, the broader impact of forest management, not only on 
human welfare but also on environmental values such as nature conservation and 
biodiversity. Green accounting is being used to assess the environmental effects of 
forestry. In a broader approach such as ethical accounting as developed for livestock 
farming, both the purpose and the type of use that is being made of the forest must be 
examined. It is also necessary to ask which visible or invisible stakeholders are to be 
included. However, it is important to note that the adoption of stakeholder approaches 
does not remove the need to reflect on one’s fundamental ethical position. In fact, one 
must critically consider one’s basic values before applying these approaches to 
forestry.  
 
Keywords: ethical accounting, ethical matrix, forestry, stakeholder, values 
 
                                          
1  Submitted to Forest Policy and Economics. 
 191
1. Introduction 
Modern forest management and forestry practices are characterised by three things in 
particular. First, forestry is a very long-term activity, with one rotation spanning 
several generations. This means that managerial alternatives must be carefully 
considered. Secondly, the profitability of forestry is declining. In many countries 
forest trees are not exactly cash crops, except perhaps where Christmas tree growing 
is concerned, and generally speaking non-commercial values of the forest (e.g. 
ecological, cultural, recreational) are emphasised in planning and management. 
Thirdly, in many industrialised, affluent countries of the sort found in Western 
Europe, the production function of a forest is not necessarily the main concern any 
longer. Many of the efficiency and production-orientated objectives in forestry in the 
industrialised part of the world have been met. However, certain costs of attaining 
these objectives − in, for example, habitat loss and declining natural biodiversity − 
have become apparent in intensively managed forests (Rune, 2001). This has caused 
concern among both environmentalists and the public at large (Krott, 2000; List, 
2000).  
 
Similar types of concern have been expressed about the environmental impact of 
pesticides and fertilisers in modern, industrial agriculture, and with regard to modern 
animal husbandry’s effect on animal welfare (Jensen and Sørensen, 1999; Thompson, 
1995). The shift, in agriculture, animal husbandry and forest management, from a 
focus on sufficient production levels and the price of products to concerns about 
animal welfare, the environment and nature conservation has been influenced by 
demographic changes and by people’s rising levels of welfare. Moreover, there seems 
to be a move in the primary economic sectors, including forestry, from a shareholder-
orientated approach to a broader, stakeholder approach where non-financial interests 
are emphasised. 
 
Governments have reacted to the concerns mentioned above by introducing regulations 
favouring production systems in the primary sector that operate with more than just 
economic aims. Moreover, extended accounting systems intended to assess 
environmental impacts have been developed, sometimes involving certification 
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schemes. However, there also seems to be an interest in finding ways of changing 
management practices in order to act in way that is more ‘ethically correct’ − that is, 
to become accountable, in an ethical sense, for a broad array of concerns expressed by 
various stakeholders, and in this way to achieve, or sustain, stakeholder acceptability.  
 
At present, however, it is unclear what becoming more accountable to stakeholders in 
an ethical sense entails. Ethically correct behaviour is unlikely to be unambiguously 
defined. What such behaviour requires will depend, for example, partly on the 
underlying values of, respectively, the producer and other stakeholders. The definition 
will also depend on how we interpret the notion of a ‘stakeholder’, since this will 
determine who is to be included on a list of relevant stakeholders. Stakeholders are 
often treated as people with an interest, not necessarily a financial interest, in a 
business or activity. However, we also need to know how to strike a balance between 
the potentially conflicting interests, needs or rights of any stakeholders we include. 
Here, two ways of extending accountability developed within the agricultural sector 
may prove useful − if they can be satisfactorily transferred to forestry. 
 
A stakeholder-orientated approach to ethical accounting has been developed for 
livestock farming (Sørensen et al., 1998). This ethical type of account − which is 
drafted so as to complement the farmer’s ordinary financial accounts and 
environmental account − enables the farmer to monitor the impact of management 
practices on selected stakeholders as part of a strategic planning process. Besides 
elaborating the basic values of the farmer, the account describes measures that will 
bring production methods and activities into line with these values. In this approach, 
both the livestock themselves and future human generations are treated as 
stakeholders. This is a novel feature and is not found in other types of ethical account 
(e.g. that developed by Pruzan and Thyssen, 1990).  
 
The other ethical tool that makes use of a stakeholder approach is the so-called ‘ethical 
matrix’. This tool facilitates analysis of the impact of different technologies or 
production systems on ethically relevant affected parties (Mepham, 2000). The matrix 
displays the affected parties in relation to key ethical principles such as well-being and 
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justice. In a specific case, an example is given in each cell stating what consideration 
of the relevant principle might entail in relation to the affected party. The matrix can 
be used in the course of public consultation, where it may enable us to anticipate the 
development of public perceptions and the likely public reaction to coming changes.  
 
The main question to be examined is whether either of these approaches can be 
successfully applied in connection with forestry. Both seem likely to be useful gauges 
of the underlying values of the producer, that is, the forest owner or forest manager. 
Both will probably help us to anticipate responses to changes in management practice 
or to the introduction of new technology. But it is nonetheless necessary to examine 
the ways in which forestry differs from production systems in, for example, animal 
husbandry without presupposing the adaptability of the approaches. For it has been 
argued that, although these approaches might be suitable for assessing which practices 
can be viewed as involving ‘ethically correct behaviour’ in forestry, we need to 
determine their ethical foundation before they can be applied. To examine these 
claims, two examples of the stakeholder approach – the idea of ethical accounting as 
developed for livestock farming and the ethical matrix – will be characterised. In 
connection with each of these examples, the key concepts of extended accountability 
and acceptability in relation to ethical outlook will then be discussed. Finally, the 
applicability of ethical accounting and the ethical matrix to forestry will be examined. 
 
 
2. Extending accountability 
In the sense of the term at issue in the present paper ‘accounting’ can be seen as the 
preparation of a structured overview of the impact of a number of specified actions 
(themselves part of a more comprehensive sequence of events) upon a stated objective.  
 
Often alternative courses of action, designed to meet the stated objective, will need to 
be considered. The objective will guide the weighing-up of these alternatives, or 
rather, the weighing-up of the numerous single actions of which they consist. The 
general purpose of an accounting system is to give a selected group of stakeholders 
accurate information which enables them to control events (Abdel-khalik, 1997). 
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 Stakeholders have previously been understood, almost in the same way as 
shareholders, as persons, or groups of people, who have a personal or financial 
involvement – or stake – in a business. This interpretation is reflected in the New 
Oxford Dictionary of English definition of a stakeholder as a “person with an interest 
or concern in something, especially a business” (Pearsall and Hanks, 1998, emphasis 
added). But more often now, the term ‘stakeholder’ is used in contrast with 
‘shareholder’ to stress that the interest is not necessarily financial and, in particular, 
not necessarily based on the possession of shares in a company. In the broader sense, 
a stakeholder can be seen as somebody who can affect, or be affected by, a certain 
action. Evidently, this increases the number of potential stakeholders that have to be 
taken into consideration when one is deciding on management practices. 
 
The main task of a conventional financial account is to portray a “true and fair” view 
of the economic position and progress of a company (Peasnell, 1993). In this account, 
directors are accountable to shareholders and perhaps creditors, i.e. the de facto 
owners. However, as Perks (1993) points out, there are several non-exclusive ways in 
which accountability can be improved, besides being more effective in general. First, 
more companies or organisations could be accountable. Secondly, companies or 
organisations could be accountable to a wider group of stakeholders. Thirdly, the 
companies or organisations concerned could be accountable for a wider range of 
activities.  
 
Environmental, or so-called green accounting is a way of extending accountability by 
making an organisation or company accountable both to a wider group and for a wider 
range of activities. Here, the shareholder approach is replaced by a stakeholder 
approach and affected parties become the focus. In contrast with an ordinary financial 
account, where money flows are accounted for, a green account measures the resource 
consumption and environmental impact of (say) a business or certain production 
activities (Schaltegger and Burrit, 2000). There seem to be two main reasons for 
including environmental accounting in the accounting portfolio. One is to remain cost 
effective in the event that product prices (e.g. those of agricultural crops or timber) go 
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down or markets become unstable. Another is to be able to document an 
environmentally friendly profile as part of a marketing strategy (Bennet and James, 
1998). 
 
Corporate social reporting is another way of extending accountability. It covers a wide 
variety of reporting by companies and other organisations on wider social and 
economic matters (Perks, 1993). The terms ‘social accounting’ and ‘public interest 
accounting’ are sometimes used to emphasise performance indicators other than profit 
margin. The information disclosed in such a report includes environmental 
performance, energy efficiency, fair business practices, human resources and 
community involvement (ibid). In the early 1970s the main focus was on statements of 
added value, as well as reports on employment and employee reports. In the 1980s 
and 1990s leading reasons for preparing these types of social account included the 
growing interest in ethical investment practices and increased concern about the 
environment. Naturally, what is regarded as ethical and un-ethical varies considerably 
(Perks et al., 1992). 
 
Taking social reporting a step further, Pruzan and Thyssen (1990) have developed the 
idea of an ethical account. Their thesis is that, in a modern society with a plurality of 
values, it is not possible to identify the ‘right’ or ‘true’ set of values (Jensen et al., 
1990). Decisions rest upon these values, and the way to act ethically, according to this 
ethical account, is to make sure that the selected types of stakeholder offer reasoned 
consent to these decisions (Hansen et al., 1990).  
 
This approach is based on a discourse-based ethical foundation on which the rightness 
of an action is a matter of it conforming to a special type of informed agreement. On 
this view of things, the actual process whereby such an agreement is reached is 
crucial. According to Habermas’ (1990) discourse ethics, morality emerges within a 
communication framework. In the conversation, or discourse, all who could be 
affected by the adoption of a certain moral action or normative claim should be 
included. When we make normative statements such as “we ought not to jeopardise 
the interests of future generations”, we either tacitly assume that these norms are valid 
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for all people or argue to bring others to accept our view. According to Habermas, it 
is the communicative activity which, through discourse, leads to universally valid 
claims. In contrast with Rawls’ (1972) contractualist theory of justice, in which it is 
claimed that genuinely binding moral principles are the ones any rational being could 
agree to, there is no “veil of ignorance” in Habermas’ discourse ethics: everybody is 
fully aware of the others’ identities, perspectives and, to some degree, intentions. 
 
In Pruzan and Thyssen’s work, the process of making an ethical account consists of 
three basic steps. First, stakeholders are identified. Secondly, through an “equal” 
dialogue with chosen stakeholders, the shared values that the company or organisation 
should focus on are established.2 Thirdly, in a way that reflects these shared values, 
certain criteria that the company has to meet are set up (Pruzan, 1994). The important 
thing in this type of accounting is the process of levelling and entering a dialogue with 
the identified stakeholders and in this way gaining acceptance of actions and practices 
(Pruzan, 2000).  
 
Does this approach have any obvious shortcomings? In forestry a great variety of 
stakeholders have to be considered, and some of these stakeholders will not have the 
capacity for speech. Moreover, Pruzan and Thyssen’s ethical account does not seem 
to register special interests, such as those of future generations, which are not 
ordinarily expressible in a practical discourse. For reasons such as these, it is time we 
looked in earnest at ethical accounting as developed for livestock and the ethical 
matrix.  
                                          
2  Certain conditions, which Habermas (1990) stated as three principles for developing these norms 
in a practical discourse, have to be met. First, all affected parties must accept the consequences 
and side effects with regard to the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (with alternative 
possibilities in principle known). Secondly, only those norms that meet, or could meet, with the 
approval of all affected parties in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse can be 
included. Thirdly, consensus can only be achieved if the participants participate freely. Equality 
and freedom of participation and expression are basic notions in the discourse. More 
specifically, procedural rules for the ideal speech situation are set up. These include the rule that 
every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse, the 
rule that everyone is allowed to introduce whatever assertions he or she desires and to express 
his or her attitudes, desires and needs, and the rule that no speaker may be prevented by 
coercion from exercising his or her rights. 
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3. Ethical accounting as developed for livestock farming and the 
ethical matrix 
The purpose of an ethical account in the context of livestock farming is “to report on 
the consequences for all parties affected and ensure that the farmer makes explicit 
ethical priorities” (Sørensen et al., 2001:1).  
 
The idea is to monitor the consequences of management practices and, having become 
aware of those consequences, to relate them to explicitly stated ethical priorities. This 
approach does not offer simple prescriptions, but it can be used as an advisory tool 
that offers elementary guidance on activities and practices. When used as part of a 
decision-making procedure, or in relation to a strategic planning process, the ethical 
account enables the farmer to improve his or her awareness of possible needs for 
change – for example, in a daily practice. Equally, it may alert the farmer to the need 
for a different balancing of concerns. An important part of the strategic planning 
process is the drafting of alternative plans in which different concerns are emphasised. 
In ethical accounting it is essential that the farmer agree to all of the ethical 
considerations that are needed to evaluate the alternative plans.  
 
Contemporary interest in ethical accounts in livestock farming can be seen as a 
response to growing public concern about animal welfare (Jensen and Sørensen, 
1999). However, animal welfare is but one of the concerns that people have about 
modern animal husbandry. Others are of an economic or ecological nature. By setting 
up an ethical account, it should be possible to combine the objective of increased 
animal welfare with other goals. The concern for animal welfare is an ethical concern 
in the sense that it is considered morally unacceptable to produce dairy products, meat 
and so on in a way that causes animal suffering (Jensen, 1996).  
 
Why is it beneficial to the farmer and society at large to engage in process of ethical 
accounting? Jensen and Sørensen (1999) offer two main reasons. First, farmers may 
be motivated to adjust their management practice after being confronted with 
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information about how their current practice negatively affects the interests of other 
parties. Secondly, if farmers want to act in accordance with the ethical concerns they 
themselves agree to they need guidelines on assessing their current practice. As the 
possible changes in production methods result in changes in management objectives, it 
becomes necessary to determine which trade-offs have to be made if new objectives 
conflict with existing ones. The preparation of an ethical account is a learning process 
for the farmer, and one in which he or she learns to recognise the underlying value 
assumptions of practices and to operationalise these fundamental values (Sørensen et 
al., 1998). 
 
The ethical account for livestock farming is based on a conception of ethical behaviour 
originating in the ‘Golden Rule’: always act in a way that you would like others to act 
towards you. The main concern is with the actual or expected consequences of one’s 
actions upon others – the stakeholders. This contrasts with the idea of ethical 
accounting developed by Pruzan and Thyssen (1990). In that approach, the focus of 
attention is the dialogue with stakeholders, whereas for Sørensen et al. (2001) ethical 
action involves the consideration of the effects of one’s actions on all affected parties, 
regardless of any actual or potential dialogue. In the latter, broadly consequentialist 
approach, the identification of stakeholders – including those unable to influence 
decisions and/or unable to voice their concerns – obviously becomes an important 
task. 
 
In a Danish project piloting the ethical account for livestock farming four groups of 
stakeholders were identified: (1) the producer (i.e. the farmer), (2) consumers, (3) 
livestock, and (4) future generations. There is a greater number and a greater variety 
of stakeholders in this approach than there is in the approach originating from Pruzan 
and Thyssen (1990). Concerns relating to the natural environment and long-term 
biodiversity are seen as stemming from the more basic interests of present and 
(especially) future generations. However, because not all of the affected parties can – 
and nor perhaps should they – be accorded equal weight, some interests are bound to 
be furthered at the expense of others. In an ethical account, however, the choices 
involved in balancing different stakeholder interests become more transparent.  
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 Let us turn now to the ethical matrix developed by Mepham (2000). The purpose of 
this matrix is to facilitate the ethical assessment of production systems: “The Matrix 
permits analysis of the ethical impacts of any production system (e.g. the application 
of a biotechnology) from the perspective of the different groups affected by its 
employment” (Mepham, 2000: 168). The ethical matrix is conceived of as one 
element in a process of decision-making following public consultation on ethically 
sensitive issues. 
 
The general idea of the ethical matrix is to provide a framework for rational ethical 
analysis. In this framework three criteria are employed. These criteria represent an 
adaptation of four ethical principles – non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and 
justice – originally introduced by Beauchamp and Childress (1994) in connection with 
medical cases.3 In the ethical matrix, these original principles are applied to a wider 
group of individuals than Beauchamp and Childress envisaged and the first two are 
converted into one criterion: well-being. To act in an ‘ethical way’, according to the 
ethical matrix approach, is to carefully consider the observance of the three principles 
in connection with chosen stakeholders. 
 
To meet the criterion of well-being, the new technology or production system must 
yield quantitative and qualitative benefits to the stakeholder in question. For instance, 
genetically modified crops may raise the level of production or be of immediate 
economic benefit both to the farmer and consumers. But they may also bring benefits 
of other kinds: for example, by leading to healthier products, better conserved natural 
biodiversity or a cleaner environment. A positive effect on well-being, health and so 
on is a generally considered a prerequisite if the risks associated with a new 
technology or production system are to be accepted (Biotechnology and the European 
Public Concerted Action Group, 1997). 
 
                                          
3  Mepham (2000) is used in the following paragraph as the main source of the idea of an ethical 
matrix. 
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To meet the criterion of autonomy, new production methods must treat affected 
individuals as autonomous and independent, and not just as instruments serving a 
technical, scientific or economic purpose. Here, the question whether this includes 
sentient and non-sentient animals, and plants, as well as human beings, and if so, what 
degree of manipulation or utilisation is to be considered an infringement of autonomy, 
arises. In view of this, discussion of inter alia how one displays respect for non-
sentient living organisms will be necessary. 
 
The principles of well-being and autonomy reflect both consequential as well as non-
consequential features of production. The third criterion, of justice as fairness, 
requires us to ensure a just distribution of goods, on the one hand, and responsibilities 
or burdens, on the other. This principle is Rawlsian in nature. Mepham notes that, in 
an early paper, Rawls (1951) addresses the question of finding a “reasonable” 
decision procedure – that is to say, a procedure through which, and by “rational 
means of enquiry”, preference can be given to one interest over another in cases 
where they conflict (Rawls, 1951:177, quoted in Mepham, 2000: 166). Distributional 
justice can be intra- or intergenerational. Some might argue that it can arise between 
and among species as well. It is debatable what is entailed by the concept of fairness. 
 
The ethical matrix cannot be used to determine which kinds of technology or 
production system ought to be promoted and which kinds ought not. It is merely a 
framework that helps to ensure that the ethical aspects of production are examined in a 
systematic way. As such, it gives some guidance where future activity is concerned. 
Moreover, it may also serve as a starting point for a discussion of some of the ethical 
principles and concepts it deploys – for example, well-being, distributional justice and 
the vulnerability and integrity of natural ecosystems.  
 
Ethical accounting for livestock farming and the ethical matrix extend accountability 
by expanding the range of activities to which accountability attaches and increasing the 
number of stakeholders to whom accountability, or at least ethical consideration, is 
owed. This latter notion – the key notion of a stakeholder − will be discussed at the 
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start of the next section. In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 the applicability of ethical 
accounting and the ethical matrix to forestry will be examined. 
 
 
4. Ethical issues in extending accountability to forest management 
In general, extending accountability over a wider group and greater range of activities 
presents some problems. First, who is to be included in the list of stakeholders? 
Secondly, are all stakeholders entitled to the same degree of consideration where their 
well-being (or some other valued state) is concerned?  
 
The first question here asks who is considered an ethically relevant stakeholder. The 
definition of stakeholder rests on the notion of interests. To be a stakeholder, one 
must be able to express, or at least be capable of having, interests. This raises the 
further question of how broadly interests are defined. Are interests to be understood 
as legal rights, the having of, or capacity to have, a preference for something? Human 
beings can express interests and future generations seem capable of having interests 
although they are not able to express them. Furthermore, according to one class of 
ethical theories, sentient animals are also seen as being capable of having interests. 
This inclusion seems to be largely accepted. More debatable is the question of 
ascribing interest to non-sentient animals and plants or even entire ecosystems. Often, 
the notion of an interest is based on the possession of a nervous system. On this 
account it becomes difficult to talk about the interests of nature − for example, of 
being in one ecological state instead of another.  
 
The second question asks whether all stakeholders are entitled to the same degree of 
consideration. It is often the case that some stakeholders deserve greater consideration 
than others. Besides the degree to which a person or group is affected by a certain 
action, place in the moral hierarchy also plays a significant role in determining how 
much consideration should be given. Traditionally, close persons or groups − in the 
spatio-temporal, or some other, more culturally determined, sense − are given more 
consideration than their more distant equivalents (Nash, 1989). In a business context, 
for example, an employee could well be given more consideration than a competitor. 
 202
However, differences in consideration also relate sometimes to the degree to which 
certain stakeholders are able to voice their concerns. Here, sentient animals as well as 
future generations face a problem. One way to solve this would be to designate 
spokespersons for these stakeholders. However, in this way the stakeholders would 
not be directly represented, for example, in a dialogue. Another response, which is 
adopted in the ethical account for livestock farming, is to introduce an assessment of 
the actual and expected consequences for the stakeholder. This can be done through 
the incorporation of, for example, different types of environmental account where 
enhanced accountability may be the outcome. This is clearly an improvement, but it 
nevertheless incorporates an interpretation of the needs and demands of, for example, 
future generations through the selection of criteria and indicators to be included in the 
sub-account.  
 
A framework for categorising the different stakeholders provided by Rubenstein 
(1994) provides a useful way to look at stakeholders. Rubenstein distinguishes 
between “visible” and “invisible” stakeholders. Visible stakeholders, who usually 
have an economic interest, include so-called contractual and interdependent 
stakeholders. Contractual stakeholders are traditional shareholders with a direct 
financial or contractual interest in the company’s or organisation’s activities. 
Interdependent stakeholders include customers, employees and the government. They 
and the company or organisation enjoy mutual economic dependence.  
 
Invisible stakeholders, on the other hand, have largely been recognised as having 
interest in the activities and practices of an organisation only during the last fifty years 
(Rubenstein, 1994). They can be divided into two groups: current and future 
generations. In many cases, the interests of these stakeholders − sometimes called 
survival interests − are of a non-economic nature. The stakeholders include any 
humans and non-humans who are more or less directly affected by an organisation’s 
activities or management practice (e.g. because their health is at stake). Users of 
shared resources are also invisible stakeholders.  This is worth highlighting, since 
shared users are especially relevant in a multiple-use forestry context. Future 
generations are another group of invisible stakeholders. An example of interests of 
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future generations in a forestry context could be equity in terms of natural resources. 
The existence of these stakeholders evidently depends upon our choice. Obviously, 
they cannot, as is the case with some stakeholders in the former group, speak for 
themselves. They need either a spokesperson who can speak on their behalf or to have 
the expected consequences of any activity that might affect them assessed.  
 
4.1 Ethical accounting and forestry 
The four groups of stakeholders identified in ethical accounting for livestock farming 
include both visible and invisible stakeholders. The producer, including potential 
shareholders or creditors, and the consumers (i.e. customers) appear in the visible 
group of stakeholders, whereas livestock and future generations are part of the 
invisible group of stakeholders.  
 
There are notable differences between farming and forestry. A well-rehearsed 
difference relates to the planning, decision-making and management timescale, which 
is far longer in forestry. For the forest manager it is especially important to be able to 
judge future developments and assess whether current trends will persist or are merely 
the consequence of short-term politics. This is because changes, and especially 
reversals of earlier commitments, often cannot easily be made.  
 
The most important difference between ethical accounting on livestock farms and in 
forestry may be the much greater number of diverse, visible and invisible stakeholders 
who benefit from the forest or are (directly or indirectly) affected in some other way 
by management practices. In most cases, forests, including privately owned forests, 
are used by many others besides the owner, his or her family, the management team 
and contractors. Customers, for example, emerge as quite a varied group when one 
takes into account the amount of so-called immaterial goods and services the forest 
can provide. Increasingly, customers want information about the full cost of forestry, 
including the cost in natural resources consumed in the process of producing timber 
and non-timber forest products. Environmentally aware customers are especially 
concerned with the forest’s management performance as measured by the set of 
criteria for sustainable temperate forest management.  
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 Often the forest is managed under some form of a multiple-use scheme and generates, 
among other things, timber, wildlife and recreational interests. Accordingly, members 
of the public who use a forest for recreational purposes are included in the group of 
invisible stakeholders. Special interest groups, such as associations of birdwatchers or 
nature conservation societies, require information on the size of clear cuts, the use of 
herbicides or the harvesting of old growth stands. These special interest groups are 
sometimes seen as spokespersons for other groups of invisible stakeholders, including 
future generations and perhaps some specific groups of animal species, such as the 
birds. The interests of future generations are far more salient in forestry settings as a 
result of the obvious fact that the mere process of growing trees normally spans 
several generations and is inherently, in this sense, an intergenerational activity.4  
 
However, in a multiple-use forest, several interests will need to be addressed at the 
same time and on the same piece of land. Consequently, none of the invisible 
stakeholders appear on the management agenda as prominently, or straightforwardly, 
as farm animals do in an ethical account for a livestock farm. This may have 
ramifications within the selection process. 
 
Once stakeholders have been selected, it is necessary to identify the activities for 
which they can legitimately demand accountability. As a result of the longer 
timescales in forestry, and because of the difficulties inherent in predicting the long-
term, accumulated consequences of management practices on the abiotic and biotic 
parts of a forest ecosystem, accountability may be more elusive here than it is in 
livestock farming. If an ethical account in forestry is to be produced over a period of 
consecutive years, it is important that the statement can withstand scrutiny in, for 
example, twenty years; and twenty years is a relatively short period of time in a 
forestry context. Finally, in assessing the feasibility of ethical accounting in forestry, 
we need to ask what scale of forestry might be relevant. 
 
                                          
4  Notable exceptions in Europe are short-rotation fuelwood coppices and Christmas tree growing. 
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Experiences from the Danish project piloting ethical accounting for a livestock farm 
have shown that the process of ethical accounting can be costly as well as time 
consuming, albeit rewarding for the farmer. Often, small-scale forestry is a secondary 
source of income, or perhaps a source of other benefits (hunting, soil protection or 
aesthetic pleasures), for the farmer. Where this is so, the forest is not very likely to be 
included in the accounting process.  
 
Moving on to the private forest industry, which derives a substantial part of its income 
from large-scale forest-based operations, we may expect that ethical accounting will 
be relevant. However, since there is no ‘correct’ bottom line in this kind of account, 
the incentive to engage in it is probably limited. 
 
Those involved in each of these types of forestry are likely to be more interested in 
meeting International Standards Organization (ISO) standards on harvesting 
operations. These standards can be met as part of a certification process. They form 
part of an environmental accounting process that is more prescriptive than the ethical 
account. One incentive that forestry companies have for joining a certification scheme 
is the likelihood that value will thereby be added to their products. Certification may 
indeed be a condition of being able to market and sell the timber or non-timber 
products at all. Larger forest corporations may be interested in showing their 
willingness to accept ethical accountability to a wide group of stakeholder, or to 
society as such. The question is whether they will engage in the certification and 
auditing processes, or prepare an ethical account, in the way described in the ethical 
account for livestock farming. It is important in the ethical account that the producer 
is genuinely interested in engaging in ethical thinking; but this kind of genuine interest 
might be hard to find in larger corporations. 
 
If ethical accounting is to be used in forestry, it will be at the level of planning and 
management. By using the ethical account, the planner and manager may be better 
able to gauge the impact of future activities on stakeholders. It may be argued that in a 
planning and management context, contemplating and anticipating the impacts of 
practices and activities is as crucial as having one’s practices certified.  
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 4.2 The ethical matrix and forestry 
The ethical matrix allows us to explore the underlying ethical aspects of new 
developments in forestry such as the use of genetically modified trees and the use of 
exotic species. In Table 1 an ethical matrix is applied to an imagined case in which 
genetically modified trees are used in commercial forestry.  
 
 
Table 1. An ethical matrix showing the bearing of three ethical principles on five 
affected parties in connection with a proposal to use genetically modified trees in 
forestry 
 
Affected party 
 
Ethical principle 
 
 
 
 
 
Well-being 
 
Autonomy 
 
Justice 
 
Producer 
 
Profitability and 
adequate working 
conditions 
 
Freedom to adopt 
or not adopt 
 
Fair treatment in 
trade and law 
 
Consumer 
 
Availability of wood 
and non-timber forest 
products 
 
Choice  
(e.g. labelling) 
 
Universal 
affordability 
 
Society 
 
Gross domestic 
product 
 
 
Democratic  
decision-making 
 
Fairness in  
global trade 
 
Future generations 
 
Possibilities for 
meeting diverse needs 
 
Choice and 
democratic  
decision-making 
 
Intergenerational 
fairness 
 
Biota 
 
Conservation  
of the biota 
 
 
Maintenance of 
biodiversity 
 
Natural 
dynamics of the 
biotic 
populations 
 
Source: based on Mepham (2000). 
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The stated purposes of genetically modifying forest tree species are to improve 
herbicide, insect, pest, drought and cold resistance; and to change specific properties 
of the timber − for example, to lower the lignin content of the wood in order to reduce 
the need for chemicals in a wood pulping process (Mullin and Bertrand, 1998; 
Tømmerås et al., 1996). 
 
The ethical matrix shown in Table 1 embodies just three ethical principles: well-being, 
autonomy and justice. However, other principles can of course be included. The 
principle of participation and openness in the decision making process, for instance, 
appears in an example given in BioTIK-gruppen (1999). This principle is elaborated in 
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, also known as The Aarhus 
convention (1998). The aim of this Convention is to simplify access to environmental 
information and, relatedly, to improve public participation in the making of decisions 
that could have an impact on the environment. 
 
The affected parties in the matrix in Table 1 are the producers, the consumers, 
society, future generations and the biota. The producers may be forest managers 
acting on behalf of forest owners. Consumers here represent, as it were, the common 
laws and common interests under which producers and consumers act. Future 
generations, as an affected party, are especially relevant in a forestry context where 
the production period may be well over 100 years and thus span several human 
generations. ‘Biota’ is used in this context as a collective term for all other living 
organisms. This contrasts with an alternative approach in which certain elements of 
the forest’s wildlife are singled out and afforded special consideration. In an animal 
husbandry situation or in relation to genetic engineering involving sentient animals, 
the latter approach would be more appropriate. 
 
The matrix can be used by a panel − consisting of, for example, scientific experts, 
members of (local) government, representatives of administrative agencies and other 
public bodies, representatives from private industry as well members of the public − 
to consult on a specific issue. In the consultation process, ‘spokespersons’ for each 
 208
affected party present their (so to speak) client’s cases, outlining the pros and cons. 
Each panellist, and each member of the audience, is then given a copy of the matrix 
similar to the one shown in Table 1. After the presentation of the case and any ensuing 
discussion, participants indicate in each cell of the matrix whether they feel that the 
ethical principle is likely to upheld, violated or unaffected by the proposed 
technology, production system or practice. By collating these responses, it is possible 
to obtain a “verdict” – that is, a measurement of the prevailing “ethical mood” among 
the participants (Mepham et al., 1997). 
 
It should be noted that the handling procedure outlined above is in a process of 
continuous development and generally needs to be adapted to individual cases. It must 
also be stressed that the ethical matrix is not a special type of opinion poll. Rather 
than testing the participant’s untutored opinions, it is to be used in a process in which 
arguments and the opinions they purport to justify are tested and then developed, 
accepted or rejected by the participants as they see fit. 
 
One particular thing that needs to be considered when the matrix is applied in a 
forestry context is whether the affected party labelled ‘biota’ in Table 1 should be 
subdivided into groups of animals. In situations where a proposed management change 
is likely to have a profound effect on some elements of the forest’s fauna, it could be 
helpful to single these elements out. For example, deer might be best treated 
separately in connection with nature-based silviculture. Another thing that needs to be 
considered is whether, for example, trees or other plants should be listed as individual 
affected parties. For the past thirty years, discussion has taken place within 
environmental ethics about extended rights and moral standing (see Stone, 1974), the 
ascription of intrinsic value (see Attfield, 1981; Callicott, 1986) or duties (see 
Rolston, 1988) to non-sentient animals and plants. At the centre of this discussion is 
the general idea of a non-anthropocentric ethic. Over time the discussion has focused 
in turn on rights, intrinsic value and duties. Recently, what Johnson (1991, quoted in 
List, 2000) calls “well-being interests” became the topic. However, from an 
opposing, anthropocentric point of view it may be argued that these considerations can 
be captured just as well by appealing to the interests of (say) future generations. 
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 It may seem that in principle the ethical matrix only allows for an ethical criterion’s 
being either respected or not respected. It may be objected that in many situations 
there is bound to be a trade-off process, and that therefore the question concerns the 
extent to which an infringement of a principle is acceptable. However, in a public 
consultation on the marketing of genetically modified food where the ethical matrix 
was applied, the option of finding that the principles, or criteria, were likely to be 
neither “respected” nor “infringed” was available (Mepham et al., 1997). Moreover, 
in that consultation responses such as “not sure” and “don’t know” were legitimate. A 
large number of neutral responses and “not sure’s” might indicate that the 
acceptability of violations of the relevant principle or criterion depends on the degree 
of manipulation. If the pros and cons were introduced in a more elaborate way, the 
debate might be polarised, but the achievement of such polarisation is certainly not the 
idea behind the ethical matrix (Mepham et al., 1997). 
 
The ethical matrix may be used to probe the acceptability of forest management 
practices; and it may help to guide the process of finding a more or less acceptable 
degree of manipulation in a forest at the overall policy level. In the European context 
it is often not a question of whether to manipulate or intervene, but rather of what 
degree of manipulation or intervention is acceptable. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The desirability of applying the ethical account as developed for livestock farming 
and/or the ethical matrix to assess the impact of activities and practices in forestry 
depends on the following factors: the main purpose of using a stakeholder orientated 
approach, the level of use, how prescriptive it should be, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the approach. Both approaches seem to have a potential use in 
forestry as tools that extend accountability and help us to judge the acceptability of 
management practices.  
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In contrast with more simple prescriptive approaches, both approaches are perhaps 
most aptly thought of as facilitating methods. Ethical accounting and the ethical matrix 
are not intended to yield ‘correct’ answers. By comparison, environmental accounting 
is an extended accounting process. It is prescriptive and operates with minimum 
standards. The two kinds of approach must be seen as complementary rather than as 
alternatives, because they work on different levels. The ethical account developed for 
livestock farming and the ethical matrix can be used to create more transparency in the 
decision-making process, whether at the planning and management level or at the 
political level. Each of these approaches offers a way of preparing for the future. Each 
examines the likely effects of, for example, potential changes in management practice 
with regard to stakeholders.  
 
If these methods are to be used in forest management, the many types of ownership, 
multiple-use management objectives and the variety of functions of a forest will 
require careful consideration. In a specific case, these matters need to be resolved 
before an ethical account can be constructed. Moreover, it has to be recognised that 
the combination of the large number of (visible and invisible) stakeholders in a 
forestry context and the fact that a forest has many diverse values makes stakeholder-
based approaches both more attractive and more difficult to apply. The discourse-
based ethical account developed by Pruzan and Thyssen (1990) only operates with 
visible stakeholders − that is, with people who are plainly in a position to influence the 
corporation or organisation. The ethical account developed for livestock farming 
includes invisible stakeholders as well, and the ethical matrix makes possible the 
inclusion of invisible stakeholders as affected parties. However, while these 
reflections about purpose and level of use are necessary they are, as yet, inconclusive.  
 
Most importantly, in determining the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the 
main purpose, of these approaches, an ethical attitude has to be chosen before the 
approach itself. The choice of ethically relevant stakeholders depends on one’s ethical 
attitude and the choice of ethically relevant principles to incorporate in the ethical 
matrix depends on one’s preferred ethical platform. Moreover, whether one favours 
an approach to ‘ethically correct’ behaviour in which ethical consequences are 
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emphasised − as opposed, for example, to a discourse ethical approach − also depends 
on ethical outlook. As tools that may assist us in acting in an ‘ethical way’, the ethical 
account and the ethical matrix certainly should not be regarded as a panaceas. Critical 
consideration of one’s basic ethical outlook and underlying values is still necessary 
before these approaches can be used in connection with forestry. 
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